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Abstract 
 
Crisis Management 
Aligning scripts and actors:  Strengthening crisis response 
capabilities by minimising process deviation 
The present business resilience paradigm has expanded to embrace the 
processes and routines employed by a business to remain viable, sustain growth 
and recover (if required) in what for many people has become a complex global 
operating environment. Sutcliffe (2003, p. 2) defines resilience as “the 
maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions” and the 
combination of proactive routines such as enterprise risk management and 
reactive routines such as crisis management create the overarching umbrella of 
business resilience.  Whether they are proactive or reactive, ostensive routines 
form the framework and script from which organisations operate and strive for 
such ‘positive adjustment’. The business challenge, particularly in crisis 
management, is to ensure the effective interpretation and performance of 
ostensive routines during events that have the potential to play out on the 
world stage.   
This research examines an observed phenomenon in business, which is the 
deviation between ostensive and performative routines during crisis 
management responses. Human nature is such that there will often be a 
difference between the script and the performance. In crisis management, 
issues are created when the gap between the performance and ostensive 
routine grows too large, or, following an acting metaphor, where actors forget 
what they have practiced in rehearsals and create their own script.  Such 
deviation has been observed repeatedly and most critically in the first 24 to 48 
hours of a response when it is arguably the most important period in which to 
follow the script and apply the correct routines.  The aetiology of deviations 
between a crisis management script and its production is the focus of this 
research. This addresses a gap in the crisis management literature which, while 
spread across multiple streams including leadership and teams, is at times 
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incoherent.  Utilising a case study approach focusing on the fast-moving 
consumer goods (FMCG) sector, this research analyses the potential causes of 
process deviation. In evaluating two specific dynamics the research collected 
empirical data to address the question of how ostensive and performative 
routines interact in a crisis management situation and what factors contribute 
to deviations from ostensive routines. By answering this question, a theory is 
developed to explain the deviation. 
The first dynamic focused on reviewing the tools and routines and sought to 
establish if deviation is due to routines being ineffective, and whether this is 
combined with a lack of process maintenance and updating, after an actual 
crisis. That is, essentially: are routines and artefacts the cause of the deviation? 
The second dynamic evaluated whether the deviation is human-related. It 
analysed whether deviation is driven by the casting and experience of the team 
members or the actions of the crisis leader in directing the team. While this 
research focuses on the root cause of the deviation from an FMCG perspective it 
argues that the findings are applicable across industry sectors. The research 
confirms that the following theory applies: 
“Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The 
process deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response 
occurs due to human dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the 
members of the crisis team and the crisis leader. The core causes of 
deviation are ineffective crisis leadership and weaknesses in the crisis team 
structure.” 
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Chapter 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Business Resilience and Crisis Management 
In recent years, business resilience has transformed as a concept into a renewed 
paradigm that embraces the processes and routines that are employed by a 
business to remain viable, sustain growth and recover when required, in a 
complex global operating environment. Conceptually, it is argued that business 
resilience now transcends traditional theory that saw it largely focused on 
business recovery. Today it embraces broader dynamics that include both 
preventative and responsive routines, which when fully adopted enable 
businesses to remain resilient and grow.    
The importance of business resilience stems from the fact that multi-national 
companies in the 21st century operate in an environment influenced by 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (Dobbs, Manyika, & Woetzel, 
2015). Today, businesses need to do certain things well to manage this 
complexity.  These activities are clustered into five streams. Businesses need to: 
▪ understand their risks and opportunities and proactively adapt to 
changing circumstances; 
▪ utilise an exceptional internal and external risk radar to detect changes 
in their operational environment; 
▪ build strong internal and external functional collaboration networks; 
▪ work proactively to minimise exposures and leverage opportunity; and 
▪ be able to respond rapidly and decisively to a crisis. 
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Resilience as a concept is difficult to define and can depend on the stream being 
studied. Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003 p.2) define resilience as “the maintenance of 
positive adjustment under challenging conditions” and it is a combination of 
proactive and reactive routines that creates the overarching umbrella of 
business resilience. The concept is intertwined with risk management as a 
process for managing uncertainty in a proactive manner. Hence, the concept 
extends beyond one of simple recovery, as positive adjustment is arguably both 
a preventative and a responsive routine.  Routines form the foundation of the 
supporting capabilities and exist to guide the process, whether their focus is on 
proactive elements such as risk management or on reactive elements such as 
the execution of business continuity plans.  
Within the business resilience model resides a core response element: crisis 
management. Crisis is also a complex term to describe but at its essence crises 
are the “unforeseen challenges that come from outside the normal course of 
business to threaten the health, and even the survival, of the firm. Crises such as 
product recalls, environmental accidents and natural disasters have challenged 
corporations and their crisis management teams since the first commercial 
enterprise opened its door” (Coghlan, 2017, p. 3).  Therefore, in a business 
context, effective crisis management requires that crisis management teams 
follow process, procedures and routines to deliver the most appropriate and 
efficient management of the response. To do otherwise can result in a variety of 
consequences.  In a worst case this could include the death of employees or 
members of the public; destruction of property and assets; significant 
reputational damage; and financial impacts either through the loss of business 
or stemming through fines or class actions.  
Furthermore, an effective and consistent approach is essential since a crisis can 
evoke multiple emotions across stakeholders, distract leadership from the core 
business, and potentially irreversibly damage the reputation of a business.  The 
four years during which the research projected in this thesis was undertaken, 
has seen an apparent escalation in the occurrences of crises (or at least their 
reporting), and during an organisation’s lifecycle many managers will be faced 
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with a crisis.  In these instances, managers need to activate and apply ostensive 
crisis management routines to effectively respond to the situation.  However, 
this is often easier said than done.  This research project analyses a pattern of 
behaviour that has been observed on multiple occasions by the researcher, 
during eighteen years of crisis management experience in the private sector. 
This behaviour is where crisis teams fail to use, or incorrectly use, the ostensive 
routines and related artefacts during a crisis response. Specifically, where 
routines exist, and teams are trained to follow them, there is an observed 
propensity to deviate from the script and to neglect the existing artefacts that 
are designed to guide a crisis team to a conclusion that minimises negative 
impacts to the business.  This leads to the core purpose of the research which is 
to examine how ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis 
management situation within a business context and to understand what factors 
contribute to deviations from the routines. 
From the outset, it is acknowledged that the extant literature on crisis 
management and routines addresses a variety of themes ranging from training 
to communication and leadership behaviour.  However, the aetiology of 
deviation between script and production and associated team dynamics in a 
business crisis response scenario, where direct response observation have been 
made, coupled with the interviewing of subject matter experts, has not been the 
focus of previous work.  This is linked to the observation that crisis 
management research and in particular research into the role of crisis 
leadership, is “often criticized for its lack of specificity” and “few scholars have 
considered the role of resource dependence in crisis situations” (Bundy, Pfarrer, 
Short, & Coombs, 2016, p. 1672 & 1682). This study addresses this gap in the 
existing narratives and targets the lack of specificity assessing crisis 
management deviation and leadership within an operational business context. 
These elements are critical areas for businesses, as they need to be prepared to 
respond to crisis in a world in which managing uncertainty is the new norm. 
This specific gap in knowledge further defined by extensive research in the field 
of crisis management has illustrated the existence of two main strands of 
literature (Bundy et al., 2016). 
 4 
 
The first strand addresses internal organisational elements. For these scholars: 
“crisis management involved the coordination of complex technical and 
relational systems and the design of organizational structures to prevent the 
occurrence, reduce the impact and learn from a crisis” (Bundy et al., 2016, p. 
1664). The second research strand addresses the external perspective, where 
the focus is on stakeholder management, which incorporates extensively the 
elements of external crisis communications.   Bundy et al also analysed crisis 
research in respect of the leadership elements of crisis management. 
Interestingly, they found that the research focus has been on the classical 
elements of leadership with a focus on the tactical response, together with the 
interrelationships between pre-crisis and post crisis leadership versus the 
actual application of leadership in the crisis team during the management of the 
crisis. Research has also focused on the conditional factors such as the role of 
the board and the nature of the response by a CEO  (Bundy et al., 2016, pp. 1670 
-1671).  They went on to conclude that “the internal perspective suggests that 
leaders are critical to the crisis management process and that a number of 
factors influence their ability to lead. However, much like research on 
organizational preparedness, research on crisis leadership is often criticized for 
its lack of specificity” and “few scholars have considered the role of resource 
dependence in crisis situations.” Therefore, “research on specific actions and 
processes may also inform research on crisis management” (Bundy et al., 2016, 
p. 1672 & 1682). 
The present research, into the aetiology of deviation during a crisis response by 
crisis teams is critical, as it addresses this gap in specific crisis management 
theory.  It thereby responds to the concerns expressed by Bundy et al (Bundy et 
al., 2016) on the lack of specificity in respect to crisis leadership and response. 
Importantly, it also makes recommendations on additional areas of research 
focus, with the added benefit of having a practical application in the business 
environment.   Ultimately the concepts of rapid, decisive and, most importantly, 
effective crisis management sit at the heart of this study, for the reality is that 
“bad things happen to good companies. Media decry mistakes, missteps and 
misdeeds. Stakeholders fear the performance of their investments. Customers 
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question loyalty … and in the end the outcomes are determined by how 
companies behave – by what they do, how they do it and when they do it’” 
(Caywood & Englehart, 2003, p. 2).   It is here, in the ‘heat of the battle’ that the 
performance of the crisis management team (CMT) can mean the difference 
between success and failure and enhancing performance and minimising 
process deviation can contribute to a positive outcome. 
Table 1 – Key Definitions 
Business 
Resilience 
The ability of a business to manage uncertainty and maintain 
positive adjustment under challenging conditions while enabling 
growth. This is achieved through the implementation of 
preparedness measures (e.g. ERM, security, training) and 
effective reactive measures (e.g. crisis management, business 
continuity, disaster recovery) that provide fundamental 
response mechanisms (Anderson, 2014; Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017; 
Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003).  
Crisis A popular evocative word derived from the Greek word ‘krisis’. A 
crisis is not limited to circumstances of emergency and disaster 
but can refer to tensions that call for critical judgments, 
exercising critique, reflexivity that would inform decisions 
reached and actions taken (Antonacopoulou, 2014). 
Routine A routine is a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent 
actions (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Mante & Sydow, 2007; 
Pentland, Hærem, & Hillison, 2010). In its basic format “an 
organizational routine is not a single pattern but, rather, a set of 
possible patterns—enabled and constrained by a variety of 
organizational, social, physical, and cognitive structures—from 
which organizational members enact particular performances” 
(Pentland & Hueter, 1994, p. 461).  
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1.2  A Theoretical Foundation  
Driving the importance and relevance of the research is the fact that businesses 
are regularly confronted by crisis situations.  Crises can cut across all sectors 
and therefore minimising the financial and reputational exposure is critical to 
ensuring that a business confronted with a crisis remains resilient. The cost of a 
crisis can be both tangible and intangible in nature. Table two illustrates the 
ubiquitous nature of crises by documenting several high-profile cases (both 
historical and recent) that transcend industry sectors.  Their listing is not 
designed to be all encompassing, but rather it aims to present a context of the 
various forms that a crisis can take and to confirm that no industry or business 
is immune to this type of risk.   As illustrated, brands are often at stake and 
while the nature of brand crises may vary, it is important to acknowledge that 
consumers rely on brands and that unethical, improper, and illegal actions may 
seriously damage that trust, while crises involving these distinctive attributes 
may be considered by stakeholders as even more serious in nature (Custance, 
Walley, & Jiang, 2012, pp. 19-20).   
Therefore, as outlined earlier, with an identified gap existing in the extant 
literature on crisis management, this study proposes to examine the specifics of a 
business crisis management response with a focus on the ostensive routines, 
artefacts, capabilities, personalities, performative actions of the CMT together 
with the CMT’s leadership, thereby addressing this gap. This will create an 
understanding of the causes of deviation and enable identification of strategies 
to minimise the deviation and thereby mitigate adverse business impacts. The 
importance of minimising the gap between the ostensive and the performative 
routines is vital and can be attributed to several areas.  In establishing the 
framework, it is noted that within the crisis management response the crisis 
management plan (CMP) and its components form the ostensive routine and 
associated artefacts, which become the script for the CMT to follow during the 
response to the event.  In this regard, the value of a well-designed crisis 
response program is that it brings to a company the ability to prepare and 
respond to any contingency.  
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As Pourkomailian (2013) notes, when an incident occurs, success results when 
the business can prevent panic and chaos, thereby stopping the incident from 
morphing into a crisis.  The basic doctrine of crisis management is to ensure 
that effective planning exists through: establishing crisis processes and 
procedures; preparation and response, including an understanding of the 
problem at hand; and the sensitivities of the market which can influence the 
response.  These sensitivities include the government’s position, as they are a 
specific stakeholder and play an influential role in the successful resolution of 
any crisis.  In the food manufacturing category, for example, the CMT needs to 
be cognisant of the fact that consumers are faced with a wide range of 
competitively priced products of consistently high quality. Each item must be 
safe, aesthetically pleasing, good tasting, and consistent with the product image. 
Variations within the same batch or between batches of a product must be kept 
to a minimum since consumers interpret such variations as an indication of 
production faults.  A further relevant factor, as the literature indicates, is that 
“overall, consumer attitudes towards food safety in general differ according to 
demographic and socio-economic factors such as gender, age, educational level 
and economic status” (Wilcock, Pun, Khanona, & Aung, 2006, p. 58).  
Within the crisis response, the ostensive routine encapsulates the scripts and 
artefacts designed to guide the actions of the CMT, and the performative aspect 
incorporates the manner of the execution of the routines by the members of the 
CMT and includes the leadership approach.  Theoretically, the script is ingrained 
into team member behaviour through frequent rehearsal. This can be described 
as the ongoing education, training and process validation that participants of 
the crisis team undergo to ensure that, during an actual crisis, their 
performance is aligned with the script.  An inconsistency between the script, the 
rehearsals, and the actual performative routine leads to added complexity in the 
crisis response with potentially adverse consequences.    
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Table 2 – Examples of Crises across Industry Sectors 
Industry Sector Nature of the Crisis 
Pharmaceutical ▪ The thalidomide disaster is one of the darkest episodes in pharmaceutical 
research history. The drug, licensed in 1956 for prescription free over the 
counter sale, was marketed as a mild sleeping pill safe even for pregnant 
women with an added ‘benefit’ of reducing morning sickness. However, it 
caused thousands of babies worldwide to be born with malformed limbs. 
The damage was revealed in 1962 (Plumb, 1962).  
▪ The Tylenol cyanide contamination case in 1982 killed seven people, 
impacted 100 million consumers and reportedly cost the company 
US$150million. It is often cited as a best practice crisis response (Davis, 
2011; Dilenschneider, 2007; Stateman, 2008). 
FMCG ▪ The 2009 baby formula scandal in China, which is noteworthy for its sheer 
magnitude and the scale of consequences: the extent of harm to consumers 
– with a total of 296,000 children falling ill after consuming milk products 
contaminated with melamine, including six fatalities (BBC News Report, 
2009); and loss of some US$113million by New Zealand based Fonterra, 
the world's largest international trader of dairy products. Guilt by 
association was extensive (Gao, Knight, Zhang, & Mather, 2013, p. 1045).   
▪ In 2014, Wal-Mart and McDonalds in China were embroiled in scandals 
relating to the sale and consumption of meat products. This impacted sales 
growth as consumers lost faith and trust in their systems. (Jourdan, 2014) 
Motor Industry ▪ The Ford Pinto case of the early 1970’s was based on Ford’s 1968 decision 
to introduce a subcompact car and produce it domestically. This crisis 
involved the explosion of multiple vehicles due to a defective fuel system 
design that Ford was aware of. The case led to the debate of many issues, 
most focussed  on the use by Ford of a cost-benefit analysis and the ethics 
surrounding its decision not to upgrade the fuel system based on this 
analysis (Lee, 1998). 
▪ The 2010 Toyota recall was linked to ineffective early warning analysis and 
poor crisis management, resulting in a cost of between US$2billion and 
US$3billion in addition to a regulatory fine of US$1.2billion (Feng, 2010, p. 
473; Kalb, 2012; Prez & Prokupecz, 2014; Trudell & Hagiwara, 2014).  
▪ The 2015 VW emissions scandal, in which VW attempted to beat the 
regulatory testing system by installing a diesel-emissions ‘defeat device’ 
impacted over 11 million vehicles globally with the financial cost topping 
$30M USD with significant reputation damage also experienced. (Riley, 
2017) 
Oil and Gas ▪ In July 1988 an explosion occurred on the Piper Alpha oil and gas platform 
in the North Sea. Within seconds a major un-stabilised crude-oil fire 
resulted, and the lower parts of the platform were engulfed in smoke. The 
subsequent fire resulted in the loss of 167 lives in what was the world's 
worst offshore accident (Drysdale & Sylvester-Evans, 1998).  
▪ The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster resulted in employee deaths and 
widespread environmental damage. It was linked to a culture that failed to 
adequately address safety risks, a poor crisis response lacking urgency, 
accuracy, empathy and honesty.  The financial impact amounted to 
US$44billion (Chazan, Faucon, & Casselman, 2010; Gilbert & Kent, 2015). 
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CMTs therefore, are trained to react in a specific way. Issues are created when 
the gap between the performative routine and the ostensive routine grows too 
large, or, following a theatrical metaphor, where the actors forget what they 
have practiced in rehearsals causing them to ad lib and create their own script.    
Understanding the cause of the deviation will enable the identification of 
strategies to enhance CMT performance and avoid pitfalls that can cause a CMT 
to become either dysfunctional or misaligned in response. This has a flow-on 
effect of minimising the impact of the crisis, “with the outcome of potentially 
improving a company’s reputation for honesty and accountability, exhibited 
through the nature of their response” (Morgan, 2012, p. 7).  This in turn can 
contribute to the learning phase of crisis management to ensure that the 
warning signals that assist in preventing future crises are identified and not 
overlooked (Veil, 2011). This point is critical as the importance of learning has 
been closely linked to the ability of a business or organisation to prevent further 
crises (Smith, 1990; Turner, 1976 ; Turner, 1978) and thereby enhance their 
overall business resilience. 
 
1.3  The Focus of the Empirical Data Collection 
The aetiology of deviation between script and production forms the basis of this 
research.  It sets out to address the question of how ostensive and performative 
routines interact in a crisis management situation and what factors contribute to 
deviations from the routines? This research adopted a case study approach and 
leverages empirical data collected from several sources, including: 
▪ observations of both training simulations and live activations of CMTs; 
▪ interviews with subject matter experts in crisis management across industry 
sectors; and 
▪ analysis of the response to specific historical incidents through case review 
and analysis from created vignettes. 
 10 
 
This combination of these varied data sources enabled the evaluation and the 
confirmation of the driving forces behind the occurrence of the deviation. That 
enabled the inquiry to evaluate if the deviation was due to factors such as 
having routines and artefacts (e.g. the CMP) but not maintaining and modifying 
the routines in response to lessons learned from an incident or, alternatively, 
whether it is the CMT members, their selection, leadership skills and team 
dynamics, that create the deviation. It is important to stress from the outset that 
the research focused on the behaviours and actions observed, rather than on the 
nature of the crisis incident per se, as the type of incident does not affect 
whether or not a deviation occurs. It examined the initial and ongoing team 
response and dynamics and discusses how script deviation, because of varying 
factors, can adversely impact the overall response.  
While crisis management approaches across business are similar in construct, 
this research accessed and evaluated the crisis response routines adopted 
within TCCS, which incorporates The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) and its 
franchise partners, following the Belgium crisis of 1999. This case is 
summarised in Table 3 with a full study of the crisis contained in appendix C.  
Coca-Cola is, of course, a major and high-profile international brand. That noted 
its approach to risk management and crisis management is typical of a major 
corporate.  Hence, it is a representative case, and informative of the experiences 
of similar corporates (Yin, 2009, p. 48).  Thus, it provided a compelling context 
for the present work. Further, it is arguable that, whilst the case is not 
necessarily ‘revelatory’, the depth of access afforded to the researcher remains 
comparatively rare in research of this nature, especially given the sensitive 
subject matter (Yin, 2009), further adding to the compelling context for this 
research.  The project specifically focused on the components as implemented 
by TCCC’s franchise-bottling partner Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company 
(CCHBC), and as aligned with the relevant TCCC Business Unit – Central and 
Eastern Europe.  The detailed rationale for examining this system is laid out in 
the methodology, however at this point it can be noted that the global reach and 
scale of this business and the impact that a crisis can have on people, product, 
and reputation make this a compelling area on which to focus the research.  
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To establish the context of the business model, TCCC is the trademark owner of 
brands including Coca-Cola, Sprite, PowerAde and Minute Maid.  TCCC operates 
under a bottling franchise arrangement and has operations in over 200 
countries.  In short, TCCC as the brand owner is the marketer of the brands and 
supplies the concentrate for the production of the products. The bottling 
partners are responsible for the manufacturing, sales and distribution of 
products to customers and ultimately to the consumer. As the brand owner, 
TCCC has developed the system-wide crisis response arrangements. This crisis 
response model is commonly referred to as Incident Management and Crisis 
Resolution (IMCR) and involves dual participation in the crisis team by 
members of TCCC and their bottling partners on either a country or a regional 
basis.  
At the time of writing, CCHBC is TCCS’s third largest franchise-bottling partner 
operating in twenty-eight markets across Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Africa. CCHBC is a FTSE 100 company and annually sells approximately two 
billion-unit cases of product1. The company has nineteen CMTs covering the 
twenty-eight markets in which they operate. This is supplemented by a Group 
CMT of which the researcher is the chairperson and leader. 
This research collected empirical data relating to process deviation during a 
crisis response and adopted a case study approach to address the question how 
do ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management 
situation in the business environment and what factors contribute to deviations 
from the routines? In answering this question, a theory was created and 
validated the reason(s) for this deviation.  As part of theory development, the 
research examined the data to assess whether the deviation occurred because 
the crisis routines, artefacts and training are either considered inappropriate in 
their current form, so not fit for purpose, or are not modified and enhanced in 
response to lessons learned during a post-incident review. 
                                                        
1  A unit case equals 5.678 litres or 24 servings of 8 US fluid ounces and is the typical 
volume measurement in TCCS. 
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Table 3 – The Coca-Cola Crisis of 1999 
The research also evaluated whether the deviation is due to an ineffective 
approach to the structure, leadership and coordination of the CMT: that is, 
actors are not cast correctly, so that their behaviour and skill sets contribute to 
the deviation.  Based on the findings from the triangulation analysis, which 
incorporated both manual and automated coding approaches, the research was 
able to answer the question posed and confirmed a theory to explain the 
FMCG 
 
Coca-Cola 
Specific 
The Belgium Crisis of 1999 – Establishing a compelling context 
 
Background: 
▪ The crisis commenced on the 8th of June 1999 when reports were 
received that several school children at a middle school in Belgium 
had fallen ill after consuming Coca-Cola. The problem was 
exacerbated two days later when school children in Bruges also 
reported illness after consuming Coca-Cola.  The crisis for the 
companies involved expanded due to an ineffective initial response 
with the Governments from France and Spain accusing the 
companies of selling tainted product. 
Issues: 
▪ Critically, it was noted that TCCS focused on the wrong problem and 
failed to follow the basic doctrines of crisis management including a 
lack of: early warning indicators; crisis routines; preparation of the 
crisis teams; and understanding of local market sensitivities (Mitroff, 
2002, pp. 1 - 2).  The companies were also criticised for a lack of 
acceptance of responsibility for the creation of the incident which 
impact consumer and public trust. 
Impact: 
▪ The cost of not getting this crisis response right from the outset was 
a product recall that saw approximately 17 million-unit cases of 
Coca-Cola and other soft drinks being recalled and destroyed.  The 
estimated cost of the crisis was US$103 million (Nemery, Fischler, 
Boogaerts, Lison, & Willems, 2002, p. 1657). 
Lessons Learned 
▪ Crisis management processes and routines must be in place to guide 
the overarching crisis response.  Importantly, these ostensive 
routines must be understood and followed. 
▪ Crisis management teams need to undergo regular practice to 
ensure that they understand the routines and apply them effectively. 
▪ Understanding the perceptions and positions of the multiple 
stakeholders enables tailored responses to be developed. 
Appendix A: Full Belgian case study 
 13 
 
deviation, recommend specific courses of action to remediate the identified 
issues, and recommend avenues for additional courses of research.  
The research concluded that the central cause of process deviation is linked to 
the team structure, its operating dynamics, and leadership. There are ample 
arguments and evidence that the ostensive routines and associated artefacts do 
not drive, nor actively contribute to, the process deviations.  It will be shown 
that the subject matter experts specifically noted the value of the tools and their 
effectiveness in their current form.  This does not mean that there is not an 
opportunity to revisit the routines and tools and enhance them as appropriate, 
rather this turns the focus to the human dynamic. Moreover, it firmly 
establishes the theory that process deviation is linked to human dynamics. That 
is, it is the actors and their casting as crisis team members, and the actions of 
the crisis leader, that are leading influences.  The theory will illustrate that this 
is driven by various factors including experience, training, culture and 
personality type.   Stemming from the answer to the question of how the 
ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management situation 
and what factors contribute to deviations from the routines, the theory notes 
that: 
Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The process 
deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response occurs due to 
human dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the members of the 
crisis team and the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are 
ineffective crisis leadership and weaknesses in the crisis team structure. 
By leveraging the findings of this research, organisations have an opportunity, 
through the application of the remedial actions, to strengthen the capabilities of 
their crisis teams. The remedial actions discussed in this paper are already 
implemented in the day to day crisis management response in Coca-Cola HBC. In 
turn, they provide tangible business benefits through enhanced crisis 
management response capabilities. Additionally, there is a further benefit in 
that the research results can actively factor into the formal education process of 
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business leaders for as Fischbacher-Smith note “crisis management is generally 
underrepresented in the MBA curriculum and it is time to feature it more 
prominently” (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, p. 70). The 
research additionally validates that future studies, both in respect of 
understanding the cultural elements of the team structure and considering the 
personality type combination of a crisis team, would serve to further strengthen 
CMT responses and further contribute to the ongoing minimisation of process 
deviation. 
 
1.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the conceptual foundations of the research within the 
business resilience stream and described that the research sets out to 
understand how ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis 
management situation and what factors contribute to deviations from the 
routines. It commenced with an outline of the new business resilience 
paradigm. This paradigm has expanded its focus to preventative measures, 
integrating components such as enterprise risk management, and worked 
through the elements of the critical responsive mechanisms of crisis 
management. It reinforced the importance of crisis management and confirmed 
that crises can strike any industry, irrespective of sector, and there is a 
significant financial and reputational impact, and in some instances loss of life, 
when a crisis team does not get it right. 
The research approach was outlined in that data would be obtained utilising a 
number of techniques including the observations of both training simulations 
and live activations of CMTs; interviews with subject matter experts in crisis 
management across industry sectors; and analysis of CMT responses to specific 
historical incidents through case review and analysis from created vignettes.  In 
doing this the focus was on an examination of the processes, routines and 
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performance within the Coca-Cola system, a business model that is compelling 
due to its size, global reach and variety of brands. 
Having established the context, the chapter moved to outline the specific focus 
of this research, that being the process deviation observed by crisis teams 
during their response to a situation. It established the point that this research is 
focused on answering the question of how the ostensive and performative 
routines interact in a crisis management situation and what factors contribute 
to deviations from the routines and is supported by theory development and 
creation, and that this is in contrast to the process of theory testing. Having 
established the causes of the process deviation, the research strived to identify 
strategies to minimise that process deviation. Overall crisis management 
capabilities would be strengthened through application of recommendations to 
minimise deviation.   
Chapter 2 will examine the extant literature on the interrelated streams of crisis 
management, risk management, business resilience and the link to ostensive 
and performative routines and provide the theoretical framing for this research.
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Chapter 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMING 
2.1  Introduction 
This research specifically focuses on crisis management and the deviation in 
ostensive and performative routines that can exist during the management of a 
crisis. Its foundations lie in four interrelated research streams: crisis 
management; ostensive and performative routines; risk management and 
business resilience. While it can be argued that the streams of crisis 
management, risk management and business resilience, despite their 
interrelationship are divergent in nature, it is acknowledged that there exists a 
debate in respect of this divergence of streams.  
Central to the debate is the relationship between risk and uncertainty 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2016b). The debate incorporates the position that crises 
are essentially uncertain events where there is little or no predictive capability 
associated with their onset. Additionally, one view is that risk assessments, per 
se, are effective for predicting random failures in engineered systems but do not 
always help in dealing with the role of human actors in the process. The 
contrary view is that the risk management agenda has expanded from its roots 
in technical analysis to become a cornerstone of good governance  (Fischbacher-
Smith, 2011, 2016a; Power, 2009; Power, Scheytt, Soin, & Sahlin, 2009).  
Arguments also exist that resilience can be seen to have three main 
perspectives,  those outlined above, with the addition of business continuity 
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framed as an element of crisis management that has an “incubation” phase 
(Turner, 1976 ), an operational phase and a crisis of legitimation (Smith, 1990). 
It is arguable that business continuity sits at the nexus of the operational crisis 
and the crisis of legitimation phase.  Conversely in the debate, it can be argued 
that crises are not always uncertain events, but can be predicted through using 
risk management and responded to through activities such as proactive security 
mechanisms. These are just two proactive elements of business resilience 
through which crises can be avoided or more efficiently managed. Bringing into 
the discussion the role that ostensive and performative routines play for each of 
these core elements illustrates further the complexities that exist.   
The complexity of the interrelated themes and the criticality of ensuring that 
process deviation is minimised effectively opens up multiple literature streams.  
To establish the contextual nature of the themes and validate the knowledge 
gap, the extant literature for these four streams is reviewed.  This review 
focuses firstly on the literature as it relates to the field of crisis management. It 
is noted that much research has been conducted in this field starting with the 
early work of Turner (1976 ) and covers a diverse range of concepts and ideas.  
In this study the crisis management literature is examined from the perspective 
of the relevant processes and routines; crisis team composition; team 
leadership and dynamics; and preparation and training.   
The discussion then turns to the second theme: the field of routines and their 
utilisation as scripts and guides as a component of the crisis management 
response.  The review then examines the concepts of enterprise risk 
management (ERM) and business resilience. In totality, they provide the 
theoretical architecture in which crisis management exists, incorporating and 
possessing three distinct phases: the precipitation phase (in which the potential 
for a crisis is created), the operational phase of the crisis, and the post-crisis 
phase (Smith, 1990), with  the observations from the review illustrating 
fragmentation in crisis management research and validating the relevance of 
the research. 
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2.2 Crisis Management 
‘Crisis’ is a term used to cover a wide range of bad and unwelcome things 
(Waring, 2013, p. 71) and what constitutes a crisis differs between 
organisations.  An organisational crisis is commonly defined as a low 
probability, high impact event that is perceived by key stakeholders to threaten 
an organisation’s viability (Alas & Gao, 2010; Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998). Others see a crisis as an event that pushes a company to 
its limits. 
“In other words a crisis should challenge the organisation’s abilities to cope 
with the task demands of the event within its existing resource and 
capability structures and without additional damage occurring” 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2014b, p. 427). 
Numerous events can trigger a crisis.  They can emerge from an identified risk 
eventuating or from a system or process failure. Pearson and Sommer (2011, p. 
27) observed that “organizational crises can seem to strike and disappear 
instantaneously, like a bolt of lightning, or they can build momentum and effect 
slowly, like a glacier.”  They can arise through poor management as the actual 
cause (Turner, 1994) and there are also occasions when stakeholders consider a 
management response to a minor incident is inappropriate. This turns what 
might be a normal business issue into an institutional crisis.  
The following subsections present the extant crisis management literature 
through the lens of processes and routines; crisis team composition; team 
leadership and dynamics; and preparation and training. The review confirms 
that while crisis management research is extensive and has focused on a variety 
of elements, past work has at time been described as fragmented (Bundy et al., 
2016) and does not address the discrepancy between ostensive and 
performative routines during the activation of a CMT response within a 
business context. 
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2.2.1  Processes and Routines 
Mitroff et al examined multiple crisis management responses and noted that  
“crisis prepared companies develop plans to handle a larger number and 
wider variety of emergencies than they have faced in the past” (Mitroff & 
Alpaslan, 2003, p. 110),   and  
“through a deliberate set of integrated and interrelated series of actions, 
these organizations make major crises far less likely to occur” (Mitroff & 
Pauchant, 1990, p. 79).  
These interrelated actions would arguably include ERM as a preventative 
element in avoiding or mitigating a potential crisis. Within this context, artefacts 
provide the framework for a structured response to situations that potentially 
impact the viability of a business. Without the routines and artefacts 
(preventative or reactive), a business can overrate its capabilities with response 
perceptions not matching reality (Ritchey, 2011). In the field of resilience 
preparedness, processes and routines provide structure as this “encompasses 
activities as diverse as risk and preparedness analysis, preparedness planning, 
resource allocation, training and exercising, deployment in real events and 
feedback” together with “early warning, evacuation, stocking equipment and 
establishing appropriate governance and coordination structures” (Staupe-
Delgado & Kruke, 2017, p. 214).  Arguments also exist as to whether it is a 
process and routine versus the result, which is more important, indicating that 
deviation can perhaps be tolerated in order to attain a result.  This latter 
concept ignores the fact that “preparedness is a continuous phenomenon 
consisting of drills, exercises, adjustments of risk and preparedness analyses 
and preparedness plans”(Staupe-Delgado & Kruke, 2017, p. 215), which all 
require structure and are best served when processes and routines are 
followed.  
Processes, routines and plans are therefore critical in guiding crisis 
management response and building capability, and the degree to which 
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institutions are encoded in an actors’ stock of practical knowledge can influence 
how they communicate, enact power, and determine what behaviours to 
sanction and reward (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 98).  That said, Smits and Ezzat 
(2003) argue that how well the action is implemented depends upon the quality 
of the plan and its support structures. Aligned to this is the readiness of the 
responsible parties to behave in accordance with the plan. 
Research has also determined that the ostensive part of the routine is often 
conceptualised as narratives, or in effect stories, of how work is done, implying 
the connections between actors, actions, and understanding at different levels 
(Salvato & Rerup, 2011). Therefore, preparation and response strategies need 
to be multifaceted and to incorporate elements including routines that identify 
potential issues (ERM); processes and tools to help manage and resolve 
situations (e.g. emergency response); and a mechanism for post crisis 
evaluation that enables modifications to be made to the routines and/or 
behaviours.  From this it is evident that to avoid crisis occurrences, businesses 
need the  
“ability to focus on many issues at the same time, analysing and 
interpreting the complex, often contradictory information that arises. It is 
only by moving from attention stability to attention vividness that 
organizations can start to pick up early warning signals and transform 
those signals into preventive actions” (Rerup, 2012, p. 14).  
Without these processes that traverse all aspects of the response, including such 
areas as media management, the response of a business may be perceived as 
slow, ineffective and potentially insincere. This was illustrated earlier in this 
thesis with reference to the Belgium incident (Table 3) and is reinforced in the 
inadequate crisis management arrangements activated by businesses during 
events such as the Chinese infant milk powder case in 2009 (Custance et al., 
2012; Kim & Choi, 2014). 
The artefacts linked to an ostensive routine enable a crisis team to avoid these 
pitfalls by providing the guidance, framework and lens on which to base 
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informed action. Rerup and Feldman (2011), in their examination of routines 
and their impact on organisational change, recognised the complexity of the 
relationship between routines and schemata and the role of trial and error 
learning processes.  It could be deduced from this that trial and error in crisis 
management builds capability via experience. Hence, the longevity of CMT 
membership becomes important as it enhances trust and skills.  Supporting the 
concept of team longevity is the tendency for the routines to improve over time 
both during performances and between performances. Within each 
performance or iteration of a pattern of action, every action is dependent on the 
prior actions (Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012), which are linked to the 
interpretation of the routine.   
Performance and practice are critical to ensuring effective utilisation and 
review of the routine. Spillane argued that practice creates and recreates the 
ostensive aspect “though Feldman and Pentland (2003) confined their 
discussion to organizational routines, ostensive and performative distinctions 
can be applied to other aspects of the situation, including structures and tools.” 
(Spillane, 2008, p. 148) 
This again drives the focus towards team performance, dynamics, training and 
leadership in respect of the cause of deviation from routines. 
2.2.2  Team Composition  
A crisis team comprises “individuals who share interactions and experiences in 
decision making" (Sommer & Pearson, 2007, p. 1243).  At the same time it is “an 
assembly of people - a chemically unstable mixture with its own personality, 
history and emotional dynamic” (Robert & Lajtha, 2002, p. 187).  When 
operational, the CMT will probably find itself subjected to unusual levels of fear, 
stress and fatigue often working in a dynamic environment under suboptimal 
conditions” (Lapierre et al., 2015, p. 195). Ultimately "a crisis management team 
is a cross functional group of people within the organization who have been 
designated to handle the crisis" (King, 2002, p. 63) and bring it to a successful 
resolution.  King (2002) further concluded that not all teams are effective, and 
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cohesion can be influenced by factors including time, information resources, 
procedural conflict, poor leadership, and prior interactions. All of these if not 
managed appropriately impact the level of trust.  In many cases the team can be 
seen to comprise subject matter experts, and this increases pressure as the 
“experts are expected to successfully attain vaguely defined goals in the face of 
uncertainty, time pressure, high stakes, team and organizational constraints, 
and shifting conditions” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 516).  
These are elements that are often present during a crisis response. Ensuring the 
correct team composition exists greatly assists the capability of the team to 
resolve the issue. It enables a team to avoid groupthink (Janis, 1972) while 
ensuring cohesiveness.  This cohesiveness in a team is important as it has been 
found to exert considerable influence on the quality of the discussions 
(Callaway & Esser, 1984). A structured approach to compositions is required as 
often managers are simply thrust into a CMT role due to the position that they 
hold, rather than any specific experience in high-pressure crisis response 
situations.  This can create issues as complex decisions will need to be made 
within the containment or damage control phase of a crisis response the 
manager will be required to make some of the “most chaotic, time-pressured, 
and critical decisions of the entire crisis life cycle” (Dionne, Gooty, Yammarino, 
& Sayama, 2018, p. 97).  In this context crisis management experience becomes 
critical.  
When considering the attributes of the managers who will comprise the team, 
Smits and Ezzat (2003) argue that the CMT members must be dependable, calm, 
self-confident and assertive, with personalities that have the ability to influence 
perception and decision-making. Further, Crandall et al (2014, p. 108) argue 
that the members must have the ability to work as a team; be able to work 
under pressure; have a tolerance of ambiguity; and possess good listening and 
verbal skills, which, when present and combined, strengthen the CMT’s 
capability. 
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Weick’s investigation (1993) into the 1949 Mann Gulch Disaster2 examined the 
role of decision making during a crisis where the actions and routines did not 
align in a high pressure situation to expectations, with devastating 
consequences. This was attributed to the thinking processes and the role of the 
crisis leader. It should be noted that while the role of the CMT is to think 
broadly the team needs to ensure that process is followed as “recovery lies not 
in thinking then doing, but in thinking while doing and in thinking by doing” 
(Weick, 2002).  In respect of team composition, the role of ‘bricoleurs’ has been 
discussed, with Weick (1993) arguing that they are important in crisis 
management as they remain creative under pressure, precisely as they routinely 
act in chaotic conditions and attain order in chaos. They are also perceived as 
innovative in their approach. It could, however, be asked what role the bricoleur 
plays in the team: are they a member or a leader? Is a high level of innovation 
perhaps counterproductive to minimising process deviation, or can the two 
elements reside together?  It could be argued that, as will be seen in this 
research, the latter applies.    
The concept of sensemaking also enters the equation in respect to the team’s 
capabilities from a preventative and response perspective. Maitlis and 
Soneshein (2010, p. 554) support the argument of Weick that “enacted 
sensemaking can provide the basis of a crisis prevention and management 
ideology by leveraging a kind of human involvement in systems that is rooted in 
shared beliefs about self-control and voluntary cooperation”.  This allows 
individuals in the view of Weick, to "think about crises in ways that highlight 
their own actions and decisions as determinants of the conditions they want to 
prevent” (Weick, 1988, p. 316) with this becoming a powerful way in which to 
support the management of a crisis.  That said, it is argued that “collective 
                                                        
2 The Mann Gulch Disaster occurred in 1949 and involved a wildfire in Montana in the 
United States. Fifteen smokejumpers parachuted into the area to fight the fire. 
Unexpected high wind changes caused a sudden expansion of the fire, cutting off the 
men’s route and resulting in the deaths of thirteen. The research examined routines, 
decisions and actions taken. 
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sensemaking in crisis is near impossible in the absence of social processes that 
lead to collective mindfulness, the enriched collective awareness that facilitates 
the ‘construction, discovery, and correction of unexpected events capable of 
escalation” (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010, p. 557).   
Mallak (1998), in examining adaptive behaviour during crises and the 
importance of having individuals who respond quickly to change, confirmed the 
role of the bricoleur, as for them a crisis is a normal operating condition and 
they have the ability to react accordingly.  A diverse range of ideas and 
information inputs is vital. Hence, the broader composition of the team is 
important as no one person can solve the problem alone (Barton & Sutcliffe, 
2010).  Here lies the importance of sense making, which is linked to contextual 
rationality. Leaders need to ensure that they develop resilient groups capable of 
four things: improvisation; wisdom; respectful interaction; and communication 
(Weick, 1996).  The type of organisation can also influence the team 
composition; for example, in High Reliability Organisations (HROs) the 
environment can make a team vulnerable to error if their attention is scattered, 
distracted or unstable (La Porte, 1996; La Porte & Consolini, 1991). These 
negative traits can predispose people to estimate incorrectly, misunderstand, 
and mis-specify the nature of the situation that they face (Schulman, 2004). 
Additionally, their continuous exposure to potential crises means that, 
figuratively speaking, their next failure to meet aspirations could also be their 
last-ever action (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). 
These arguments reinforce the importance of getting the composition right and 
here the teams’ personalities and dynamics, together with the leadership 
displayed, play a key role. 
2.2.3  Team Leadership and Dynamics 
Leadership is a critical element of crisis management and this incorporates the 
business decision relating to the leader of the crisis team (Alas & Gao, 2010). 
The criticality stems from the fact that the “difference between triumph and 
tragedy hinges upon the ability to produce and revise (i.e. plausible, reasonable, 
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coherent, actionable, justifiable) assessments of highly unusual, ambiguous and 
dynamic situations”(Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005, p. 19).  From a 
leadership perspective, studies have examined a variety of aspects. These 
include the role that the company leader, be that Chairman or CEO, plays during 
a crisis response and why they may fail to provide the necessary leadership and 
prioritisation to prevent and prepare for a crisis (Caywood & Englehart, 2003; 
Cesta, Cortellessa, & De Benedictis, 2014; Halverson, Murphy, & Riggio, 2004; 
Jaques, 2012). The leadership theme incorporates understanding the attributes 
that create the environment in which leaders fail to identify the emerging risks 
that can lead to a crisis (Sheaffer & Brender-Ilan, 2014) and this can include the 
role that the hubris syndrome in a company’s CEO or senior leadership plays in 
leading to haphazard decision making (Owen & Davidson, 2009).  Indeed Owen 
concluded that “collective hubris may well prove to be a contributing factor in 
the risk taking behind the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig” 
(Owen, 2011) and at the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) under its chief executive 
prior to it having to be bailed out by the British taxpayer in 2008 (Owen, 2011). 
Therefore, hubris certainly is a leadership attribute to be avoided. 
The literature also examined the nature of leader selection and how the 
unpredictability of a crisis, due to the number of risk components involved, 
requires different skill sets to day to day management. As Fischbacher-Smith 
proposed to their students when discussing crisis leadership, “do you think that 
those who manage well under conditions of steady state, but who are untested 
in conditions of crisis will cope when the  crises arises?” (Fischbacher-Smith & 
Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, p. 63).  This is an interesting point. Evaluating and 
understanding the individual leader is fundamental with factors such as a 
leaders’ openness to receive differing perspectives and allowing their team to 
voice their observations and ideas being an important theme (Martínez‐
Córcoles, 2018, p. 240).   
In this vein, it can be argued “that both the qualities of the individual and 
environmental factors in which they operate are important elements in the 
leadership equation. Finally, leaders who are expected to perform as crisis 
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managers need to be trained and experienced in crisis management, and should 
not be  placed into such positions without applicable training and assessment” 
(Surugiu & Surugiu, 2012, p. 305). This is a concept supported by Dionne who 
comments that “the importance of having active and engaged leaders during a 
crisis cannot be understated. Because proficient decision making is driven by 
expert or experience-based knowledge” (Dionne et al., 2018, p. 104).  
Other researchers, such as Cesta et al (2014), focus on leadership, the impact on 
the decision-making process and the importance that training and rehearsals 
play in enhancing response capabilities. In his findings, King (2007) noted that a 
crisis leader must display a sense of confidence, while at the same time 
expressing empathy with those who were hurt or potentially harmed by the 
crisis.  Conversely, Teo et al (Teo, Lee, & Lim, 2017, p. 136) presented the 
argument that “leadership is critical in an organizational crisis and is often 
conceptualized as the process of exercising social influence.”  They contend that: 
“during periods of high uncertainty, charismatic leadership behaviour, 
which communicates determination, provides mission and a vision while 
articulating high performance expectations, is predictive of organizational 
performance, compared to transactional leadership behaviour which 
focuses on setting goals and tasks and ensuring compliance.” (2017, p. 138) 
What these themes assert is that the context of leadership will vary depending 
on the interpretation of the role. In many cases the leader of the organisation is 
the CEO and will be called on to be the spokesperson of the business, not the 
leader of the crisis team. The reality is that the operational crisis leader is a 
senior manager that is suitably trained and skilled, who is focused on the 
process, goals and completion of the associated tasks and who is pivotal in 
guiding the company spokesperson. This is supported by the findings of Dionne 
et al  (2018, p. 117), who concluded  that “the best person for addressing a crisis 
may not be a formal leader holding the highest position of authority, but rather 
a widely acknowledged expert in a specific type of crisis response or crisis 
management that has established critical relationships with several key 
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constituents”.  What is required is a transformational leader who can motivate 
the team to exceed expectations rather than a passive leader who shirks the 
responsibility of nurturing the team (LePine, Buckman, Crawford, & Methot, 
2011). 
In a different vein, the literature also illustrates that the perspective of crisis 
management and the perception of who should be a crisis leader and the skills 
they should possess can be influenced by the nature of the businesses surveyed.   
By way of example, Mikušová & Čopíková’s research centred on understanding 
the expectations of small business owners (their survey pool) regarding the 
skills required by a crisis manager. The researchers emphasised that the 
managers surveyed often had no theoretical knowledge or practical experience 
with crisis management and therefore decided intuitively on the skills sets. This 
saw the skills categorised in managerial, functional and social streams and with 
performance expectations being centred against managerial competencies such 
as financial acumen. This showed an expectation that the crisis manager is a 
doer with managerial skills such as finance, rather than a leader (Mikušová & 
Čopíková, 2016, p. 174). So, while processes and routines exist to be managed, 
the critical leadership element was not seen as relevant to small business 
owners.  
Research into team dynamics discusses a variety of areas relevant to the CMT 
structure. Roberts and O’Reilly (1974) discussed communication failures and 
pinpointed three potential culprits: trust; influence; and mobility. This is 
particularly relevant in the structure and response of the CMT, since they found 
that with “high trust groups there was less socially generated uncertainty and 
more efficient problem solving.”  Weick (1988) explored the relevance of sense 
making by the team in crisis situations and argued that commitment, capacity 
and expectations affect sense making during a crisis and the manner of 
interpretation can impact the severity of the crisis itself.  “Capacity and 
response repertoire affect crisis perception, because people see those events 
and they feel they have the capacity to do something about. As capacities 
change, so do perceptions and actions.” (Weick, 1988, p. 311) Additionally, due 
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to the lack of cognitive schema, some people must wait until a crisis occurs 
before they can diagnose a problem, rather than be in a position to detect a 
potential problem as part of early warning. 
The team’s skills and dynamics also influence the approach adopted toward the 
issue at hand. Belbin (1993) discussed the importance of team dynamics, and 
identified a series of nine key roles in a team and argued that the balance 
between roles reflected in team composition is a factor in determining success. 
Studies have examined the potential that  Belbin’s team roles can play in the 
composition of crisis teams (Smith, 2000) and the fact that some roles can 
actually undertake a primary and secondary role thereby reducing the size of 
the team (Fisher, Hunter, & Macrosson, 1998). While Belbin’s approach may 
have relevance in enhancing a team’s dynamics it is however noted, that the 
Belbin framework is not without criticism (Furnham, Steele, & Pendleton, 
1993). In respect of the team membership it was observed that the relative 
influence of different members may change as a function of the tasks that they 
are performing or the demands that are directed toward the team. Additionally, 
while the adoption of Belbin’s approach in a ‘normal’ business context may have 
relevance, for a crisis team this is difficult as other factors influence CMT 
construct.  
Mathieu et al  (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & Alliger, 2013, p. 146) 
commented that early in their lifecycle teams benefited from a composition that 
had low average but moderate variance in members’ uncertainty avoidance. 
Then later in the lifecycles, teams benefited more from a combination of high 
average and moderate variability of members’ relationship orientation, which 
illustrated the importance of relationships overtime as this translates to 
enhancing trust through experience.  Weick and Sutcliffe ( 2006) contend that 
when individuals are paying attention to failure, simplification and resilience 
mindfulness occurs. Mindfulness, in turn, broadens environmental scanning, 
generates interpretations that are more context relevant, and produces decision 
behaviour that is more discriminating.  They found that “those who manifest 
mindfulness engage in thought patterns that allow them to make a larger 
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number of currently relevant, more precise distinctions” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2006, p. 516), which are critical in the team’s evaluation of information. This 
poses a question as to which personality traits most effectively enable the 
application of mindfulness, which in turn may mitigate process deviation? 
Building on this, Yin and Jing (2014) note that the broader the nature of a crisis, 
the more complex and dynamic the environmental pressure becomes, and that 
this can impact the team by dissuading them from careful thinking, 
communication and judgement. "When coordination ties deteriorate, people 
must make their own sense of what is occurring. The collapse of collective 
awareness causes a chain reaction, further disturbing regularities and rendering 
individual rational thinking and efforts useless at best, and counterproductive at 
worst" (Yin & Jing, 2014, p. 102).    
Sommer and Pearson (2007) provide further insight into the complexities faced 
by a CMT identifying that often, in a crisis, conventional decision making no 
longer suffices. The team may need to not only follow process and routines but 
to do so by applying creative and novel decisions.  A creative decision is defined 
as a decision that is both a novel contribution and of operational value. A novel 
decision is unusual, uncommon, unconventional, or different from past 
decisions (Sommer & Pearson, 2007).  Pearson (2002), in studying blueprinting 
for crisis management, canvassed the themes relating to crisis prepared 
organisations, including the role of training and response capabilities, and with 
Claire (1997) outlined the enduring interest in the role of leadership within a 
CMT.  The studies concluded that leadership within the context of team 
operations was a critical area of future study and suggested that further 
research might focus on whether the leadership skills, strategies and 
approaches required during a crisis mirror those that are effective during 
normal operations.  That aligns to the current area of study, which examines the 
role of team composition and leadership as it relates to the issue of process 
deviation by a CMT.  It also raised a specific question in respect of the 
personality types that are best suited to perform not only the crisis response 
role but also the critical role of the crisis leader. Ultimately, it is difficult to 
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dispute the impact of weak leadership and its translation to ineffective team 
performance within a crisis context (Owen, 2008, 2011; Smith, 1990, 2000; 
Turner, 1976 ). That said, it is not the only factor that contributes to the cause of 
process deviation (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016a; Fischbacher-Smith, 2017) with 
the following section delving into the role that planning, preparation and 
training can play. 
2.2.4  Planning, Preparation and Training  
As the business environment has been rendered more complex, the need to 
focus on crisis management readiness has heightened.  These are trends that 
will continue. Carmeli and Schaubroeck (2008, p. 178) argue that in order “to 
have and maintain an advantageous position in a complex and high-velocity 
environment, the top management team (TMT) needs to build up a repertoire of 
responses that will ensure the organisation’s viability under all plausible 
circumstances”.  Labas (2017, p. 78) notes that “organizational crisis 
preparedness has strategic importance and significant influence on business, 
which is mainly the result of an adequate existing crisis preparedness culture 
and firm’s values.” He concludes:  
“lots of firms are crisis prone and a few are truly crisis prepared. The 
results obtained stress the importance of adequately implementing 
organizational crisis preparedness, while also outlining that firms should 
take action. Accordingly, in order to succeed, the implementation of 
organizational crisis preparedness should be top managers’ strategic 
responsibility and they, in turn, should be able to train and motivate their 
employees” (Labas, 2017, p. 78). 
The existence of threats to competitiveness and business survival however, may 
or may not be sufficient stimuli to cause business leaders to ‘think the 
unthinkable’.  That said, it is acknowledged that preparation is the backbone of a 
solid response program. Robert and Latjtha (2002, p. 187) support this and 
argue that:  
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"the key to effective crisis management lies not so much with the writing of 
detailed manuals…as with structured and continuous learning processes 
designed to equip key managers with the capabilities, flexibility and 
confidence to deal with sudden and unexpected problems/events".     
Additionally, they contended that plans and routines should be subject to 
ongoing review to ensure that they remain relevant.  This updating should be 
enriched with feedback from experience and through simulation exercises. 
Organisational learning is critical to the review process and Bundy et al (2016, 
p. 1678) note that, while research remains equivocal on the ability of 
organisations to learn from a crisis, there is evidence that learning is highly 
conditional and driven by multi-level phenomenon.  Irrespective of the 
complexity, post crisis learning is a core activity and is a “rather straightforward 
process: the causes of the crisis event are revealed through evaluation, after 
which flaws are addressed by the implementation of changes” (Broekema, Kleef, 
& Steen, 2017, p. 328).  Broekema et al (2017, p. 329) also noted that 
sensemaking is a central part of returning to normality and the “shared 
understanding of the causes of events and what changes should be made to 
prevent future crises might facilitate the effective implementation of crisis 
lessons”.   
The importance of the routine of learning post a crisis can be traced back to the 
work of Turner.  He noted that “when the immediate effects [of a disaster] have 
subsided, it becomes possible to move toward something like a full cultural 
readjustment . . . of beliefs, norms and precautions, making them compatible 
with the newly gained understanding of the world” (Turner, 1976 p. 382). The 
importance rests in the fact that a crisis creates an environment that challenges 
existing routines and management thinking. It provides the opportunity for 
reflection however it is observed that full cultural review and readjustment is 
an ideal that is rarely achieved (Smith & Elliott, 2007).  The barriers to post 
crisis learning are varied and can include a belief that catastrophic events are 
unique in nature and restricted in both space and time. Additionally, the 
organisations learning culture may give rise to single loop learning and in this 
scenario while some learning occurs “it tends to occur within the dominant 
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organizational paradigm which may well have given rise to the conditions for 
the failure in the first place” (Smith & Elliott, 2007, p. 532). 
Acknowledging the importance of learning, it is critical that facilitated learning 
exists within the structured processes and routines. Here again the crisis leader 
plays the pivotal role in ensuring that team members are engaged and take part 
in the learning process. In this post “crisis revision stage, when normality has 
been restored, there is time for reflection and more structural changes can be 
implemented, such as changes in protocols” (Broekema et al., 2017, p. 335).  
When conducting the learning, it is critical to ensure the correct climate exists. 
This is because during a crisis things go wrong and therefore post crisis “the 
learning climate should lead workers to feel accepted and respected rather than 
fearing blame, punishment or ridicule engaging workers in a process of self-
diagnoses” (Margaryan, Littlejohn, & Lukic, 2018, p. 59). 
Building on the themes discussed, in the planning and preparation stage the 
importance of the plan and the artefacts becomes clear since they provide 
structure for those who are working under duress.  Training and rehearsals 
through simulations are the keys to ensuring that a CMT is prepared to manage 
a crisis, as the team gains awareness of decision strategies that enhance the 
response to potential crises and their associated pressure (Roberts, 1990; 
Sommer & Pearson, 2007). While practice does not necessarily make perfect, “it 
does seem to lead to clearer thinking and smoother action under duress” 
(Pearson et al., 1997, p. 53). In respect of the ostensive routines and the role of 
plans, it has been contended that “the purpose of crisis management is not to 
produce a set of plans, it is to prepare the organization to think creatively” 
(Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 59). The practice of the ostensive routine and the 
delivery of the required performance in times of pressure therefore becomes 
critical, hence the importance of training.  
Research does examine deviation in training, yet only in the context of 
preparation; that is, how companies actually prepare and why they deviate from 
best practice in this space (Kovoor-Misra, Zammuto, & Mitroff, 2000). The study 
by Kovoor-Misra et al (2000) did not extend to an evaluation of CMT 
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performance or the failure to utilise the artefacts created to support the 
ostensive routine.  Acknowledging that the crisis management plan and its 
components form the artefacts supporting the ostensive routine, their use must 
become ingrained into team member behaviour through regular rehearsal. This 
is ongoing education, training and process validation that participants on the 
crisis team undergo in order to ensure that, during a crisis, their performance is 
aligned to the script.     
In the area of planning and preparation Pearson and Mitroff (1993) highlighted 
the need for proactive (e.g. signal detection) and reactive (e.g. containment 
strategies) components of crisis management. Signal detection ensures that 
signs of danger are identified (Rerup, 2006), for – irrespective of how weak the 
signals may be – there are often processes that can be enacted to aid in the 
detection of the event (Rerup, 2012), and “through a deliberate set of integrated 
and interrelated series of actions…these organizations make major crisis far less 
likely to occur” (Mitroff & Pauchant, 1990, p. 79).  
While Elsubbaugh et al (2004) agree that training is at the core of preparation, 
they challenge Mitroff’s focus on the importance of early warning indicators.  
They argue that this position fails to acknowledge the importance of the 
interrelationship between risk, resilience and crisis management and associated 
preventative strategies that can stop a crisis from eventuating.  Counter 
research, though, has reinforced the importance of signals detection. This 
includes such elements as indicators of consumer safety, and how this 
complements strategies to ensure that managers are well prepared, with the 
skills and practice to act effectively (Pearson, 2002, 2012).  Additionally it 
discusses culture as a concept specifically linked to the role of enabling, 
enacting and elaborating to drive cultural change and imbed practices (Vogus, 
Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010).  
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2.3 Ostensive and Performative Routines 
This research examined the interaction of ostensive and performative routines 
in a crisis response and the factors contributing to deviation.  With this 
establishing the context at the outset it is observed that the relevance of pre-
determined routines and plans in crisis response is an issue that has been 
debated within the literature. In the context of complexity, the potential for 
systems emergence is high (Goldstein, 1999; Gribbin, 2005; Holland, 2000) and 
it is therefore the ability of the crisis management team to adapt that is critical. 
This is also influenced by the complexity and dynamics of the operational 
environment and the socio-technical system that comprise the location of the 
crisis. Within this context it is still pertinent to examine the extant literature 
regarding ostensive and performative routines and discuss this within the 
context of the crisis response. 
Feldman and Pentland (2003) first raised the concept of ostensive and 
performative aspects in the creation and execution of routines.  Ostensive refers 
to the abstract pattern of actions, whilst performative refers to the specific 
instances of action, actors, time and place. It is arguable that the ostensive and 
performative aspects are not part of the definition of routines, as a routine is 
defined by repetitive, recognisable patterns of interdependent actions (Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003; Mante & Sydow, 2007; Pentland et al., 2010). While routines 
are a fundamental part of how organisations go about accomplishing their 
objectives, it is the actual behavioural patterns that constitute routines, rather 
than the managerially desired patterns of behaviour. As Feldman and Pentland 
(2003, p. 102) note “the ostensive aspect of the routine is the idea; the 
performative aspect, the enactment. Both aspects are necessary to constitute 
what we understand to be the routine.” Additionally, they argue that the:  
“ostensive aspect of a routine can serve as a template for behaviour… and 
is why routines are sometimes likened to scripts. But it serves only as a 
guide; it cannot specify the details of the performance, which people must 
choose.” (2003, p. 106) 
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Howard-Grenville (2005, p. 618) built on this theme, arguing that: 
“the ostensive aspect acts as a guide for what actions should be taken in 
performing a routine and can also account for actions already taken. It 
signifies what is distinctive about a set of activities that can be called a 
routine. Conversely, the performance of a routine recreates, maintains, and 
may modify the ostensive aspect of the routine.”  
Additionally, it has been argued that the actual processes generate performance 
outcomes, with Becker et al (2005) positioning Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) 
argument that the abstract understandings and the specific performances, as 
well as artefacts, are rarely precisely aligned; rather, they are interrelated in 
complex ways. For instance, the performative and ostensive aspects of routines 
are mutually constitutive, with the ostensive guiding the performance but not 
determining the result. The performative aspect of routines can be best 
understood as inherently improvisational, thus it is impossible to specify 
routines in a complete way (Becker et al., 2005, p. 781).  As Aggerholm et al 
(2014) argue, the performative aspect is essential for the creation and 
recreation of the ostensive aspect, while the ostensive aspect constrains and 
enables the performative. Power and position of the different inter-dependent 
occupational groups are influential regarding organisational resilience: the 
actors improvise, adapt and redefine roles as members of an occupational group 
to defend their occupational territory and their expertise (Tillement, 2009).  It 
is also argued that one cannot assume that the processes as designed have been 
objectively created and fit for purpose. It is argued that by definition the 
routines will not be designed to deal with emergent conditions that are by 
definition, unforeseen or alternatively they can contain and reflect latent errors 
that have been embedded by those who designed the response (Reason, 1990, 
1997; Smith, 2005). 
On the topic of deviation, the literature confirms that human nature is such that 
performative deviation from the documented routine can occur and there is 
extensive research theorising the rationale for deviation (Feldman, 2000; 
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Feldman & Pentland, 2003). For example Feldman (2000) studied why 
individuals do not always carry out routines as they are intended. She 
concluded that people changed their enactment of routines in the day-to-day 
application because the routine was not achieving as intended or the outcome 
wished for; it was producing unintended or undesirable outcomes; or because 
outcomes revealed new possibilities. In each case, people either sought to repair 
a routine, or strove to improve it to match their aspirations. Beyond simple 
trial-and-error learning and adjustment, Feldman (2000) further argued, such 
changes could lead to ongoing, continuous change in how the routine is used 
across an organisation (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011 p.435).  
Deviation from a routine therefore may not in itself be a negative but can create 
positive benefits when improvements in the routine eventuate. This is the 
critical criterion: improvements in the ostensive routines must occur.  
Additionally, deviation can be also referred to as improvised behaviour and as 
Martinez concluded in his study on crisis leadership “improvised behaviour will 
only reveal its appropriateness in its aftermath. Improvisation could be defined 
as the unplanned, just-in-time behavior used to achieve the best possible result” 
(Martínez‐Córcoles, 2018, p. 241).  This research adopts elements of a 
theatrical metaphor as it delves into aspects of business life in terms of how 
activities are carried out and ordered with organisational members enacting 
roles, interpreting scripts and working to respond to scenes and plots 
(Cornelissen & Werner, 2014, p. 715). The relevance is that “in the case of the 
‘organization as theatre’ metaphor, the aspectual or structural similarity that is 
constructed between the concepts of ‘organization’ and ‘theatre’ in their 
respective domains is that within both entities activities are carried out and 
statements are made that have a performative quality” (Cornelissen & Werner, 
2014, p. 714). In their work, Barley and Tolbert defined scripts as "observable, 
recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular 
setting" (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 100) that mediate between the level of the 
field and the level of action. When actors perform the script by playing their 
roles within a plot, their behavior elicits reciprocal scripted behavior from 
others and this pattern of interaction confirms the organizational routine. If 
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actors vary from the script, the routine is disrupted and may change. Barley 
argues that the “actors' behaviors and interpretations give life to these 
abstractions…but since acts of communication, power, and moral sanction 
necessarily entail the vagaries of interaction, some slippage will occur between 
the institutional template and the exigencies of daily life” (Barley, 1986, p. 80).  
It is evident that the routines are critical for providing a framework, script and 
lens for the actors and that the institution is reliant on the actors interpretation. 
Barley et al (1997, p. 102) determined that actions created deviation and “in 
many cases, however, enactment does not involve awareness or intentionality: 
actors simply behave according to their perception of the way things are.”  This 
is particularly relevant where an individual lacks knowledge or experience, or 
both, since it enables ‘thinking before acting’ rather than ‘acting before 
thinking’. There are obviously individual characteristics associated with a 
propensity to individual action in crisis situations, where the actors may lack 
knowledge or experience, or both, or fail to enter into dialogue or follow process 
when their habits and routines are interrupted (Vera, Crossan, Rerup, & 
Werner, 2014).  
Howard-Grenville (2005) also analysed the intentions of the actors and the 
manner in which activities are performed in order to understand the way in 
which intentions can influence the routines and the way that routines can be 
changed over time. The process “conceptualizes routines as ongoing 
accomplishments, and it extends it by identifying how actors and contexts shape 
both individual performances of routines and contribute to their persistence or 
change over time” (Howard-Grenville, 2005, p. 618).  The focus though becomes 
the importance of deviation and its ultimate impact for it has been argued that 
“while idiosyncratic deviations from script occur, perhaps even with some 
frequency, such random deviations are apt to have only passing impact on social 
arrangements”(Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 102). However, while valid in respect 
to innovation through script alterations this position does not address the 
importance of potential negative consequences of this immediate response.   
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Conversely, Iannacci and Hatzaras (2012) contend that the actors have the 
option of altering the script. They argue that studies by Feldman and Pentland 
had a major shortcoming, as the work forced scholars to accept a single level of 
reality which is ‘flat’ and ‘horizontal’, thus diminishing the existence of 
emergent properties. Therefore, while the ostensive aspects of routines fall 
within the realm of the actual, the performative aspects fall into an empirical 
domain.  While participants may use the ostensive aspect to guide actions and 
account for what they are doing, and to refer to patterns of activity that would 
otherwise be incomprehensible, the performative aspect creates, maintains and 
modifies the ostensive aspect in practice (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013).  The 
reactions of the participants are therefore situated in institutional, 
organisational and personal contexts. Their actions are motivated by will and 
intention with the organisational routine created through a reciprocal 
interactional relationship between the performative and ostensive aspects.   
Sonenshein (2016), in his study on the utilisations of routines in a retail chain, 
discussed the relationship of creativity (a form of deviation) and routines for 
“although scholars typically view creativity and routines as opposing concepts, a 
routine dynamics perspective helps recast these concepts as a duality. 
Recognizing their mutual constitution, and theorizing the dynamics and 
mechanisms that explain their relationship, illustrates how creativity is as much 
a part of routines as routines are a part of creativity” (Sonenshein, 2016, p. 756). 
Therefore, if deviation is a form of creativity Sonenshein argues that “adopting a 
dynamic ontology of routines allows scholars to notice and elaborate on how 
routines and creativity are not inherently contradictory because creativity is 
endogenous to and an outcome of routine performances” (2016, p. 753). 
While creativity can play a role, and indeed is important in managing through 
complex scenarios, other scholars argue the importance of the relationship 
between role switching and adaption. For example Rosales (2014) argued that 
routines are upheld and underpinned through two main practices: role 
switching and role adaptation. By changing roles, individuals manage to 
maintain routines through the fulfilment of activities that correspond to others. 
Adjusting role actions enables individuals to perform the routine while taking 
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situational factors into account. The present research suggests that looking at 
organisational routines from a role-based perspective could enhance our 
understanding of the micro-foundations of organisational routines. In turn, 
routine theory has brought an important contribution to our understanding of 
organisations. In particular, it has denoted a renewed interest in organised 
action after a long period during which action, activity and work were neglected 
(Barley & Kunda 2001).  
Researchers had in some cases focused their attention on decision systems; 
information processing; actors' subjective involvement and motivation; formal 
and informal rules; market and competition; or technologies. Research in 
routines also addresses the key role of past experience and organisational 
history in the development of the present forms of action and competences and  
“last but not least it illustrates the complex epistemic nature of action, by 
showing that acts are not only performed transformations of the world, but 
also social, historical and cultural meaningful signs, and recognizable 
segments of complex, recognizable and purposeful social patterns of 
action.” (Lorino, 2014, p. 1).  
Further delving into the area of performative aspects of routines, a new stream 
of organisational research has emerged in recent years which draws on the 
notion of mindfulness (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). At the same time, there is a 
long-standing body of work that emphasises the role of routine-driven, or less-
mindful, behaviour. Levinthal and Rerup (2006) attempt in their research to 
connect these two seemingly disparate literatures, arguing that at a 
performative level important elements of less-mindful processes are necessary 
elements underlying mindfulness. Here they note important elements of 
mindfulness that underlie less-mindful behaviour, in particular the role of 
mindfulness in interpreting one’s context so as to identify what constitutes 
appropriate action in a given circumstance, and in interpreting outcomes that 
form the basis for processes of reinforcement learning.  Essentially, mindfulness 
is seen as a state of active awareness characterized by the continual creation 
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and refinement of categories, openness to new information, and a willingness to 
view contexts from multiple perspectives (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). 
The actors consider the context in which they find themselves and ask what 
behaviours are suited to that context (Pentland & Feldman, 2005) and how they 
relate to the application of the performance against the routine.  
Arguably though, during crisis response the success of the program rests with 
structure and execution. Here the ostensive routines and supporting artefacts 
provide the framework and script from which a CMT operates and strives for 
‘positive adjustment’. So, while the ostensive routines may, and in fact should, 
change over time through structured post crisis reviews, it is critical that 
changes do not occur during the course of managing the response, for the result 
can be confusion, misdirection and excessive deviation. An actual neglect of 
processes by the performers can also exacerbate what is initially a routine 
business incident and turn it into a crisis. This point is reinforced by 
Fischbacher-Smith (D) and Fischbacher-Smith (M) who highlighted “the central 
role that management can play in the generation of crisis events. A crisis is not 
simply about the operational phase or even the processes by which turnaround 
processes occur but it is a function of the core activities of management.” 
(Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2016, p. 935) 
Debate extends to the role that artefacts play, with one position being that the 
artefacts such as rules and procedures are sometimes mistaken for the 
ostensive aspect of the routine. Artefacts such as checklists can provide a 
convenient trace of the performative, but it is argued that the ostensive and 
performative aspect of the routines are recursively related; while the artefacts 
are distinct from the routine and therefore artefact-centred, assumptions about 
design are not suited to the design of organisational routines (Pentland & 
Feldman, 2008). A counter-argument brings artefacts to the centre of the 
routine as they are not passive black boxes; rather they perform a role in 
directing the actor’s performance.  The more successful performative programs 
manage to utilise an array of materials and tools to create a functional 
environment, and where the performative elements struggle with competing 
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agencies, artefacts play a key role (D'Adderio, 2010).  This is relevant in the 
study of ostensive routines during crisis response as artefacts provide the 
program’s direction and guidance for the actors. However, they are often 
underutilised or not utilised at all, creating script deviation. When evaluating a 
routine, Gawande (2011, p. 79) notes, we need to acknowledge that a  
"routine requires balancing a number of virtues: freedom and discipline, 
craft and protocol, specialized ability and group collaboration. And for 
checklists to help achieve the balance, they have to take two almost 
opposing forms. They supply a set of checks to ensure that the stupid but 
critical stuff is not overlooked, and they ensure another set of checks to 
ensure people talk and coordinate and accept responsibility while 
nonetheless being left the power to manage the nuances and 
unpredictability."  
The importance of checklists as an artefact cannot be understated, since they 
can “have several objectives, including memory recall, standardization and 
regulation of processes and methodologies, providing a framework for 
evaluation or as a diagnostic tool” (Hales & Pronovost, 2006, p. 231). An 
additional element with the use of a checklists is the “cessation of activity if the 
steps of the process are not enacted have become cornerstones of the safety 
movement” (Seifert, 2009, p. 653).  Regardless of the context in which the 
checklist is used, the goal is to control and reduce errors in any industry sector 
(Degani & Wiener, 1997).  This was confirmed in a review of medical studies 
which found that safety checklists are effective tools for improving patient 
safety. “Their use has reduced mortality and morbidity. In addition, safety 
checklists strengthen compliance with guidelines, improve human factors, and 
reduce the incidence of adverse events” (Thomassen, Storesund, Søfteland, & 
Brattebø, 2014, p. 15).  
In considering the checklist routine in the context of crisis management, it 
needs to be understood that the checklists will take two forms. They are the 
‘DO-CONFIRM’ checklist style and the ‘READ-DO’ style (Gawande, 2011, p. 122). 
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With the former, the team during their routines perform their job from memory 
and experience. Then they stop, take a breath, and run the checklist to make 
sure everything that should be done has been done, and utilise this tool to 
trigger additional ideas.  This is in contrast to the READ-DO checklist, which is 
akin to following a recipe (Gawande, 2011, p. 123). All steps must be taken in 
the correct sequence to ensure it is effective (e.g. the ostensive routine applied 
by a pilot). In the case of a crisis response, the confirmation approach holds 
specific relevance as it provides that critical stop and check point that enables a 
validation of the activities that are being performed. Therefore, the integration 
of a DO-CONFIRM checklist as an artefact in the crisis response program is 
essential to and supportive of the broader range of artefacts that are applied in 
a crisis response.  Finally, it must be reinforced that, in the context of the 
routine,  
“the checklist is only an aid and if it does not aid, then it is not right. If it is 
effective as an aid, we must be ready to embrace it while at all times 
remembering that the checklist must change over time while 
acknowledging that the checklist does not tell us what to do, rather it helps 
us to be as smart as possible at each step of the way, ensuring crucial 
information is on hand when needed” (Gawande, 2011, p. 167). 
Ultimately, all these elements need to be factored into the consideration of the 
deviation from routines during crisis management. 
 
2.4  Enterprise Risk Management 
Risk management is a process that assists in the management of uncertainty 
with the downside elements minimised while the growth elements are 
maximised.  The business operating environment remains complex, volatile and 
at times ambiguous, with the risks and hazards today being influenced by 
modernisation and are systemically intensified due to globalisation (Beck, 1992, 
p. 21).  Industry observations have concluded that risk management plays a 
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pivotal role in resilience and this stems from it residing within a three-
dimensional model that encompasses the risk operating environment and 
processes; governance and accountability structures; and best practice crisis 
preparedness and response (Gius, Mieszala, Panayiotou, & Poppensieker, 2018).   
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a program that enhances the traditional 
approaches of risk management and brings the management of risk out of 
functional silos, thereby enhancing the visibility not only of the risks themselves 
but also of the controls and management actions applied to manage those risks. 
It is argued that ERM leads to enhanced business management, organisational 
effectiveness, improved business performance and increased business value, 
and assists in the identification of potential crisis scenarios (Gates, Nicolas, & 
Walker, 2012; Gorzeń-Mitka, 2013). Ultimately, risk is inherent in any given 
situation and, while risks can be subjective in nature (Das & Teng, 2001),  they 
stem from the business environment which establishes their contextual 
meaning. Risk is neither static nor objective, but is constantly constructed and 
negotiated (Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009).  It is therefore argued 
that the risk management process assists in ensuring that managers have a 
system that guides them in the management of uncertainty and “predictable 
surprises”.  It addresses an issue observed by Watkins et al whereby “lapses in 
recognition occur when leaders remain oblivious to an emerging threat or 
problem – a lack of attention that can plague even the most skilled executive” 
(Watkins & Bazerman, 2003, p. 75).  Fischbacher-Smith et al (Fischbacher-Smith 
& Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, p. 56) confirm the importance on understanding the 
broader dynamics and risks by directing their students “to consider other 
concepts, such as regulatory gaps that create vulnerabilities to a crisis, the 
notion that crises incubate over time, and the extent to which organizational 
cultures may both incubate problems and constrain the capacity to learn from 
them” which are all sources of risk.  Other ‘predictable surprises’ can stem from 
“bad management, reactive attitudes, not complying with rules, silo thinking 
and more. Organizations can collectively prepare much better for the 
unexpected through system- level thinking and activating partnerships with 
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stakeholders” (Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017, p. 120) with this stakeholder 
collaboration central to effective risk management. 
Therefore, central to the success of an ERM program is ensuring that ostensive 
routines exist to provide the framework and structure and that the prevailing 
cultural mindset drives management from considering potential losses to 
thinking of potential gains, thus requiring a focus away from downside of 
uncertainty.  This requires processes and routines that imbed ERM into plans 
supporting business growth (Alesi, 2008; Hubert, 2011).  This is specifically 
relevant as risk is often not clearly identifiable and manageable, but emerges 
and is socially constructed (Renn, Jaeger, Rosa, & Webler, 1992) from “complex 
and necessarily incomplete processes of organizational attention involving 
information systems, incentive structures and narratives of explanation which 
are the source of further uncertainties” (Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin-Andersson, & 
Power, 2006, p. 1333).  
There is however, ongoing debate as to the value of ERM. McShane et al (2011) 
contend that the abstract nature of ERM creates a perceived difficulty in 
quantifying value to business objectives. Power (2005) also expressed concern 
relating to some of the limitations associated with processes around operational 
(enterprise) risk management particularly the predictive validity of the various 
calculative practices used and their relevance in complex settings.  That said, he 
contended that a focus on operational risk “invented new visibilities within risk 
management and new possibilities for intervention and control in the name of 
risk” (Power, 2005, p. 595).  Fong et al (2011) further contended that, as ERM 
provides a clear linkage between risk and opportunity, it clearly assists in 
positioning a company to leverage competitive advantage, thus contributing to 
its resilience and ongoing viability.  A flow-on effect is the ability to market the 
value of a risk and resilience program to underwriters, thereby leveraging 
significant savings in insurance premiums (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011), and thus 
minimising the cost of insurable risk. Additional benefits rest in the ability of the 
program to identify potential crisis scenarios, thus ensuring that the correct 
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ostensive routines and artefacts are implemented to manage the occurrence of 
the risk.   
The ERM routines enable cataloguing of risks and the assessment of the risk 
parameters. This provides for policy development and formulation of 
“strategies and tactics for dealing with each potential crisis; and identifying who 
will be affected by them and devising effective communication channels to those 
who are affected" (Alas & Gao, 2010, p. 30).  As Comer noted, an understanding 
of the risk management processes and their linkage to crisis response, helps 
with providing appreciation of “the illusiveness and elusiveness of certainty; to 
distinguish between what is truly unknowable, what is merely unknown, and 
what is known but ignored; and to be able to prepare cognitively, emotionally, 
and practically for and respond wisely, morally, and skillfully to whatever the 
future may bring” (Comer, 2012, p. 3). 
Additionally, the concept of risk identification and the role of early warning are 
intertwined with crisis management.  This is due to the fact that, proactively, 
businesses should minimise the occurrence of unexpected events which can 
become a threat to organisational survival if they exceed a certain temporal and 
spatial scale (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010). “Effective threat recognition is, 
however, often inhibited by paradigm blindness, where decision makers deny 
the plausibility of particular threats and fail to develop appropriate mitigation 
strategies” (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014b, p. 432).  ERM enables risk identification 
and mitigation to occur and can assist in addressing this blindness.  
By imbedding ERM into the business resilience framework, businesses are able 
to find ways to deal with challenging issues not only prior to their occurrence, 
but once they have occurred in a crisis scenario and before their impacts 
escalate. Watkins and Bazerman support the argument that there is a critical 
linkage between risk management and crisis management as we need to be 
cognizant of the important sequence that involves “recognizing the threat, to 
making it a priority in the organization, to actually mobilizing the resources 
required to stop it” (2003, p. 74) and this awareness of potential crisis 
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situations through enterprise risk management is a critical first step.  Processes 
and routines that support crisis response planning come to the fore at this time 
because while experience is a component of the mental map of what options the 
crisis or risk managers have when confronted with seemingly similar events, 
the ostensive routines are designed to guide them in the response. Furthermore, 
in these cases, sensemaking becomes a retrospective process in which the risk 
manager uses their past experiences to judge what makes sense in the future. 
Judging what constitutes a risk in situations including a crisis is not only the 
estimated chance of an event, as prescribed by the techno-scientific perspective, 
or our ability to cognitively identify events as risky, it is also informed by past 
and present knowledge of similar occurrences (Taarup-Esbensen, 2018, p. 7). 
 
2.5  Business Resilience  
 
The definition of terms that are used to share organisational behaviours are an 
important aspect in framing performance and ambiguity in definitions can 
impair performance (Fischbacher-Smith, 2017).  Resilience is one of the 
concepts that has been difficult to define and can have a range of different 
meanings.  By way of example, in engineering resilience is often framed in terms 
of the ability of a system to bounce back, whilst in systems biology resilience is 
framed in the terms of fitness of organisms and organisations to operate across 
different environments (Fischbacher-Smith, 2017).  Cole (2015) proposed yet 
another variant to resilience arguing that in the business sense it incorporates 
strategic and operational elements. Strategically it focusses on diversifying to 
meet changing situations and incorporates the adjustments to business models 
and strategies. The operational element relates to an ability to function properly 
when adverse situations arise.  Others, such as Marchese et al (2018) have 
adopted the definition of the United States National Research Council which 
defines resilience as “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from 
and more successfully adapt to adverse events”.  
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With this backdrop of complexity, in the business context, it is argued that in 
recent years the concept of business resilience has undergone a metamorphosis. 
Conventionally, the concept focused on responding to disruptive events and an 
organisation’s ability to survive in chaotic and turbulent times (Kantur & Iseri-
Say, 2012). In fact, even today some researchers maintain this narrow focus. For  
example, Teo et al (2017, p. 136) contend that “resilience may be framed as the 
capacity to bounce back to a state of normality or as an emergent property, 
when an organization learns to adjust to adversity and, in the process, 
strengthens its capability to overcome future challenges.” Other research 
however focuses on a manager’s need to understand the overall structure and 
conduct of the organisation in order to combine both proactive and reactive 
business responses with affirmations that the proactive approach improves the 
ability of an organisation to deal with complexity and risk. (Normandin & 
Therrien, 2016, p. 108). Proactively, this includes enhancing and culturally 
embedding routines involving ERM and protective security measures aimed at 
minimising the likelihood of an adverse occurrence. These proactive measures 
are then closely aligned to reactive response and recovery strategies such as 
crisis management and business continuity planning (Burnard & Bhamra, 2011; 
Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith., 2009).  This combination provides 
flexibility, with the ‘resilient organization’ having flexibility as opposed to 
rigidity, enabling it to respond more effectively than an organisation that has 
not embraced this approach (Tillement, 2009).   An example of the new 
paradigm in action as adopted by CCHBC, is depicted in figure 1. 
 
In their article Business Resilience: The best defense is a good offence, IBM (2009) 
also argue that true business resilience is more than simply having a good 
response to an adverse event. It starts with having an understanding of exactly 
what a business requires to survive unexpected events and plan for the future. 
Central to the reactive elements of business resilience and the continuity of 
services are several core elements. These include effective event identification 
which incorporates risk management; mitigation and control planning; business 
readiness; and the ability to respond effectively and in a timely manner to any 
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threat or opportunity through strong crisis management and business 
continuity.  This combination of activities ensures that businesses are no longer 
working defensively; instead they have embraced a combined proactive and 
reactive business resilience approach. This enables them to leverage growth 
opportunities and respond to unexpected events promptly, more efficiently and 
in the most cost-effective manner.  Prezelj and Doerfel build on this theme by 
noting that “resilience involves preparedness measures (planning, risk 
assessment, training and education), high-reliability organizing (collective 
capability to manage the unexpected), networking among stakeholders 
(planning and preparedness) and reactive measures” (Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017, 
p. 118).   
Crisis management resides within the reactive measures category as do 
elements such as business continuity management and disaster recovery.  
Supporting the business resilience paradigm shift, Anderson (2014) argues that 
Figure 1 – The CCHBC business resilience paradim in action 
Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company Business Resilience Model – 
implemented 2015 
 
▪ CCHBC has identified the intrinsic benefits of a proactive and reactive approach to 
business resilience 
▪ The role of the Group Chief Risk Officer is to lead the response across specific streams 
while ensuring that the business has full visibility of all risks and the associated 
mitigation and control strategies.  
▪ The structure below depicts how the business draws the critical components together 
and, by assigning accountability via one leader, can leverage synergies across the streams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
businesses currently operate in an environment influenced by volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. In response, a resilient business today 
needs to do several things, and do them well. In essence resilient businesses 
today need to: understand their risks and opportunities and proactively adapt 
business strategies to respond to changing circumstances; utilise an exceptional 
internal and external risk radar that enables them to detect changes in their 
operational environment; build strong internal and external functional 
collaborative networks that encourage the sharing of information; work 
proactively to minimise business exposures and leverage opportunity; and be 
able to respond rapidly and decisively to a crisis. This aligns with the position of 
Prezelj and Doerfel (2017) who have presented the proactive and reactive 
nature of business resilience in their research. 
Drawing from the concepts listed, for the purpose of this research business 
resilience draws together a number of elements and is defined as the ability of a 
business to manage uncertainty and maintain positive adjustment under 
challenging conditions while enabling growth. This is achieved through the 
implementation of preparedness measures (e.g. ERM, security, training) and 
effective reactive measures (e.g. crisis management, business continuity, 
disaster recovery) that provide fundamental response mechanisms (Anderson, 
2014; Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). 
In the context of this research, it is the final component of business resilience 
relating to crisis management response that plays a pivotal role in protecting 
brands and reputation. As Caywood and Englewood (2003) argue, effective 
crisis management is critical as the reality is that bad things can and do happen 
to good companies.  
“Media decry mistakes, missteps and misdeeds. Stakeholders fear the 
performance of their investments. Customers question loyalty … and in the 
end the outcomes are determined by how companies behave – by what they 
do, how they do it and when they do it.” (Caywood & Englehart, 2003, p. 2) 
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McCann et al (2009, p. 45) further support the alignment between business 
resilience and crisis management, concluding that “companies exhibiting higher 
levels of agility and resiliency are more competitive and profitable even with 
higher levels of turbulence.”  Moreover, through critical planning that addresses 
business plan inaccuracies, an organisation’s risk management program 
automatically becomes integrated with crisis management and business 
continuity (Barton, Shenkir, & L. Walker, 2008), thereby strengthening 
resilience. Building on this theme the importance of assessing resilience before 
a crisis is identified contributes to effective crisis preparation, while evaluation 
after a crisis on all aspects of resilience can ensure that recovery measures will 
not cause an imbalance by placing the correct focus on the required elements 
and in the correct sequence (Normandin & Therrien, 2016, p. 116). 
Finally, Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) argue that resiliency is not a rare and 
extraordinary concept, but emerges from an ability to adapt and to maintain 
positive adjustments under challenging circumstances.  Therefore, as 
businesses adapt to the complexities of a new environment, the resilient 
organisation is not just able to respond, but rather has the ability to align  
“its strategy, operations, management systems, governance structure and 
decision support capabilities so that it can uncover and adjust to 
continually changing risks … and create advantages over less adaptive 
competitors” (Starr, 2003).  
 
 2.6  Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework and the interaction of the various elements existing 
within an organisation relevant to this study and the interconnectivity between 
the ostensive and performative routines together with the business resilience 
linkages are depicted in figure two.  These linkages establish the core themes as 
discussed in the literature review and establish the question of how the 
ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management situation 
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and what factors contribute to deviations from the routines. The framework 
depicts the time bound nature of organisational events and the influence 
created by the organisation’s dynamic external and internal environment on 
resilience, risk and crisis management. The upper section of the process flow 
illustrates the core preventative elements that support the creation of the state 
of business resilience.  The lower section illustrates the flow as it relates to a 
crisis response with both process flows resulting in contextual change over time 
(T=Time).  
 
 Figure 2 – Theoretical Framework 
The utilisation of time as a research lens enables consideration of both the 
organisational processes and practices together with temporally-centred 
phenomena such as timing, pace, change, and flow (Adam, 1995; Bluedorn & 
Denhardt, 1988). Evaluation of time can be complex with clock time dominating 
management thinking as it has been standardised in a way that makes it 
fundamental to industrial production.  The difficulty in research is that an 
individual’s experience of time can be too complex for clock time to capture as 
an individual comprises a complex mixture of experiences and hence the 
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complexity of ‘real’ time (Adam, 1995). In the context of this research real time 
is utilised as a reference point against which activities are mapped.   
The timing is influenced by variables along a time continuum with two temporal 
maps existing, one for the ‘normal’ state of play and the other for the ‘crisis’ 
situation. Irrespective of the stream, time plays a pivotal role in responding to 
organisational context changes (internal and external) and creating and 
modifying ostensive routines.   
This discussion of the theoretical framework will delve firstly into the core 
preventative component within business resilience and that is the area of risk 
management.  Secondly it discusses the dynamics as they relate to crisis 
management with time dynamics having an influence in both streams. 
Commencing with the top stream, risk management is integrated within 
business resilience and relates to the routines and processes that enable an 
organisation to effectively manage uncertainty. This involves utilising routines 
within ERM that minimise the downside of uncertainty while leveraging the 
upside which embrace identified growth opportunities.  As illustrated in the 
literature review, the risk management process is designed to assist in ensuring 
that managers have a system that guides them in the management of 
uncertainty and predictable surprises.  In a formalised manner, it addresses an 
issue observed by Watkins et al whereby “lapses in recognition occur when 
leaders remain oblivious to an emerging threat or problem – a lack of attention 
that can plague even the most skilled executive” (Watkins & Bazerman, 2003, p. 
75).   
As illustrated, the emphasis is placed in this proactive and preventative area on 
ensuring that the ostensive routines continued to remain relevant to the 
business by evaluating their suitability against the organisation’s performance 
over time and this establishes the connectivity to crisis management. Time in 
this scenario is influenced by both the organisation’s dynamic external and 
internal contexts and the routines will be modified over time to reflect changes 
in the operational context. The time variant between t1 and t3 will be driven by 
multiple factors emanating from external and internal organisational contexts 
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which are generally existent over a longer period of time (e.g. 2 – 3 years) and 
can influence the strategic direction of the organisation. 
Within the business resilience paradigm and with strong correlation to risk 
management, resides the reactive element of crisis management with its 
ostensive elements guiding the response, with performance, and the linkage to 
the script, dependent on various artefacts existing and being applied correctly.  
Crisis management resides in the parallel stream that comes to the fore when 
there is a requirement to activate the process. Relevant to this research, the 
crisis management stream and response will be triggered in the event of a crisis 
event and as outlined earlier, numerous events can trigger a crisis.  They can 
eventuate through the occurrence of an identified risk, from a system or process 
failure, through poor management (Turner, 1994) or on occasions when 
stakeholders consider a management response to a minor incident 
inappropriate, thereby turning what might be a normal business issue into an 
institutional crisis. Pearson and Sommer (2011, p. 27) observed that 
“organizational crises can seem to strike and disappear instantaneously, like a 
bolt of lightning, or they can build momentum and effect slowly, like a glacier.”   
This latter point illustrates the core time dynamics associated with a crisis.  The 
time frame that exists between t4 and t5 can indeed be quite limited and the 
nature of the performative response will influence the time that exists to move 
from t5 to t6.  A deviation from the routines has the potential to extend the time 
continuum with an increased time in resolving the crisis, having the potential to 
influence the degree to which organisational performance is adversely impacted 
over the short and long term.  Ultimately the resolution of the crisis and the 
evaluation of the learnings will drive change in both risk and crisis 
management.  This is important as the evaluation after a crisis on all aspects of 
resilience can ensure that recovery measures will not cause an imbalance by 
placing the correct focus on the required corrective elements and in the correct 
sequence.  
Overall, within the framework the routines provide the foundation for 
preparation and the response. The ostensive routines sit within the overarching 
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business resilience framework and guide the responses across the various 
elements. The ostensive routines established in an organisation and integrated 
in risk management enable it to respond to the dynamics of the external 
environment and the context that this establishes for the business.  Ostensive 
routines exist to guide the performative elements, so in this case, when a crisis 
arises, a team has the processes and artefacts which will enable them to 
navigate the waters around the response. As noted earlier, over time these will 
need to be modified to ensure that the ostensive routines retain their relevance 
not only for the internal dynamics of the organisation, but against the external 
dynamic factors that have the potential to impact the objectives of the 
organisation over time and from experience.  Taken in total, the proactive 
function of risk management coupled with an organisation’s response to a crisis 
directly support business resilience and hence viability. 
The review of the extant literature across the divergent yet interrelated fields of 
business resilience, enterprise risk management, ostensive and performative 
routines, and crisis management, indicated that while extensive work has been 
undertaken gaps remain.  It has been illustrated that while in this specific crisis 
management space of focus, work exists in the field of crisis team composition, 
crisis team leadership, and training there is no connectivity to the specific 
application and interaction of the ostensive routines during a crisis.  Returning 
then to the summation of Bundy et al. (2016) in respect to crisis management 
research it is reinforced that they concluded that while work on crisis 
leadership and teams exist, the work is often criticised for a lack of specificity 
and consideration to the role of resource dependence in crisis situations.  
They conclude that research on actions and processes would further inform the 
research on crisis management (Bundy et al., 2016).  This observation confirms 
the existence of a knowledge gap and therefore the analysis of how ostensive 
and performative routines interact in a crisis management situation and the 
factors contributing to process deviation from the routines in a business context 
would further inform the research in the crisis management field. In addition to 
informing the subject research the practical application of findings and 
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recommendations in this field will assist organisations in strengthening their 
approach to crisis management.  Therefore, this gap has created the 
fundamental research focus to understand how the ostensive and performative 
routines interact in a crisis management situation and what factors contribute 
to deviations from the routines. 
Lastly it is argued that this is an important gap to address as ultimately, crisis 
management is effective when operations are resumed, losses minimised, and 
key learnings occur, with these lessons being transferred to the management of 
future incidents. This will occur most effectively when the team composition is 
correct and the existing management routines are executed correctly thereby 
minimising process deviation. 
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter evaluated the extant literature and presented the theoretical 
framework within which this research would be conducted. This literature was 
subject to ongoing review throughout the research period from January 2014 to 
December 2018. In respect of the literature, it embraced an evaluation of data 
across multiple related streams starting with crisis management, then ostensive 
and performative routines, to risk management and business resilience.  
It commenced with a deep dive into the central theme of crisis management. 
Within this frame of reference there was a specific focus on several core 
elements.  These were: crisis management processes and routines; team 
composition and dynamics; crisis leadership; and crisis planning and 
preparation. What is evident is that crisis management research can be 
fragmented in nature and that the specific research question in this study had 
not been addressed, creating a knowledge gap.  Within the extant literature 
there are of course beliefs and doubts amongst scholars as to the cause of the 
phenomenon observed, and the objective of this research is ultimately to 
remove that doubt. That said, for any researcher both belief and doubt are 
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necessary for creative action and “the complexity of the world ensures that the 
interplay between belief and doubt is continuous” (Locke, Golden-Biddle, & 
Feldman, 2008, p. 909).   
From crisis management the focus shifted to the literature relating to ostensive 
and performative routines which form a basis for the evaluation of process 
deviations. This included a discussion of the role of artefacts before moving to 
review of the enterprise risk management and business resilience streams.  
Having provided the review of the literature, the chapter moved to address the 
theoretical framework.  Here it was established that the ostensive routines sit 
within the overarching business resilience framework and guide the responses 
across the various elements. The ostensive routines are critical, for they provide 
the foundation that enables an organisation to respond to the dynamics of their 
external environment.  This chapter validated that deviation from process 
during a crisis response can have an adverse impact on the overall management 
of the situation. Herein lies the critical focus of this research: minimising 
performative deviation with the result of strengthening crisis response while 
mitigating adverse consequences. Ultimately, the literature review has 
confirmed a gap in the crisis management theory as it relates to the elements of 
performative deviation from the ostensive crisis management routines.  
The debate in this research revolves around business crisis teams, their 
leadership and the reasons for deviations from routines during a crisis 
response.  While extensive research exists across each of the interrelated 
streams of crisis management; ostensive and performative routines; enterprise 
risk management and business resilience, it is obvious that the bulk of the 
research undertaken to date, while focusing on various elements, is incapable of 
informing the specifics of this debate.  The objective here is to understand the 
fundamental elements contributing to interaction of the crisis team members 
with the ostensive routines and to confirm the causes for the process deviation 
in a business environment.  This will be achieved by answering the question of 
how the ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management 
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situation and what factors contribute to deviations from the routines and 
suggesting possible relationships which should be further explored.  
With the research background established, the next chapter will detail the 
research methodology adopted. 
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Chapter 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology that was adopted for this research which 
sets out to investigate elements of the crisis management paradigm that 
embrace the routines and performances that contribute to an effective crisis 
response. The paradigm and its outcome are adversely impacted when, as 
observed in the business context, deviation from process occurs. As explored in 
the literature review, crisis management research in the business context has 
been described as fragmented at times and while research on process deviation 
and the role of leadership exists, this specific and critical element of deviation in 
the business application has not been addressed.    
This research aims to examine the root causes for this process deviation during 
a business crisis management response and is qualitative in nature.  In 
summary, it explores the contributing factors relating to two interrelated 
themes. These are the nature and role played by the routines and artefacts and 
their application together with an analysis of the composition of the CMT, and 
the causal effect that can be created by the team composition and its leadership.   
The research utilises a case study approach that incorporates interviews with 
subject matter experts; observations of actual crisis activations and simulations; 
and the observations of the researcher through his experiences which are 
documented in the form of vignettes, used commonly in observational research 
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(Bennett, 2009). On this last point of vignettes, researcher experience is 
important as “the qualitative researcher attempts to be fair, balanced, and 
conscientious in taking account of multiple perspectives, interests, and realities 
that will exist within any social setting”  (Amis & Silk, 2008, p. 464) and this had 
applicability in this research.   The research was also shaped through the 
researcher’s understanding of the topic at hand through direct interaction, 
observation and commentary.  In doing so it is important to stress that Amis and 
Silk observed that a researcher’s background inevitably shapes the approaches 
that they take to their “work, philosophically, methodologically, and 
presentationally” (Amis & Silk, 2008, p. 458), This can result in research bias 
and a strategy is utilised to manage this risk. 
The methodology is broken down into the following subsections: 
▪ Subsection 3.2 discusses the fundamental and philosophical 
characteristics of logical positivism, relativism, pragmatism and realism 
and presents the argument for the researcher’s critical realism approach; 
▪ Subsection 3.3 provides an overview of the case study research 
methodology that was utilised.  This section includes the for rationale for 
the case study of TCCS and CCHBC and the reasons why they offered a 
compelling context within which to investigate the research question; 
▪ Subsection 3.4 discusses the case study approach in detail and outlines 
the various phases of the data collection. This includes the utilisation of 
an introductory case study analysis; crisis simulation and response 
observations (teams in training and in live activation); crisis 
management subject matter expert (SME) interviews; the role and use of 
vignettes for illustrating the researcher’s observations; and the potential 
role of personality identification through the use of mechanisms such as 
Myers Briggs Type Indicator; 
▪ Subsection 3.5 addresses the concept of data reliability and the strategies 
to manage and mitigate the risk of researcher coding bias.  This involved 
the utilisation of Leximancer, a software program, which enabled an 
unbiased analysis of the data to occur. This ensured that additional 
rigour was established; 
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▪ Subsection 3.6 discusses the process of manual data coding and thematic 
analysis. This coding was conducted by the researcher, in addition to the 
automated process with Leximancer, based on critical feedback received 
on an earlier version of the thesis.  The concept and use of research 
triangulation is also addressed. 
 
3.2  The Case for the Critical Realist Approach 
The research philosophy encapsulates the researcher’s belief with respect to the 
way in which data which is linked to a specific phenomenon should be gathered, 
analysed and used. At the outset it is important to present the rationale for a 
case study research model and validate the critical realist approach adopted by 
the researcher in this study. In order to do this a comparison of the 
characteristics of Logical Positivism, Relativism, Pragmatism and Realism are 
presented. They draw on the views of Van den Ven (2007, p. 39) as expressed in 
Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and Social Research.  Working 
through the various characteristics as discussed by Van den Ven this section will 
outline the definitions, ontology, and epistemology of the various streams.  It 
will establish and validate that realism was the relevant philosophical space for 
this research due to an underlying linkage to the case study approach. 
Logical Positivism is described as a movement emanating from the Vienna Circle 
and Berlin School and was inspired by empiricism, instrumentalism and 
positivism. With respect to ontology, it sees reality as the empirical world and 
epistemologically seeks correspondence between statements and reality 
through inductive verification or deductive falsification.  In this sphere the 
researcher is independent from the empirical world by being a positive 
observer with the researcher’s language being value free and providing a means 
with which to mirror the empirical world. 
Relativism is a contemporary intellectual movement that is characterised by 
scepticism around the foundations of Western philosophy where ontologically 
the approach is subjective, and reality is socially constructed. Driven by the 
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incommensurability of discourses there is no privileged epistemology. The 
language is self-referential in nature with the researcher being in the world and 
unable to stand outside of their socio-linguistic constructs to view objectively. 
With respect to pragmatism it is a philosophical movement that is characterised 
by the relation of theory and praxis, and specifically with the predetermined 
outcomes of an inquiry. It is subjective in nature and dependent on practical 
consequences, with reality placing limitations and constraints on actions.  In 
this realm the researcher has a prior framework that influences their perception 
of the world with the language used being actionable to meet the researcher’s 
goals and objectives. 
The fourth field is realism, which captures the approach taken in this thesis.  It is 
a movement characterised by the existence of a mind-independent reality and 
the ability of a concept to capture aspects of reality. Ontologically, reality exists 
independent of cognition with realism being subjectivist in nature as there is no 
predefined or predetermined methodology to evaluate the veracity of 
knowledge.  Importantly, the researcher has prior cognitive frameworks that 
influence perceptions of the world utilising language that is not theory neutral 
but describes, sometimes partially, the underlying structure and mechanics of 
the phenomenon.  In this study the researcher adopts a critical realist approach 
specifically, as prior cognitive and practical awareness of crisis management 
influences the perspective of the world and the phenomenon that is evaluated in 
order to answer the research question.   
Building on this theme and validating the critical realist approach, Van den Ven 
(2007, p. 70) argues that our individual understanding of the real world is 
limited and that tangible processes are easier to understand than both reflective 
and social processes.  Therefore, observations and data are theory laden, either 
implicitly or explicitly and the analysis and evaluation techniques apply 
theoretical and methodological triangulation and coding (manual and 
automatic) to create the additional knowledge base.  Through the utilisation of 
the case study approach and researching through a critical realist lens, this 
research contributes to the existing literature and addresses a specific 
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knowledge gap through “an evolutionary growth of knowledge” (Van den Ven, 
2007, p. 70) as it relates specifically to the field of crisis management response 
in a business context. 
 
3.3  The Argument for a Case Study Approach 
The method of building theories from case studies is an acknowledged research 
strategy that involves using one or more cases or lines of information to create 
theoretical constructs, propositions and theory from case-based empirical 
evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). It is considered by Yin (2009, p. 11) to 
be the preferred inquiry method when examining contemporary events within a 
real-life context and where the behaviours and issues cannot be manipulated.  
That is, the observations and raw data occur without interference. The strategy 
is specifically pertinent in this research, as it seeks to explain ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
the observed behaviour of process deviation during crisis response occurs. In 
this respect, the case study approach enables the researcher to deal with a 
range of evidence incorporating documents, such as the material from specialist 
interviews, and other artefacts including the tools and checklists, all of which 
are considered by Yin (Yin, 2009, p. 11) as material that extends beyond what 
might be available in a conventional historical study.  
This case study focuses on the application of crisis response arrangements in 
the context of the TCCS and the leading role played by a key franchise bottling 
partner, CCHBC. TCCS specifically created a compelling research context for 
several reasons. These include the global reach of the company and its bottling 
partners with operations in over two hundred (200) countries; its high brand 
profile; an employee base of over seven hundred thousand (700,000); 
producing twenty (20) brands each worth a billion-dollars; and delivering 1.9 
billion servings of their products globally daily (TCCC, 2018).  For the system’s 
consumers, product quality and brand reputation are of critical importance. 
Intentional product tampering, threats or accidental product quality issues have 
the potential to erode consumer trust and damage brand equity.  As illustrated 
in the Belgian crisis (table 2), when a crisis is managed poorly it becomes high 
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profile with social, reputation and financial implications (US$103million in 
1999 terms). The Belgium crisis indeed establishes further contextual 
importance as it provided for the researcher a unique point in time from which 
the existing ostensive processes and routines were designed and implemented 
post crisis. These ostensive processes and routines have become the focus of 
this research as they are the routines from which deviation has occurred during 
crisis activation.  This is reflective of the theoretical framework and the time-
based nature of reviewing ostensive routines or altering processes as a 
consequence of a crisis. 
With respect to CCHBC, as a major franchise bottling partner it has a franchise 
obligation to align with the crisis program and has been actively engaged in 
enhancing business resilience capabilities since 2014.  The programs that have 
been implemented, including risk and crisis management elements have 
received industry recognition in 2016 and 2018 (CCHBC, 2018).  These multiple 
dynamics thus ensure that the case study context as it relates to TCCS and 
CCHBC is compelling at multiple levels and is highly relevant as a mechanism for 
investigating the research question.  That said, the nature of the research and its 
findings have applicability across all industry sectors.   
Returning to the case study rationale, at the foundation of rigorous or credible 
empirical research lies a strong grounding in the related literature. This enables 
the identification of research gaps and, from there, the development of the 
relevant research questions that address the gaps. The construction of the case 
study therefore requires the researcher to justify why this specific research area 
is better addressed by theory building, rather than theory testing, and requires 
the researcher to frame the research in terms of the importance of the 
phenomenon and the lack of relevant or plausible existing theory (Golden-
Biddle & Locke, 2007).  Having identified the gap through the literature review 
of crisis management material, for this is where the research can be fragmented, 
the decision was made to adopt a case study approach.  While it was deemed the 
most appropriate approach, the challenge was to identify the number of cases 
and types of data sources that, when combined and analysed, contribute to 
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explaining the nature of the phenomenon. This required an expanded program 
for the collection of the empirical data, for while a single case study can richly 
describe the existence of a phenomenon (Siggelkow, 2007), a multiple case 
study strategy enables a ‘deep dive’ to occur, which provides a stronger basis 
for the theory building (Yin, 2009).  
The decision to adopt a multiple case study approach in this instance was based 
less on the uniqueness of the given theory gap, but rather on the contribution to 
the theory development that will be extracted from the data through the 
analysis of multiple cases and approaches and answering the research question. 
In this instance the multiple case study approach was used to replicate or 
extend theory and to eliminate alternative explanations (Yin, 2009).  Ultimately, 
the case study presents us with a ‘story’ to tell and the story is not a fictional 
account since it embraces real life data.  At the front of the researcher’s mind 
were multiple questions including: what are the distinctive features of this 
study, how does the collected data relate to the research questions, have new 
insights emerged (Yin, 2011, p. 183), and have these new insights marked the 
entire analytic process? 
It was decided that a multi-faceted approach be adopted, as it provided the 
opportunity to review multiple elements of crisis management response, both 
within and external to the TCCS, thereby presenting a combination of data 
sources to evaluate. In this research, with multiple data points, observational 
techniques were critical with exposure to specific performances and the ability 
to obtain data through participant observations in the actual operational 
setting, be that a simulation or real case. There was also the opportunity to step 
back and look at the world from a critical realist perspective to further build the 
data repository. The unique ability to interview and question a range of subject 
matter experts provided the opportunity to deepen the understanding of what 
was occurring through close interaction with the researcher.  The logic for this 
is that it is difficult to understand what contributes to the phenomenon if a 
researcher is not engaging with, or observing, the subjects.  At the end of the day 
it is the performer of a routine that ultimately can paint the picture of what is 
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occurring and why.  The following section of the thesis addresses the data 
collection process.  
 
3.4. Strategies for Data Collection 
3.4.1 Field Data Collection 
It was determined that the study would collect information from various 
sources, and these would combine observational and interview techniques. 
These activities included:  
▪ direct observations of crisis training simulations;  
▪ crisis management responses which formulated vignettes that enabled 
researcher observations and experience to be captured;  
▪ both formal and unstructured interviews with members of the crisis 
teams and subject matter experts;  
▪ participant-observations;  
▪ reviews of crisis documentation and physical artefacts.   
The researcher was able to observe the operational application of crisis 
management responses within CCHBC and TCCS and was able to obtain access 
to subject matter experts for interview both within, and external to, TCCS. The 
subject matter expert interviews would provide specialist insights into their 
views and perceptions as experts in the field.  As identified by Barley et al this 
would enable the compilation of “accurate observational records on who 
interacts with whom and in what ways at what times, as well as data on actors’ 
interpretations of their behavior” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 102) together with 
the actions of others to provide insights into the rationale for crisis teams 
altering courses of actions and deviation from the routines.   
This unique access to SMEs and through the conduct of interviews enabled 
specific focus on these sources of data which each providing a different lens to 
view the issue at hand. No single lens offered a ‘complete’ picture, which is 
known as the observer’s paradox. This combined approach enabled a broad 
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range of relevant empirical data to be collected for the analysis. The various 
sources were highly complementary, which is critical in case study research, 
and hence the focus on these sources.  
Observational activities were also central to the data collection methodology. 
During the period of January 2016 to April 2017, the researcher, a senior 
manager within CCHBC, had the opportunity to observe several different 
elements of crisis management dynamics in action. Being embedded in the 
business enabled the researcher to collect data simultaneously across a diverse 
range of sources.  These included ten crisis management simulations covering a 
broad spectrum of geographic and cultural territories. Additionally, they 
included the observations of the activation of the crisis management teams 
across the business in response to incidents from which vignettes were created.  
The multiple data collection modes however also created a risk of researcher 
bias, due to the researcher’s close proximity to the business and his 
interpretation of the data through familiar, direct daily interactions.  This bias 
risk was largely addressed through the utilisation of Leximancer software, 
which enabled concept identification and development outside the influence of 
the researcher. The necessity to collect as much data as possible is supported by 
King et al (1994, p. 24) who identified it as an important guideline for 
improving data quality. They further noted that broad data and observations 
sources enable minimisation in selection bias, a phenomenon that can occur if 
certain observations are focused on but others are neglected (King et al., 1994, 
pp. 27-28). The quality of the data for this case study research was supported by 
the extended sixteen-month observation period, which enabled the researcher 
to gain significant insight into the topic.  
While the research employed several techniques, it relied extensively on direct 
observational data acquired during the simulation exercises and case response 
activations. This data evaluated the processes and skills applied in training, 
together with an evaluation of their real-life application. Data was also collected 
through a process of structured interviews with the identified subject matter 
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experts, with this data offering the potential to pose a number of challenges to 
the researcher. Such challenges included elements such as impression 
management and retrospective sense making (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 
28).  
There are several strategies that can assist in mitigating these challenges. In this 
research, this mitigation involved ensuring that for the observational exercise a 
diverse range of teams was examined, together with the use of numerous highly 
knowledgeable and specialised informants who viewed the phenomena from a 
diversity of perspectives. This use of multiple informants assisted in 
substantiating the evidence gained from other sources (e.g. documents) thereby 
assisting in the validation of the data.  The breakdown of the data sources is 
detailed in Table 4, with the specific source details being outlined in the 
appendices (B) with an example of the SME interview in appendix C. The 
analysis of the background skills of the subject matter experts, to support their 
experience, was also contained in the findings. 
3.4.2 Data Creation 
With regard to the data collection in a case study analysis, it is important for the 
researcher to report on how the data is created and how one came to possess 
that data (King et al., 1994, p. 51). Regarding the crisis management 
simulations, data was collected through observing the process without active 
participation. In each simulation, the core crisis team participants received a 
verbal briefing on the research and its objectives at the beginning of the 
simulation day.  They were provided with background material to the research, 
and their signed authorisation to participate was obtained. The hard copies of 
the authorisations have been filed and scanned for electronic storage. The focus 
of the observations during the simulation was the adherence of the team and 
the crisis leader to compliance with the ostensive routines and utilisation of the 
relevant artefacts. 
During the crisis response activations, the data was collected through 
observational evaluation. In a simulation, the teams were generally requesting  
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Table 4 – Research Data Sources 
Data Source Period of Collection Purpose of the Data Quantity 
Crisis Training 
and Simulation 
Observations 
Observations 
undertaken between 
1 February 2016 and 
31 January 2017 
Evaluation of the way the CMT 
and the coordinator responded 
to the simulation, with a focus 
on their utilisation of the 
artefacts, team dynamics, and 
strategies implemented to 
resolve the incidents. 
Ten 
(10) 
Crisis 
Management 
Subject Matter 
Expert Interviews 
Interviews 
conducted between 1 
February 2016 and 
30 June 2017 
Specialist insights into the crisis 
management process with an 
emphasis on process deviation, 
strategies to minimise 
deviation, team dynamics, and 
strategies to enhance CMT 
effectiveness. The SMEs were 
drawn from a variety of 
business streams. This process 
also included the creation of a 
vignette on the researcher’s 
operational experience. 
Appendix B: SME data 
Appendix C: SME Interview 
Twenty-
two plus 
one 
research 
vignette  
(23) 
Crisis Response 
Observations – 
Vignettes created 
Observations of 
country responses 
directly supported 
between 1 January 
2016 and 28 
February 2017 
Evaluation of the ‘real’ life case 
activation of the teams, and the 
degree to which artefacts were 
utilised, which provided a 
subjective perspective of the 
value, or otherwise, of the 
artefacts. In total, there were 
one hundred and thirty-eight 
(138) cases during the 
observation period, of which 
vignettes were prepared for 
eleven (11).  The selection of 
the cases was driven by the 
level of interaction and 
engagement that the researcher 
had in the resolution of the 
matter. 
Appendix D: Vignette sample 
Eleven 
(11) 
crisis management support and therefore there was at times a degree of 
researcher participation and guidance as part of that intervention.  This was in 
line with the ‘real life guidance’ that would be presented by the researcher. In 
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respect of observations, the researcher focused on the application of process in 
the recorded findings with no personal data relating to any individual person 
being reflected. Rather, only data regarding the nature of the incident and the 
observations in relation to each element regarding the performative routines 
was collected. As Marshall & Rossman (2006, p. 98) argue, the observation 
process entails the systematic noting and recording of events and behaviours in 
the social setting chosen for the study. Here, this involved evaluating the use of 
and deviation from the artefacts. In both the simulations and case analysis, the 
researcher’s field notes, which are detailed non-judgemental descriptions of 
what was observed, became critical observational data points. The observations 
from the simulations were captured initially in writing as contemporaneous 
notes and transcribed generally between one and five days after the event.  The 
observations from the live activations, to which support was provided, were 
also captured as contemporaneous notes during the course of the collection 
period, with the vignettes created through data consolidation and review in 
January 2017. The role and creation of the vignettes is discussed further in 
section 3.4.4. 
3.4.3 Subject Matter Experts 
The use of subject matter experts (SMEs) to gather requisite data was an 
important element and differentiator for this research.  This was because it 
provided contributor expertise in that the “expert would be able to use their 
expertise to contribute to the domain to which their expertise pertains” (Collins, 
Evans, & Weinel, 2016, p. 105). Collins et al commented that where the target 
expertise included different domains of contributory expertise then a means of 
sharing expertise between the different practice languages would be needed 
and they argue that interactional expertise provided the solution to this 
problem. This was relevant here in that the expertise of the SMEs would 
potentially vary across streams and therefore degrees of interactional expertise 
would need to be identified (Collins & Evans, 2015) and this interaction was 
provided by the researcher. 
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Of critical importance was the selection of the SMEs and criterion for selection 
needed to be established.  Firstly, the SMEs were identified by the researcher 
based on his experience of working with and observations of the SMEs in action 
across TCCS, consultancies, other businesses, and public-sector organisations. 
The criteria for selection as a specialist in the field were that the SME had a 
minimum of five years in crisis response (public or private sector) and had 
undergone training and simulations in crisis response. A working knowledge of 
the business application of both crisis management and ERM was also pertinent. 
Twenty-two SMEs were identified with all agreeing to be interviewed.  Each 
SME was supplied with the background material for the research and all 
consented to participate, with consent forms being obtained. Before the 
interviews commenced, the SMEs were provided with a summary of a generic 
line of questioning to assist in their preparation. The researched as an SME 
prepared a vignette in respect of his observations for this research (see section 
3.4.4). 
Statistical material was also collected relating to their background, their 
experience in crisis management, and their Myers Briggs personality type in 
order to validate their experience and skills. The purpose here was to validate 
the level of crisis management knowledge through a comparative analysis of the 
individuals, their backgrounds and experiences. This was critical to ensure that 
they would be legitimately considered as specialists in an evaluation of the 
research. The meetings with the SMEs were electronically recorded and 
transcribed generally within twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the 
interview. This process was time consuming, as on average one hour of 
recording required three or more hours of transcribing. The transcript was then 
reviewed to identify trends, themes, and any areas that might require further 
clarification.  
Where follow-up questions were identified these were asked via email to ensure 
that an audit trail of the responses was available.  In all instances, the SME 
interviews were conducted via phone or Skype with the researcher using either 
an iPhone recorder or the recording mechanism on Skype.  It is noted that a 
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challenge with electronic recording is that while it captures the words and tones 
it does not capture the non-verbal signs, feelings and emotions. In this research, 
however, due to the non-emotive nature of the interviews, this element is not 
considered to impact the validity of the recordings.    
In respect of the interviewing of the SMEs, the fact that the researcher also had 
extensive experience in this field of specialisation focused the dialogue on the 
crisis management gaps in question.  This field experience was an important 
attribute as it also established a rapport with the SMEs being interviewed and 
stemmed from the fact that the researcher could show that he ‘has been there’  
(Cunliffe & Karunanayake, 2013).  Cunliffe et al argue “that ‘being there’ is a 
hyphen-space in which researcher-researched identities are deeply implicated 
and mutually influential” (Cunliffe & Karunanayake, 2013, p. 370).  This 
positioning is particularly important for “interpretive, narrative, and discursive 
forms of research where the nature of conversations and degree of trust are 
essential to gathering rich data and multiple perspectives” (Cunliffe & 
Karunanayake, 2013, p. 374).  In this research, rapport was established with the 
SMEs and this created an effective bridge that enhanced the overall dialogue. 
3.4.4  Researcher Observations – the use of Vignettes 
One challenge was how to address and incorporate the observations of the 
researcher who had observations from nineteen years of experience in crisis 
management within the private sector to factor into the equation.  This was in 
addition to thirteen years experience from the public sector. It was critical 
therefore, to provide a suitable mechanism from which to present that voice and 
observations.  Anteby contends that there is a taboo on telling one’s own story 
and whatever a “researcher’s personal involvement within a given field, the 
prevailing advice about publishing one’s findings seems to be to convey distance 
and suggests a fairly blank researcher entering a distant field” (Anteby, 2013, p. 
1278).  The issue with this approach is that it presumes that personal 
involvement “inexorably signifies loss of professional distance and that social 
distance equates with professional distance. This view not only fails to 
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distinguish distance and involvement, it also fails to recognize the necessity for 
both distance and involvement. When properly handled, telling one’s own 
stories can prove quite generative” (Anteby, 2013, p. 1283) and to do this “you 
need both distance and closeness” (Bazeley, 2007, p. 60) thereby securing a 
rounded perspective of the data and by default, the findings. 
To enable story telling from the perspective of the researcher, this research 
utilised the creation of vignettes, which enabled the presentation of an insider’s 
perspective (Cochran-Smith and Lytle 1993).  Vignettes are a suitable 
mechanism as they provide for short impressionistic scenes that focus on one 
moment, or give an impression about people, an idea or a setting (Bennett, 
2009). Miles and Huberman (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 81) further noted that  
“a vignette is a focused description of a series of events taken to be 
representative, typical, or emblematic.”  Therefore, a vignette is not strictly 
linked with a sequential plot development; rather it establishes meaning 
through loose symbolic or linguistic connection to other vignettes or scenes, 
which in this case consisted of the additional data sources. Vignettes are also 
seen as the literary equivalent of snapshots, often incomplete or fragmented. 
Characteristically, snapshots are short pieces of writing that capture a moment, 
scene or incident that tells a compelling part of a bigger story. A key benefit is 
that vignettes can provide a composite that encapsulates what the researcher 
finds in the fieldwork through his or her own observations and experiences. In 
every case, vignettes demand attention and represent a growing sense of 
understanding about the meaning of the research work. (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & 
Anzul, 1997, p. 70). 
The value of vignettes is that they provide an opportunity for the researcher to 
present and integrate personal observations into the process.  A vignette, by 
being an obvious literary construct, gives an account of the experience it 
addresses. The fact that a vignette says, “I am a construction” and “I am written 
by an author who has interpreted the experience depicted” (Spalding & Phillips, 
2007, p. 959) has the ability to make it more trustworthy simply because it 
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more openly declares its subjectivity. It appears trustworthy because it does not 
pretend to be anything other than what it is.  
In respect of this research the vignettes take two forms.  The first vignettes 
contain a compilation of the knowledge and observations of the researcher over 
the course of his experience in undertaking and supporting crisis management 
in the private sector, with these collective thoughts contributing to the 
framework.  Secondly, during the field work the research required the creation 
of observational notes relating to high risk cases that necessitated specific 
support by the researcher, or for which the nature of the case and its complexity 
meant that the researcher closely observed the interactions and the dynamics of 
the CMT.  There were also observations related to the crisis simulations that 
were conducted during the research period (see appendices E and F). In this 
regard, it is noted that during the fieldwork period there were one hundred and 
thirty-eight (138) activations of the CMTs across the Group, of which eleven 
(11) were subject to detailed observation and analysis, contained in 
contemporaneous notes and transcribed for analysis and vignette creation. 
Additionally, ten country crisis simulations were observed and factored into the 
research.  In these instances, the data was documented, and these were 
subjected to the same data analysis rigour as the other material; that is, via the 
use of software concept mapping.  
3.4.5  Personality Assessment: Subject Matter Experts and Crisis Leaders 
One dynamic of the research focused on creating an understanding of the role 
that the composition of the CMT and the skill sets brought to the crisis 
management event had in respect to process deviation.  It was considered 
relevant, as part of the evaluation of the skills data of the SMEs, to understand 
their personality typology, enabling an evaluation of the linkages to leadership 
and team dynamics.  In addition to enhanced understanding of the role that 
personality plays, this dynamic also potentially provides a foundation for future 
research into the characteristics that an assigned manager should look for when 
constructing the team.  Several personality assessment tools are available and 
used across businesses that are designed to measure and describe a person’s 
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thinking and action preferences.  The programs are designed to provide 
information that can enhance skills application through an understanding of the 
specific traits.  These tools include the Neo Personality Inventory (Neo-PI), 
Herman Brain Dominance Index (HBDI) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI). 
For this research, MBTI was selected as the tool to gain a snapshot of an 
individual’s personality, thereby enabling a basic top line position to be 
established.  A key use of the MBTI in management is that it informs individuals 
regarding “their innate preferences for interaction with each dimension 
representing both opportunity and liability in a given situation” with the its 
usefulness being in “helping individuals to understand their innate preferred 
behavioural styles” (Brown & Reilly, 2009, p. 927).  This said, it is acknowledged 
that controversy surrounds MBTI’s scientific relevance, with critics citing its 
lack of scientific structure. This is despite MBTI being utilised by organisations 
globally as a preferred personality assessment tool.  It is seen by many as an 
invaluable tool that helps in understanding their own behaviour as well as the 
behaviour of others. Across the business sector it is commonly applied to the 
assessment of emerging leaders as an element of leadership development 
programs. Hence, for the SMEs and others in this study, there was already a 
level of familiarity with the concept, its question structure and its output.  
That said, a brief discussion of the conflicting perceptions is relevant to 
establish the context and to illustrate the differing trains of thought as to the 
value of the MBTI.  On the one hand, Gardner and Martinko (1996) indicated 
that MBTI was valid and reliable enough to be used as a tool for examining the 
relationships between manager personality and attributes. It was also 
determined to have a role to play in informing individuals on their innate 
preferences for interaction while acknowledging that those preferences are not 
irresistible (Brown & Reilly, 2009). Others categorically argued that despite the 
popularity of the MBTI, which may be driven more by marketing than by 
scientific relevance, there are problems with its use. Both Burnett (2013) and 
Pettinger (1993) contend that there is a body of research that suggests that the 
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claims made about the accuracy of MBTI cannot be supported. In other words, 
although the MBTI appears to measure something, many psychologists are not 
convinced that any significant conclusions can be based on the test and that this 
can become dangerous when it comes to adaptation and utilisation of the 
results. 
There is a case for arguing that other personality testing programs, such as the 
Neo-PI model, have greater relevance and present a more accurate evaluation. 
For example, the Neo-PI uses a five-factor model of personality which avoids the 
risk of boxing an individual into a specific category.  It examines the respondent 
a through a hierarchical organisation of personality traits in terms of five basic 
dimensions: extroversion; agreeableness; conscientiousness; neuroticism; and 
openness to experiences. It differs from the MBTI in that it does not simply 
classify an individual into one specific category linked to either extroversion or 
introversion. Rather, it argues that a situation can dictate the level of 
extroversion that an individual may exhibit in given situations.  The downside of 
utilising this tool for the purposes of this research was the extent of questioning 
(two hundred and fifty questions) and the complexity of the further personality 
evaluation, which is a potential flow on from this research.  Ultimately, as 
Furnham (1996) noted there is sufficient replicated overlap between the MBTI 
and NEO-PI and whilst “each measure may benefit from examining the extant 
empirical literature of the other, they would benefit considerably by examining 
the behavioural and cognitive correlates of the various dimensions of both 
scales and overlap”(Furnham, 1996, p. 303). 
While acknowledging that different personality assessment tools exist, and 
despite conflicting positions with respect to the value of MBTI, it is important to 
stress that for the purpose of this research, the objective was not to prove or 
disprove the benefit of any one particular tool over another.  The purpose was 
simply to build on qualitative observations and assessments in order to gain an 
initial snapshot of any commonalties existing in those individuals that had been 
selected to perform the role of crisis leader or subject matter experts.  This 
information would ultimately act as a discussion starter and thought provoker 
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regarding the aspect of personality contributions to the crisis team. This 
mirrors the opinion of Bosanac (2015), who contends that the MBTI test should 
be used as a conversation starter, rather than a driver of big managerial 
decisions. He cites the position of CPP Inc., the publisher of the MBTI test, and 
advises against using it to make decisions about hiring, firing and promoting.   
This utilisation of the results as a conversation starter fits comfortably into the 
context of this research. 
Figure 3 – Myers-Briggs Personality Types  
 
Source: Tieger, Barron & Tieger (2014) 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the specifics of the MBTI personality types against the 
standard keys (see appendix G for additional data).  It illustrates that the 
modelling will labels respondents as either an extrovert or an introvert, so 
establishing the first parameters of an individual’s personality.  The MBTI goes 
on to examine the respondent against the elements of sensor versus intuitive, 
thinking versus feeling and judging versus perceiving.  The combination of the 
results creates an illustration of the respondent’s personality and the way in 
which they approach issues.  Whilst not a perfect outcome, it does, as previously 
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pointed out, provide a discussion starter. This is a critical discussion as it 
generates a dialogue to further understand the role that individuals as leaders, 
or individuals within a crisis team, play in respect of influencing deviation from 
the ostensive routines during operational performance. 
Figure 4 – Myers-Briggs Personality Categories  
 
Source: MBTI Home Page (2017) 
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3.4.6  Crisis Leader Personality Evaluations 
Having established the skill parameters of the SMEs, it was determined that it 
was relevant to take the qualitative analysis one step further and this was as it 
related to the operational crisis leaders.  As part of the methodology, the crisis 
leaders of the nineteen business units covering the twenty-eight countries in 
CCHBC together with the members of the Group response team, were 
approached. It was requested that they agree to be evaluated against qualitative 
and quantitative assessment criteria to assess process deviation and crisis 
leadership in practice. Additionally, further analysis would indicate if there was 
benefit in utilising personality assessments in selecting crisis leaders.   
Eighteen (18) agreed to participate based on anonymity of the final data, 
specifically regarding the personality assessment. The evaluation also aimed to 
validate whether there is a specific need to appoint crisis leaders based on an 
assessment of a combination of operational experience and personality traits.  
This would be different from the process of simply selecting an individual based 
on the function represented, which is the most common practice in many 
businesses.  For example, within TCCS this role is often assigned to the Public 
Affairs and Communications managers  (SME17, 2016) or in some cases Legal 
(SME8, 2017) managers, irrespective of their actual crisis management 
experience. 
To undertake this evaluation, a panel of four subject matter experts was 
established, including the researcher. The three other subject matter experts 
had been interviewed as part of this research and had been in a position, due to 
their role as trainers and operational support roles, to observe the crisis leaders 
in action over a period ranging from six months (newest crisis leader 
appointment) to seven years. The panel’s operational support for the crisis 
leaders involved observing them in both real-life cases and simulation 
activations of the crisis team. In total, the panel had over seventy- five years’ 
operational crisis management experience. They also had a combined exposure 
to over one thousand crisis team activations spanning private industry and the 
public sector. 
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For this process, a structured questionnaire was developed to establish the 
measurement parameters for the qualitative assessment of the observed 
behaviours.  As the data was going to be tabulated into an Excel spreadsheet the 
design of the methodology saw the Y-axis measuring leadership skills exhibited 
during crisis response with a specific focus on the execution of command and 
control of the team. The X-axis was designed to measure the level of knowledge 
of the ostensive routines and, during the performative element, the level of 
consistent application of the artefacts, whether that related to the crisis 
management plan, the relevant tools, or the checklists. Examples of the key 
crisis management artefacts are contained in appendix H. 
The objective of this exercise was to evaluate whether, when examined in 
totality, the performative actions were consistent with the provisions of the 
ostensive routines.  Lastly, as visibility was also provided of the country of 
origin of the crisis leader, a qualitative evaluation was undertaken with respect 
to the role that culture potentially played as part of the crisis response.  The 
findings of this material were then depicted on a grid, with linkages assigned to 
the personality type of each individual and analysis conducted during the 
discussion section of this paper, based on the observed findings.    
 
3.5  Data Reliability, Research Bias and Ethical Issues 
3.5.1  Data Reliability 
In discussing data reliability, Lincoln & Guba posed the following question: 
 “How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including self) that the 
findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth taking account of?” 
(1985, p. 290) 
Answering this question lies at the very foundation of the case study approach, 
with the strategy requiring that each step logically leads to the audience being 
convinced of the value of the research.  To confirm the research value, this 
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section addresses the approach relating to data reliability and to managing the 
concept of researcher bias.   
To ensure that the data was ultimately deemed reliable, it was subjected to a 
multi-staged approach. In the first stage the collected data was transcribed and 
subjected to content analysis, which was used to determine the presence of 
words or concepts within the collected material. The most common forms of 
content analysis are conceptual and relational. The conceptual analysis 
technique involves the detection of explicit and implicit concepts and then 
breaks down the text into categories against specified rules. This manual 
technique enables initial thinking to be developed by the researcher. The 
challenge with this manual process is that coding bias can occur, with this bias 
emanating from the fact that the researcher, by design, brings to the research 
their own experience and opinions.   
Challenges also arise from the need to manage multiple data sources to make 
sure that a balance is found, thereby ensuring that information overload is 
avoided. This means that the researcher needs firstly to find the correct level of 
data collection and then to confirm the number of records collected and 
observed, ensuring that the correct balance results (Yin, 2011). The various 
elements of the data collection have been discussed earlier and from the data 
collection flowed the data analysis, which is the process of reviewing, cleansing, 
and modelling the data with the objective of highlighting useful information 
relevant to the phenomenon under investigation. The ultimate goal of the 
analysis was to provide the researcher with the knowledge for theory 
construction and this included ‘playing’ with the data (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) and creating a structure that: 
▪ placed the information into arrays and into chronological order; 
▪ created a matrix of categories into which the data can be placed; 
▪ created data displays, flowcharts and graphics for data examination; and 
▪ tabulated the frequency of different events, examining the complexity of 
those tabulations and their relationships. 
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Within this context and having conducted an initial evaluation of the data 
through the content analysis, the focus turned to strategies that would assist in 
managing the risk of coding bias.  It was determined that the most effective way 
to address coding bias was to utilise a software tool that through its structured 
methodology and automation mitigates this specific risk.  In this regard two 
systems were considered, the first being NVivo 9, a software tool designed to 
analyse qualitative research data. This software offers the ability to define a set 
of codes (concepts) and allocate textual data to the codes. The main drawback, 
however, is that it cannot prevent analytical bias which, if it occurs, potentially 
skews the data and adds additional complexities to the research.  As an 
alternative, the Leximancer software was identified and ultimately selected as 
the appropriate software tool. Leximancer provided the researcher with the 
additional capability to analyse the collected data in a systematic, 
comprehensive and unbiased fashion, thereby contributing to the enhancement 
of the research reliability.   
The use of Leximancer addresses the risk of coding bias and its benefits lie in 
that it is a text analytics tool that analyses the contents of collections of textual 
documents and then displays the extracted information visually. Its relevance 
stems from the fact that it allows for a systematic, comprehensive and unbiased 
analysis of the data. The software is a data repository that enables systematic 
organisation of qualitative data. The machine code that Leximancer executes 
enables two types of analysis to be undertaken. One is conceptual analysis, 
which is the element of concept discovery. The other is relational analysis, 
which examined how concepts are interrelated. A detailed analysis of the 
utilisation of the artefacts follows shortly. 
Reliability of research data is a contentious topic and the subject of extensive 
debate in the scholarly community (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). Hence, it 
imperative that this risk be addressed. Code reliability, rigour, ability to 
replicate and level of generalisation, or standardisation, all assist in establishing 
trust and confidence during the data collection, data analysis and the 
interpretation phases of the research. Thomas & Magilvy (2011, pp. 152-154) 
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argue that there are four pillars that are relevant to case study research: truth-
value, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  Truth-value occurs 
where credibility is generated when the study presents an accurate 
interpretation of experiences.  This is accomplished through establishing a 
common strategy for member checking, or an informant feedback loop, 
whereby the researcher returns to the source of the data seeking confirmation.  
This can be challenging if interpretations and themes are not accurately 
represented.  Transferability is the ability to transfer the research findings into 
other contexts or to other subjects or participants.  Dependability ensures that 
other researchers can follow the decision trail of the researcher in respect of the 
purpose of the study, the rationale for case selection, and data collection 
modelling as well as data analysis and interpretation.  The last pillar is 
confirmability, and this can only be validated after the first three components 
have been established. 
It was imperative therefore, that this research catered for the establishment of a 
structure that addressed the requirements of these four pillars.  This was 
particularly important for dependability, ensuring that strategies were in place 
to mitigate the researcher coding bias risk.  While the selection of Leximancer 
would aim to do this, prior to the utilisation of the software, as outlined earlier 
in this section, the researcher undertook initial independent review and 
analysis of the collected data.  This involved coding the data and using informed 
judgement against the various concepts that were under review. Specifically, 
there was detailed sentence and paragraph review to identify keywords that 
described one or more of the concepts.  The purpose of this initial coding was 
for the researcher to establish an initial assessment of the concepts.  At all times, 
it was acknowledged that the process was introducing subjectivity and potential 
coding errors. This in turn held the potential to generate coding bias emanating 
from the risk associated with conscious and sub-conscious preconceived 
conclusions held by the researcher. This is because any researcher runs the risk 
of seeing things differently from how others may view the data, especially if 
they come from different disciplines (Richards, 2005, p. 99).  This 
differentiation in perceptions is an issue that is well known among academics 
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and referred to as ‘inter-coder reliability’, which is a measure of agreement 
among multiple coders of how they apply codes to text data. 
With respect to strengthening the approach to qualitative analysis, there are 
several strategies that can be used singularly or in combination to validate the 
accuracy of the data and the findings. These include using triangulation, 
member checking, the use of thick descriptions, clarification of researcher bias, 
the presentation of negative information or discrepancies, prolonging the time 
of data collection, peer briefings or utilising an external auditor (Creswell, 2003, 
p. 196).  Leveraging this thinking, the current research validated the findings 
through a combination of these approaches. 
Triangulation of the different data sources of information through multiple 
collection sources, was used to construct coherent themes.  The data was also 
subjected to member checking. This was a concept that was touched on earlier, 
where the researcher could specifically draw on the collective knowledge of the 
SMEs to establish the validity of the qualitative findings. This involved 
discussing the data, interpretations and conclusions with members of the core 
group of subject matter experts. This enabled the participants to add additional 
input and insights together with the opportunity to challenge interpretations, 
providing an additional conduit to the sourced data.  The use of vignettes 
enabled detailed descriptions of researcher observations to be conveyed.  This 
built on the concept of ‘thick description’ as the presentations were in sufficient 
detail to evaluate the conclusions and the relevance to times, settings and 
situations, rather than simply being restricted to the fast-moving consumer 
goods stream.  The research activity of spending prolonged time in the field, in 
this case observations over a sixteen-month period, also enabled a clearer 
picture to be constructed.   
3.5.2  Addressing Researcher Bias with Leximancer 
Leximancer was selected as the mechanism to automate the analysis with the 
aim of mitigating researcher bias.  It was deemed a suitable mechanism 
irrespective of commentary that documented limitations of Leximancer. This 
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was specifically argued for cases where the data could produce false positives as 
a result of simplifying complex original data through the machine analysis. The 
counterbalancing argument was Leximancer’s objectivity, face validity and 
reliability  (Dann, 2016) which the researcher determined would outweigh the 
risk in this exploratory study, with the tolerances being within acceptable 
boundaries.  
The Leximancer program works in four distinct stages: data cleansing and 
loading; generation of concept seeds; generation of a thesaurus; and the running 
of the project.  In the first step, the data was assembled into the relevant format 
to provide for effective analysis and uploaded into the program.  At the same 
time, within Leximancer, work was undertaken to install and align the initial 
thesaurus together with the text processing options. In this case, this included 
the selection of the relevant dictionary that enables the elimination in the 
analysis of common words (e.g. ‘a’, ‘the’, ‘and’, etc.).   The various process set-up 
stages are depicted in Figure 5, with Figure 6 illustrating the ability to establish 
the initial search parameters.  
Figure 5 – Leximancer: The process stages 
 
As part of the formatting the work was broken into two streams. The first was 
the observational data together with the vignettes from the observed 
simulations and the crisis management cases supported, which in total 
comprised some forty documents. The second stream incorporated the  
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Figure 6 – Leximancer: Establishing the Initial Parameters 
 
transcribed interviews from the subject matter experts.  The segmentation was 
important in this initial stage for the researcher to identify similar concepts and 
themes, together with specific differences around the identified parameters.   
After the initial researcher analysis of these independent streams, the material 
was consolidated and Leximancer was used to evaluate the completed data 
streams, thereby providing the additional layer of system output data for review 
and cross checking of the findings.  
As illustrated in Figure 7, the second stage involved the use of Leximancer in 
Generating Concept Seeds. This is where the program automatically identifies 
the concept seeds, which are the starting point of a concept, by looking for the 
words that most frequently appear in the text (Amaratunga, Baldry, & Sarshar, 
2001, p. 11).  As the process progresses, more terms are added to the definition 
through learning.  This research applied variables for the seeding commencing 
with the default ‘discovery’ mode, whereby the software automatically 
discovers concepts without any user intervention. This enables the program to 
be an important means of methodological translation. As an option, which was 
also utilised, this process could be expanded to incorporate two sub-stages, the 
use of the Text Processing Settings and Concept Seeds Settings, which enabled 
additional data sets to be obtained.  In short, irrespective of the option utilised, 
the processing phase converted the raw documents into the format used for 
processing. 
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Figure 7 – Leximancer: Generating Concept Seeds 
 
Figure 8 – Leximancer: Merging of Word Variants 
 
Figure 9 – Leximancer: Example Concept Map Output 
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Figure 10 – Leximancer: Example concept map & relevance count 
 
Figure 11 – Detailed Leximancer Concepts: Current research 
 
For example, the text processing phase (a) splits the information into sentences; 
the paragraphs and documents phase (b) removes weak semantic information 
(such as the words ‘and’ and ‘of’), and phase (c) identifies people, places or 
company names.  The Concept Seeds Settings phase depicted in Figure 7 
provided the opportunity for the researcher to manually input seed words into 
the mix to further test the findings.  In this case, however, the ability to add 
manual seed words by the researcher had the potential to input researcher bias 
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into the equation, so this was avoided by only utilising the automated modelling 
module.  
The third stage is Generate Thesaurus. This is the point at which the researcher 
interacts with the seeds extracted automatically from the previous stage and 
edits, adds or removes seeds from the list. This was critical to ensure that words 
that had no relevance to the research and were potentially generic in nature and 
not contained in the original thesaurus were removed.  As Amaratunga et al 
(2001, p. 79) noted, this editing and merging is important for a number of 
reasons. One reason is the fact that the automatically generated concepts may 
contain words that have similar meaning (such as think and thought, or in this 
research plans, tools, artefacts and checklists), or alternatively other concepts 
that are not of interest to the user. In the Concept Editing stage, the user can 
merge similar looking concepts into a single concept or delete concepts that the 
researcher does not wish to explore further (see Figure 8). This also enables 
word variants to be merged.  This is where words with a similar meaning are 
drawn together (e.g. incident is a word that TCCS uses to describe a crisis event, 
so it was linked to the word crisis).  Additionally, there is a possibility for the 
researcher to elect and/or create his or her own concepts that they feel are 
pertinent to the evaluation and the analysis of the data.  As mentioned 
previously, this was not undertaken in this research, due to the risk of 
generating researcher bias, which was the reason for utilising Leximancer in the 
first place. 
The final stage is Run Project, and this is where all Leximancer-generated 
concepts as well as user-defined concepts are displayed under the “Concept 
Map” structure.   As exhibited in Figure 9, the Concept Map is divided into two 
distinct sections: a visual display of concepts and their relationships to each 
other on the left, and report tabs on the right for interacting with the map 
(Amaratunga et al., 2001, p. 13).  Figure 10 presents an example concept map 
relating to a safety study. The colours illustrate the intensity of the themes and 
on the right the frequency of the key word hits.   As depicted in Figure 10, the 
tabs can also illustrate the relevance of the concepts. 
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When the map first opens, only the top 50 per cent of the concepts are visible on 
the bubble map. These are the concepts that appear most frequently and are the 
most connected (grey lines on the map) to the other concepts on the map. The 
user can alter the number of concepts appearing on the map (increase or 
reduce) by utilising the ‘percentage visible’ concepts slider that is shown at the 
bottom of the map. The researcher experimented with both increasing and 
decreasing the number of visible concepts and finally settled on the 
presentation of the 100% visibility of the concepts.  In detailing the 
methodology surrounding the data depiction it is important to understand that: 
▪ The concepts are clustered into higher level Themes which appear as 
coloured circles on the map. Themes contain concepts that appear together 
often in the same pieces of text, and therefore tend to settle near one 
another in the map space. ‘Heat-mapping’ is used to indicate the relative 
importance of a specific theme, for example, the theme with the most textual 
hits appears in red, the next hottest in orange, and so on according to the 
colour wheel. As with the ability to alter concept visibility, the theme 
visibility can be altered through the per cent Theme Size option contained 
within the map. Moving the slider to the right brought a limitation to the 
broader themes, which embrace a larger number of concepts. Moving the 
slider to the left causes the themes to become tighter and linkages to be 
strengthened. 
▪ Concept frequency is another key component with the concept dots (i.e. the 
grey dots sitting behind concept names on the map) ranging in colour and in 
size from black to light grey.  Referring to Figure 9 and linked to Figure 10, 
the darker and larger the dot, the greater the number of text references 
coded at that concept, also referred to as the compound.  
▪ Concept co-occurrence illustrates that the same concept is referenced and 
coded in more than one concept. In this case, this means that the following 
words such as ‘process’, ‘processes’ and ‘procedures’ are very close to each 
other, indicating that the root words that constitute them are often used in a 
similar context. By drawing the words together via the linkage tool, it is 
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possible to ensure that the linkages are drawn more closely together and are 
not duplicated.  
Ultimately, the use of Leximancer, within the overall research methodology, 
aided the presentation of an unbiased analysis of the material collected during 
the various phases of the research, from which the findings that are discussed in 
the next chapter were extracted. 
3.5.3  Addressing Ethical Issues 
This research involved elements of human research through the interviewing of 
identified subject matter experts, together with direct observation of selected 
crisis teams and their members during simulations.  To enable this, approval 
was sought and obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
Western Sydney University (approval reference H11307).  The subject matter 
experts and the simulation participants of the core crisis team were each 
approached for their consent to participation in the research. At all times, the 
option to withdraw from the research was available. They were provided the 
background data for the research project and had the research verbally 
explained.  Research participants completed consent forms, which have been 
retained by the researcher in accordance with the University Policy. 
 
3.6  Thematic Analysis: Supplementary Data Coding 
A critical review of an earlier version of this thesis noted that the volume and 
the type of the data that the researcher was able to collect was one of its real 
strengths.  However, the use of Leximancer was flagged as potentially 
suppressing the researcher’s interpretation of the data. For example Smith and 
Humphreys (2006, p. 277), in their testing of functional validity with 
Leximancer, identified issues with correlative validity that could impact 
findings.  That said, they did conclude that it was apparent that there was an 
abundance of rich and complex information that can be extracted by utilising a 
program such as Leximancer.  Sotiriadou et al. (Sotiriadou, Brouwers, & Le, 
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2014, p. 14) in their review of Leximancer and NVivo found that while a well-
designed research study using appropriate qualitative software assists in the 
analysis of data sets and creates a pathway to increasing the rigour of the 
research, there is a risk of distancing the researcher from the interpretations of 
the data.  They ultimately proposed that for a researcher to avoid this risk that a 
combination of automatic and manual text analysis be utilised with this 
enabling research triangulation to occur.   
In this study, it was noted that the adoption of the manual text analysis would 
enable further validation of the data and therefore the researcher supplemented 
the automated computer coding with a manual process to further engage in, and 
confirm, the theoretical interpretations from the data. This process, post-
automation, leveraged the reduction of coder bias and introduced source 
methodological triangulation into the analysis.  
Central to the overall approach in the data analysis and the creation of the 
aggregate dimensions, was the necessity to continually review the source data 
during collection.  This comprised an ongoing review of the interview 
transcripts and the vignettes, which was an iterative process that was initially 
undertaken sequentially after each interview was transcribed in order to derive 
data flows and lines of inquiry for the researcher.  This constant comparison 
and theoretical sampling guided the development of the emergent theory with 
the overall purpose of validating whether the data supported and continued to 
support emerging categories (Holton, 2010, p. 268).  This ensured that the 
developing analysis of how the theoretical categories aggregated together with 
the findings accurately represented the available data (Locke, 2001).  This was 
ongoing and performed prior to the automation in the initial data review. 
In respect of the supplementary manual coding process, a challenge with any 
qualitative research is the way in which the data is manually coded and 
analysed to ensure that findings are robust and of a suitable quality that 
supports the findings. Amis and Silk (2008, p. 459) contend that 
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“quality is judged according to traditional criteria of internal and external 
validity, reliability, objectivity, and generalizability. Thus, often unwieldy 
and unstructured data are reduced, systematically elicited, standardized 
and quantified in relation to predetermined categorizations through a 
range of techniques, ranging from, but not limited to, keywords in context 
analysis, componential analysis, taxonomies, word counts, frequencies, 
cognitive mapping, semantic analyses, and word matrices.” 
There are differing views as to the importance of data coding, with scholars 
such as Jonsen et al (Jonsen, Fendt, & Point, 2017, p. 48) arguing that data 
coding is not a necessary part of the procedure in exploratory research, as it is 
the narrative itself that is the sense maker. Despite that contention they go on to 
note that though coding neither interprets nor builds theory, it remains popular, 
as researchers appreciate the efficiency of coding when faced with vast amounts 
of narrative data.  The reality is that coding does play a critical role and Miles 
and Huberman emphasized the importance of coding by stressing that is not 
“the words themselves but their meaning that matters”(Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 56) and that coding assists in formalising and systematising the 
researcher’s thinking into a coherent set of explanations (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 75).  Ultimately the researcher “is not coding for conditions or 
consequences per se, but rather uses the tools to obtain an understanding of the 
circumstances that surround the event” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 90).  
In approaching the manual coding and data analysis of the multiple information 
points in this project, the researcher built on the conceptual analysis that was 
adopted during the data collection process and referred to earlier. During that 
early stage of the research the interviews were reviewed and analysed post 
transcription to identify themes and trends. This work created the baseline and 
was subsequently built on with the researcher adopting broad elements of the 
analytical coding approach employed by Petriglieri (2015). While that research 
focused on the damage to the relationship that can occur between organisation 
and employee, stemming from the way in which BP managed their Deepwater 
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Horizon crisis, rather than the nature of the crisis response itself, the coding 
approach was robust and thereby emulated. 
In Petriglieri’s approach, consideration was given to the arguments of Walker 
and Myrick (2006), who evaluated the differing coding approaches of Anselm 
Strauss and Barney Glaser and stated that “grounded theory is an evolving 
method premised on the inductive generation of theory derived from data” 
(Walker & Myrick, 2006, p. 557) and that essentially elements of both 
approaches could be adopted to formulate a strategy that is most suitable to the 
researcher. They stressed that central to the “grounded theory data analysis 
involves the researcher as an actor in the process. They are the people who 
intervene, manipulate, act on, conceptualize, and use specific techniques to 
generate or discover the theory. They engage in an intervention process, 
comprising stages or procedures, to excavate a theory from the raw data” 
(Walker & Myrick, 2006, p. 550).  This philosophy links to the position adopted 
by the present researcher as a critical realist utilising a case study approach.  
Returning to the initial data collection phase, which included taped interviews 
and transcription of the interviews, the researcher had already examined the 
data on a regular basis to evaluate the linkage of the commentary to the 
theoretical framework and research question.  This supplementary manual 
coding phase took this analysis to a deeper level, which saw codes further 
linked to data.  As the coding progressed, patterns of association between the 
codes became apparent (Bazeley, 2007) and these were then further distilled to 
identify the core commonalities. The importance here was that “qualitative 
researchers code in order to get past the data record, to a category, and to work 
with all the data segments” (Richards, 2005, p. 86) and in the manual coding 
process utilised, line-by-line analysis was conducted to formally identify 
common terms, statements and themes, which were grouped into the category 
of concepts and first-order codes.   
This utilised in vivo coding. In vivo, a form of qualitative data analysis that places 
emphasis on the actual spoken words of the participants and is championed by 
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many for its usefulness in highlighting the voices of participants and for its 
reliance on the participants themselves for giving meaning to the data and 
terms (Manning, 2017). This is particularly pertinent considering the case study 
approach adopted and the focus on evaluating the views of the subject matter 
experts, informing the analysis of performative routine and process deviation. 
The coding was reviewed and modified as additional data points were identified 
and analysed. As this manual coding was after the initial collection, this came 
from a sequential review of the material based on the timing of the undertaking 
of the interviews, preparation of the observational vignettes and the additional 
literary insights obtained providing for data and theoretical triangulation.  This 
approach to manual coding focused the review and challenged initial thoughts 
as new themes were evaluated against their fit to the data obtained from each 
preceding document.  This sequential process of continual review, grouping, 
regrouping and evaluation led to the creation of the initial concepts.  This was 
important as “the processes of constant comparison and theoretical sampling 
guide the development of the emergent theory. The purpose of constant 
comparison is to see if the data support and continue to support emerging 
categories” (Holton, 2010, p. 268). To be considered an initial concept a theme 
had to be addressed by a minimum of 75% of the respondents.  This cyclical 
review, where the researcher stepped away and then back to examine the data 
on the receipt of the additional information (via sequence obtained), also 
aligned with the concept that “the researchers can theoretically and 
conceptually think about the data from a distance, while simultaneously 
maintaining an in-close level of sensitivity and understanding about the process 
and their involvement in that process” (Walker & Myrick, 2006, p. 551) in order 
to extract the relevant meaning of the data. 
The process then utilised axial coding which is the process of crosscutting or 
relating concepts to each other (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 195). As noted by 
Walker et al (Walker & Myrick, 2006, p. 553) in their commentary on Strauss 
and Corbin (1998), this phase establishes connections through a process that 
focuses on three aspects of the phenomenon being studied.  The first is the 
 
 
 
 
95 
conditions or situations in which the phenomenon occurs; the second relates to 
the actions or interactions of the people in response to what is happening in the 
situations; and lastly the consequences or results of the action taken or inaction. 
In summary during the axial coding for this research, the researcher worked 
back through the material to understand categories and their relationship to 
other categories and subcategories.  The purpose was to identify relationships 
on which the axis of the category is focused and involved consolidation of the 
initial concepts through selective coding, which distilled the data into categories 
that became the various overarching themes.  
This phase involved documenting the relationships and variations amongst the 
concept codes.  The output from the analysis of the data was then further 
distilled to present the core elements that the participants determined were 
influencing ostensive routine utilisation; the process deviation; and impacted 
effective crisis management and these final categories are the thematic codes.  
These were consolidated and defined with the final aggregation forming a basis 
for further review in the discussions on the theme of the process deviation and 
the way to mitigate this risk.   
As this process was post the initial data evaluation and review by Leximancer, it 
was important to validate the accuracy of the process. To further ensure the 
reliability of the findings from this manual coding, the research supervisors 
undertook a limited sampling of the data to validate the approach and output.  
As would be expected and will be illustrated in the findings, the resulting codes 
were not an exact match to the researcher’s findings utilising Leximancer, 
however, there was sufficient commonality in the outputs to suggest that the 
manual coding process provided a realistic interpretation of the data which 
further strengthened the findings of the earlier automated and non-biased 
Leximancer output. 
The last element of the exercise involved conducting the triangulation to 
analyse the findings from Leximancer and the manual coding thematic results. 
As noted by Carter et al (Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, Dicenso, Blythe, & Neville, 
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2014) triangulation relates to the utilisation of multiple methods or data 
sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
phenomena. It is also viewed as a qualitative research strategy to test validity 
through the convergence of information from different sources.  While there are 
four types of triangulation: method triangulation; investigator triangulation; 
theory triangulation; and data source triangulation, this research used method, 
theory and data source triangulation. Method triangulation involved the use of 
multiple methods of data collection about the same phenomenon and can 
include interviews, observation, and field notes all which were relevant in this 
research. 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology adopted. It commenced 
with an evaluation of the various philosophical approaches available to the 
researcher and presented the critical realist approach adopted by the 
researcher in this study.  It then presented the rationale for the utilisation of a 
case study approach to develop an explanatory theory versus testing a theory.  
This approach is acknowledged as a preferred inquiry method when examining 
contemporary events within a real-life context. It is commonly applied in 
situations where the behaviours and issues cannot be manipulated and where 
observations and raw data occur without interference. It is specifically pertinent 
in this research, as it seeks to explain ‘how’ or ‘why’ the observed behaviour of 
concern, the process deviation during crisis response, potentially occurs.   
Within this discussion the arguments for the case study context of evaluating 
crisis management through a Coca-Cola system lens was presented, thereby 
providing a compelling context for the examination of the research question. It 
has also described the strategies that were utilised for the data collection. These 
included the interviewing of subject matter experts and the observations of 
crisis management teams during both crisis simulations and ‘real-life’ 
responses.  These observations were captured in vignettes. The vignette, by 
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being an obvious literary construct, enabled the researcher to present an 
account of the experience that it addressed.   As the research was also 
examining the composition of crisis teams, their leadership and their 
contribution to the deviation, the personality types of the participants were 
evaluated. This evaluation not only examined existing coordinators but also 
examined the SMEs to look at commonalities.  For this purpose, MBTI was 
adopted and the rationale for selection of this personality assessment tool and a 
description of the approach was provided. 
The chapter then moved to address the topic of data reliability and ethics.  In 
respect of reliability, it outlined the utilisation of the Leximancer software to 
examine the collected data in a manner that addressed researcher bias. 
Leximancer was selected as the most appropriate tool as it had the capability to 
provide reliability and rigour in the evaluation.  Additionally, the ability to 
replicate and standardise the material assisted in establishing trust and 
confidence during the data collection, data analysis and interpretation phases of 
the research.  In respect of research ethics, the methodology outlined the 
compliance with the relevant university requirements in this space.  
Lastly, the methodology chapter discussed the approach taken to manual coding 
and thematic analysis.  This element was incorporated into the research from 
feedback that was presented during a critical review of an earlier version of the 
thesis. This was linked to concerns of relying purely on Leximancer as the 
coding mechanic.  The manual coding process aimed to provide further 
independent evaluation of the material together with providing additional 
rigour to the testing and validation of the results as presented by Leximancer. 
This enabled method triangulation of the data to be undertaken. 
With this chapter having outlined the methodology the following chapter, 
presents the empirical data and the findings of the research.  From there, the 
focus will turn to the detailed discussion of the findings with an evaluation 
against the extant literature.  
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Chapter 4 – FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the findings of the research. As outlined previously, this research set 
out to understand the root causes of deviations from ostensive routines observed during 
the actual performance of crisis teams during real life activations. Such deviations have 
the potential to adversely impact the team’s ability to effectively resolve the issue at 
hand.  Specifically, the objective was to utilise the empirical data to develop a theory that 
explains this paradox. 
The analysis focused initially on two discrete areas.  The first discrete area collected 
data to evaluate whether the deviation occurred as the crisis routines, artefacts and 
training are either considered inappropriate in their current form or are not modified 
and enhanced in response to lessons that are learned during a post incident review. The 
second area of data analysis examined whether the deviation occurs due to an 
ineffective approach to the structure, leadership and coordination of the CMT; that is, 
the actors are not cast correctly, so that behaviour and skill sets contribute to the 
deviation.  
The data was collected from a variety of sources, including: documented observations of 
crisis teams during training and simulation; interviews with subject matter experts; 
evaluation of crisis leader capabilities; and vignettes of real case responses.  This 
chapter will outline the findings from the research and analysis and commences by 
presenting the findings as they relate to the qualifications and experience of the subject 
matter experts, as this is important to confirm their level of experience and competence 
to comment critically on the topic of crisis management. 
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The focus then moves to the findings relating to the data itself as extracted from 
Leximancer and researcher analysis.  As documented in the methodology, the data was 
subjected to initial researcher analysis, which established the starting point for the 
interpretation of the data. During the second stage the connectivity of themes was 
evaluated utilising the software, thereby mitigating the risk of researcher bias.  This 
process involved the uploading of the complete data pool into Leximancer where it was 
subjected to simulation modelling, and this is the focus of the second part of the chapter.  
Lastly, as was mentioned in the methodology, critical feedback on an earlier version of 
the paper, recommended the utilisation of manual coding to validate the accuracy of the 
Leximancer results.   The findings from the manual coding and thematic analysis are 
reported in the third part of the chapter. 
In sequence, the first two sections of the chapter will examine the findings as they relate 
to: 
▪ subject matter experts; 
▪ an overview of the concept findings; 
▪ role of the artefacts; 
▪ observations of process deviation; 
▪ role of the team and the crisis leader; 
▪ role of training and process improvements;  
▪ culture and personality in team dynamics; and 
▪ perceptions of risk management and business resilience. 
The chapter will then address the findings from the thematic analysis and 
supplementary manual coding that will illustrate commonalities between the data sets. 
 
4.2 Subject Matter Experts 
Prior to discussing the concepts and themes as identified from the data sources, it is 
important to discuss and validate the background and the experience of the twenty-
three subject matter experts who were either interviewed or, in the case of the 
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researcher, contributed to the creation of the vignettes for the research.  While twenty–
four were approached, twenty-two participated in the interview process, with 
operational availability and time zones impacting the participation of two SMEs. The 
subject matter experts were sourced from the network that the researcher has 
developed over eighteen years both within and external to TCCS. The researcher’s 
perspective on what constitutes an SME was established through observations of the 
performance of SMEs during crisis activations either as core members of teams or as 
crisis management leaders.  The SME pool was considered representative, based on the 
researcher’s experience of observing over one hundred crisis coordinators during his 
eighteen-year period as a private sector crisis specialist. The selected number 
represented approximately 23% of the best-case accessible knowledge pool known to 
the researcher. The SMEs were selected to ensure that there was representation across 
geographies and cultures. 
As illustrated in Figure 12, the ratio of males to females was weighted towards males, 
(83%), with 17% female. In Figure 13 it is noted that 74% of the respondents were, at 
the time of interview, performing the role of crisis coordinator at either a country, 
business unit or Group level. For this research a business unit within the structure of 
Coca-Cola HBC, is defined as a group of countries under the assigned leadership of one 
general manager (e.g. the Baltics Business Unit comprises the countries of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania).  Within TCCC it comprises multiple markets covering an aligned 
geographic spread. 
Figure 14 documents the education level of the SMEs. The majority of the respondents 
(87%) held postgraduate master’s degrees, and the findings indicate two instances of 
respondents having multiple master’s degrees. Two of the respondents held a PhD 
(9%) and there was one respondent who at the time of interviewing held an 
undergraduate degree (4%).  However, this SME was in the process of undertaking his 
postgraduate degree, which was completed at the end of 2017. This respondent was 
also the youngest of those surveyed.  
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
Figure 12 – Gender of the SMES 
 
 
Figure 13 – SMEs as Crisis Coordinators 
 
 
  
Figure 14 – SMEs Education Level 
 
 
Figure 15 – SMEs age range 
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Figure 16 – SMEs Crisis Management Experience 
 
 
Figure 17 – Functional Area of SME Expertise 
 
 
Figure 18 – Operational Location of SME at Interview 
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Figure 15 indicates that 87% of the respondents were above 40 years of age, with the 
majority being in the 50–59 age range (52%). This age maturity has a direct correlation 
to the years of crisis experience, exposure to crisis situations, business experience, and 
training, which validates the importance of maturity and time in the team in 
minimising process deviation risk. Additionally, many of the respondents had been 
exposed to both public and private crisis response and, as depicted in Figure 16, fifteen 
of the respondents (65%) had worked in the crisis management field for more than 11 
years. This linked to the observed correlation between age and experience, which in 
turn links to functional expertise, that had enabled the skills sets to be developed.  For 
the purposes of this research, most of the respondents came from the security and risk 
field (52%) followed by the public affairs and communications (PAC) stream of 
business (30%).  From an operational perspective, this can be attributed to the fact 
that, in many organisations, crisis management is incorrectly seen as correlating with 
crisis communication. Within TCCC there has been a trend to automatically place PAC 
as the leader in crisis management response. 
 
Figure 19 – Nationalities of the SMEs 
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Several of the respondents, typically those currently in the security and risk 
management streams, indicated that they had had previous careers in the military or 
law enforcement.  This exposure to both complex and high-pressure roles indicated that 
a certain personality type, with exposure to elements such as process compliance and 
process discipline, tended to be drawn into these types of business roles.  What was 
important to note is that, as mentioned earlier, not all were currently in coordination or 
leadership roles, as some were strong SMEs in their specific functional area, which did 
not automatically place them in a crisis leadership position.  
The SME sample pool also covered a diverse range of business unit geographical 
territories as shown in Figure 18, and nationalities as illustrated in Figure 19. The 
countries with the most respondents, in each instance three, were from Australia, 
Poland and the United States.  This diversity added additional balance to the analysis by 
avoiding a focus on any one geographic area or specific ethnicity. Despite this 
diversification strong commonalities in themes and perspectives were observed, 
thereby validating that the issues with respect to process deviation transcended 
geographic and social boundaries. For example, all of the SMEs had observed the process 
deviation issue during the course of their careers.  
In summary, while the group was diverse in nature, many commonalities were observed 
in respect of their experience and the nature of the cases that they had worked on. What 
was evident was that training, practice, exposure to a variety of cases, and longevity as a 
member of the crisis team all contributed to the development of the skills sets as 
displayed by the subject matter experts. Therefore, it will be argued that deviation in the 
application of the ostensive routines is minimised by experience, which is built up over 
time, creating a familiarity with the process that is complemented by the team members’ 
trust in the crisis team’s leadership.  The findings in respect of the SMEs, personality 
types will be discussed in depth later in this chapter. 
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4.3 Concept Analysis  
4.3.1 Concepts Identified by Leximancer 
Commencing with the process of the extraction of the findings, it is important to 
reiterate that Leximancer was utilised to develop an unbiased depiction of the concepts 
identified from reviews of the simulations, case study vignettes and transcriptions of the 
interviews with the subject matter experts.  This initial section discusses what the 
concept maps showed and creates the framework for further depiction of the findings. In 
the first stage of the development of the concept map, a ‘low detailed’ approach was 
adopted to capture the core themes, and then a ‘high detailed’ map was created to 
highlight in detail the themes captured within each of the clusters.  As discussed in the 
methodology, the colour coding depicts the frequency of the concept, with the red 
bubble being the ‘hottest’ concept followed by orange, then purple through to the 
greens.  It is from this high detailed chart that the connectivity of the findings to be 
extracted is obtained.  
The concept map provides an illustration of the importance of the team and the crisis 
leader to the process.  This linkage with the utilisation of the tools is also illustrated by 
the correlation to collection of the information that is required to effectively guide the 
problem solving.  Interestingly, culture is confirmed as an element that was raised on 
multiple occasions throughout the research, with an emphasis on the impact that culture 
can have across diverse territories on the dynamics and capabilities of the team. There 
was a strong interconnectivity between the concepts stemming from the term ‘crisis’, 
which by default is the central concept.  
The common links extended to the importance of the ‘team’ and the ‘people’ and their 
ability to work together by using the tools or artefacts in managing the response 
together with a specific linkage of the people to ‘culture’.  Within the elements also sat 
commentary on the role that each of these elements played with respect to deviation. At 
this point it is important to reinforce that due to the word ‘crisis’ being the central 
theme and node of this research, with the focus on the process deviation from the 
ostensive routines, it was omitted as a term from the specific analysis. 
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Figure 20 depicts the synopsis of the key words and the level of the hits, taking into 
consideration that in some instances the word stream has been consolidated.  For 
example, the word ‘crisis’ was structured in the system in such a way as to incorporate 
associated words utilised in TCCS such as “incident’, ‘issue’ and ‘event’, which have a 
common thread as categories in the research focus. These are distinct categories and 
related to the classification of event types which will lead to the activation of a crisis 
team within TCCS. The extensive nature of the ‘hits’ for crisis (1,549) stemmed from it 
being the central theme.  As all discussions branched off it, it was important to remove 
the focus from the word. The visuals and the theme connectivity as depicted in the ‘low 
detail concept map’ and the more detailed connectivity as shown in the ‘high detail 
concept map’, both in Figure 21, confirm that the findings should focus on the themes as 
they relate to: the artefacts (tools and checklists); the team and the elements of 
experience, structure, personality (people), response and training; the role within the 
teams of the coordinator; and the impact of culture, be that business or social culture.  
Intrinsically linked to ‘crisis’ is the concept of risk management. The findings will 
examine perspectives as to the role that risk management plays in both a reactive and a 
proactive sense. 
Figure 20 – Leximancer: Synopsis of Key Words 
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Figure 21 – Leximancer: Low Detail and High Detail Outputs 
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Dealing with these concepts generically first, it is important to examine the findings as 
they relate to the role of the tools and the utilisation of the key artefacts.  In the context 
of the ostensive routines these are contained within the crisis management plans and 
they are supported by specific artefacts. These comprise the various tools and checklists. 
It is evident from the findings that there was both an acceptance of and a heavy 
weighting placed on the importance of their use in driving the successful resolution of 
the crisis. In this stream, there was a linkage to ensuring their utilisation in a timely 
manner, which ensures that the problem is correctly identified and provides for effective 
root cause analysis. This theme grouping will also examine the commentary as it relates 
to the observed reasons for the occurrence of process deviation. 
The focus of the findings will then shift to address the elements of the team structure 
and the need for the crisis team to have effective synergies and experience.  Within this 
theme sits the role of the crisis leader, described in the language of TCCS as the IMCR 
coordinator, and the influence that they have, or should have, in driving utilisation of the 
artefacts to ensure process deviation minimisation. The findings will also show that a 
team under effective crisis leadership is central to the undertaking of the performative 
routines, with training and repetition central to the enhancement of individual and 
collective skills.  When dealing with the individuals, and the team collectively, 
personality has a critical role to play and this is addressed specifically in the 
commentary of the subject matter experts.  On the periphery of the findings linked to 
roles sits the concept of culture.  This point is illustrated in the blue ‘concept’ bubble 
with an overlapping to the green ‘role’ bubble that captures the crisis team member’s 
role and level. 
Interestingly, across the SMEs there were differing orders of theme prioritisation. Some 
SMEs argued that the tools were the first priority in setting the context of the response. 
Others stipulated the importance of the team and the tools as the core element (SME12, 
2017) that provided the framework for the corrective resolution.  There was a common 
focus on crisis leadership and, irrespective of the prioritisation, the findings 
demonstrate the intrinsic links between: the ostensive routines; the people performing 
those routines, whether as members of the crisis team or as crisis leaders; the team 
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dynamics driven by the influence of personality and culture; and, finally, the roles of 
training and individual experience. With this context now established, the findings will 
be discussed within the parameters of these overarching streams and their related key 
linked areas.  
 
 4.4  Concept and Data Findings 
4.4.1 The role of key artefacts: tools and checklists 
The concept of ‘tools’ as shown in Figure 20, rated fifth in the overall analysis of the 
trends. Therefore, it is relevant to firstly outline the findings for this category as they 
relate directly to the examination of the first stream in the theory building.  This focuses 
on the value of the routines and the artefacts in supporting the crisis response. 
Referring to Figure 21, the high-detailed Leximancer concept map indicates that the 
tools play a pivotal role in the resolution of the incident and this confirms that the use of 
artefacts is critical.  Depicted in the nodes is the importance of the ostensive processes 
as a component of a crisis response. This validates the direct correlation to the tools and 
the effective utilisation during the response. The crisis node has an additional stream 
that indicates time factors driving problem solving and fact finding, with information 
collection a component within the tools bubble. With these concepts in mind, this 
section focuses on these elements and the relevant themes.   
A deep dive into the responses finds several common themes as presented by the 
subject matter experts.  Firstly, it was noted that the crisis management tools were in 
fact introduced because what had been commonly observed was a very inconsistent 
approach to crisis response.  Consistency is critical and comes about through 
standardisation, not only of approach, but of the tools that are used by the teams during 
the crisis response (SME1, 2017, p. 2).  The logic behind process standardisation is that 
once a manager is trained, in theory, that individual could move to any other part of 
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TCCS and participate in the crisis team, as the artefacts and the ostensive routines are 
the same. This program originated with TCCS, for most part, because of the ineffective 
response to the Belgium crisis, as discussed earlier in this thesis and outlined in more 
detail in appendix C. As SME9 (2016, p. 2), who was involved in the Belgium case, stated 
in respect of that crisis response, “at the end of the day Coke comprehensively resolved 
the wrong problem.”  This was in part driven by the fact that no structured and 
consistent ostensive routines existed that provided for a standardised approach to be 
executed, thereby impacting the capabilities and response of the team. 
As for the tools themselves, SME22 (2016, p. 2) confirmed that the “tools are absolutely 
essential because they provide cues to consider things that people would not necessarily 
do. It is a way for people to consider their approach to a problem and an incident in a 
holistic way.” SME8 (2017, p. 2) further argued that 
 “the tools are fundamental and vital…and it is very important that you follow the 
process and that you don't get deviated and that you don't start panicking. 
Deviation occurs when the coordinator does not follow the process… and when 
people start to panic, or senior people exert a presence that results in process 
deviation. The tools provide the structure.”    
The value of the artefacts is demonstrated “in the heat of battle, when a lot of things are 
going on, it makes sure that you answer all the fundamental questions that need to be 
answered, which you might forget about if it is a very big incident and there is a lot of 
pressure. It makes sure that you don't miss anything” (SME21, 2016, p. 2).  In essence, 
the tools were consistently acknowledged by the SMEs as providing the framework for 
the establishment of the crisis management response (SME16, 2017), with all of the 
artefacts linked to the core ostensive routines as documented in the crisis management 
plan.  
The concept map indicates that the tools drive information collection and that the crisis 
dictates the methodology and approach. As SME10 (2016, p. 4), a retired Chief 
Superintendent of Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism team, noted, 
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“the tools are extremely helpful because they give someone a visual guide and a 
visual clarity as to what it is they should be looking for. I think that in the middle of 
the process that there are times that I have observed, and I am sure you have as 
well, where you lose sight of the wood from the trees. Where you think you are 
going with this ends up not being on the destination plan anywhere at all and the 
roadmap suddenly gets very, very confused. So, I think having the tools is very, very 
good and I think they are exceptional in finding out what the problem is. They are a 
Sherlock Holmes idiots guide to doing an investigation to find out the basic facts”  
SME18 (2016, p. 2) also validated the importance of the tools when she noted that “the 
tools are very valuable and very useful, especially for the leader as this is something that 
in general allows people to think before they jump into the action and the conclusion.” 
With this objective in mind SME17  (2016, p. 2) further argued that in fact the tools 
mitigate the risk of the process derailing and deviation. She stated that 
 “I think that one of the biggest risks, in an IMCR process, is that people get caught 
up on a particular track, train of thought, component of an issue and they lose the 
bigger picture.  So, one of the advantages of tools is that it makes sure that you are 
stopping, checking, and considering all the components.”  
The data also validated that the tools were not only determined to be extremely 
beneficial but were described as providing the backbone and the structure that is critical 
in reacting and analysing the crisis in order to achieve the correct outcome. They are 
fundamental to the success of the crisis team (SME7, 2017; SME17, 2016; SME21, 2016). 
Their value is exhibited particularly in the high pressure stages, for crises are not static, 
but dynamic events, which ebb and flow, and through correct utilisation the tools ensure 
that nothing is missed by the team (SME8, 2017, p. 3).  The role of the tools is directly 
linked to collection of the relevant information that is pertinent to the situation, enabling 
the team to deep dive into the operational linkages and trends that are occurring. This is 
core to effective crisis investigation and provides the structure that is required to assist 
in the identification of the root cause. Furthermore, SME21 (2016, p. 2) noted that the 
tools provide a framework that ensures “that we do not miss any of the basics when we 
are gathering information on the incident and when dealing with the incident.”   
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Others argued that, irrespective of the level of experience possessed by a team, all teams 
can benefit from actually working their way through the tools with the known 
information. By leveraging the tools and the checklists they challenge their thinking and 
are guided towards the data gaps (SME7, 2017, p. 2).  It was also evident that the 
common theme was that the teams that performed effectively in crisis situations clearly 
understood the role of the ostensive routines and utilised the tools, ensuring that 
process deviation was kept to a minimum.  As SME2 (2016, p. 2) observed, in situations 
where crises have not been managed well it is because weaker teams either do not 
understand the tools, and therefore do not apply them correctly, or in worst case 
situations simply pay ‘lip service’ to them.  This validates the importance of leveraging 
the tools on a continuous basis and always within the time constraints presented by the 
case at hand.  The importance of regular training and simulation exercises was 
highlighted in driving compliance with use. This is because this not only educates, but 
tests the capabilities of, the crisis team members.   
Interestingly, the relationship of the tools to the teams was identified as a critical 
influencing factor in the minds of some of the respondents. This was because the critical 
element that influenced the importance of the tools was very much linked to the teams 
themselves. One observer noted that, dependent on the teams, the effectiveness of the 
tools may actually vary from medium to significant value (SME20, 2016).  Others argued 
that, while the tools are very valuable, their continued use over the years by an 
experienced crisis leader may create a situation in which their utilisation becomes 
intuitive in nature (SME21, 2016; SME23, 2016).  SME6, for example, argued specifically 
in favour of the relevance of intuition. Here the most important aspect was to have an 
understanding of the tools and their utilisation, “making sure that when they run IMCR 
sessions that they follow, you know, the steps, the principles of the tools, but not 
necessarily having a print out in front of them” (SME6, 2016, p. 3).   SME17 took the view 
that, while the tools were central to successful resolution, “you can’t just manage the 
crisis by the process, there is a whole, not to sound fluffy, creative, artistic, intuitive 
component that has to blend in with all of this” (SME17, 2016, p. 7).  The acknowledged 
risk here is that even with intuition something can be missed and therefore there is a 
need to revisit the documents to validate thinking.  These views tended to contradict the 
majority of the other arguments, that there was value in always having the tools present. 
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The findings also confirmed the role that experience and longevity of the team members 
and crisis leader play in influencing utilisation of the artefacts.  The role of the crisis 
leader was seen as essential to driving utilisation of the tools and this is where  “good 
leadership, effective leadership” plays its part, for where things have gone wrong 
“sometimes it is the process leader not following the process” or allowing “too much 
discussion” (SME21, 2016, p. 7) to occur. This theme will be outlined and built on in 
more detail in discussing the role of the team and the crisis leader. Having presented the 
importance that the SMEs placed on the tools, a deeper evaluation of the tool bubble 
indicates a variety of critical commentary in relation to the types of tools that are used.  
SME23 (2016) argued that of the crisis tools available the problem analysis tool (see 
Figure 27, appendix H for detailed descriptions) was critically important. This was 
because it provided the initial response context by enabling the team to understand the 
problem presented, thereby ensuring that the team were working on the correct 
‘problem’. This was not the case, for example, during the Belgium crisis. Understanding 
the problem and the dynamics provided information that would feed into the commonly 
referred to 10Q document (see Figure 28, Appendix H). This is because, as SME23 (2016, 
p. 5) noted, if you were able to answer those ten questions it illustrated that the team 
had an effective understanding not only of the problem but of the strategies 
implemented, or required to be implemented, to manage the crisis response.   
While the findings indicated that the current tools utilised by the teams were effective, 
some observers felt that there was a need for additional artefacts to be designed.  For 
example, SME19 (2016) noted that while he liked the current suite of tools he saw the 
need for additional material to be available. This was particularly related to ensuring 
that there was more structure for the meetings.  Without this guidance and support for 
the crisis leader a team continually ran the risk of allowing the meeting to flow out of 
control, with instances noted where the crisis management calls and the in-person 
meetings turning into chaos. From an artefact creation perspective, this illustrated the 
importance of a model agenda to support the crisis leader in creating structure. Overall, 
though, many of the suggestions related more to the importance of checklists, and their 
value to the coordinator in particular, than to the development of additional tools 
(SME11, 2016; SME19, 2016; SME21, 2016; SME22, 2016). 
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An argument was presented that the tools, and in particular the checklists, needed to be 
tailored to ensure that they cater for the relevant scenario. This confirmed the 
importance of avoiding generic checklists and developing checklists that support 
responses to specific themes such as product quality.  This aligned with one 
respondent’s position that the more effective crisis leaders utilised checklists that were 
“tailored to the nature of the specific crisis that they may face” (SME14, 2016, p. 6).  The 
importance of the checklist and the role that it plays in supporting the direction of the 
team was highlighted by SME2, who stated:  
“The word checklist, I think has a difficult connotation in people’s minds, they think 
it’s the case of you just have to go, just go over it. The checklist is, have we actually 
satisfactorily answered this question, do we have this? So, the checklist approach 
can have a very beneficial thing, particularly going back and making sure. Because 
like a murder, in these incidents we have limited information at the start and we 
have to make some assumptions. Then we start building our actions through those 
assumptions and we gather more information.” (SME2, 2016, p. 11 ) 
Checklists, combined with the plans and the tools, were seen as providing the definitive 
and ultimate guide to a coordinated response, with SME1 arguing that “checklists are 
vital in that they establish the playbook. The crisis leader needs to drive the process, 
follow the playbook” (SME1, 2017).  SME17 went on to validate this position by noting 
that what is needed is “some really good, just single page like checklist stuff that you 
could quickly run your eye down and say, ‘Oh, we haven't done that, let's make sure that 
we are comfortable and that we have not glossed over this’ for example” (SME17, 2016, 
p. 8). This would therefore ensure that all elements are addressed.  SME9 went further, 
observing that crises are not linear events and that it is critical that the stakeholders are 
identified and managed; to this end “checklists make sure that you know that you have 
to communicate with all these people…and you know that you need certain information’ 
in order to do this effectively” (SME9, 2016, p. 4).  Building on this theme, SME3 (2016, 
p. 10) stated that  
“the ISO process is typically about checklists. But at the end if you are ISO certified it 
doesn't mean your plane will not crash, it means you followed the structured 
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process to build your plane, but the checklist will not tell you whether your plane is 
able to fly. So, all the time you have to look at the two sides of the coin. Yes, there is 
a checklist of process management and then also the real management.”   
It was noted that reviewing and potentially redesigning the checklists would be a 
valuable exercise, as would be the specialised training of the crisis leader in the correct 
utilisation of the complete collection of artefacts.  In addition to enhancement of the 
checklists, there was certainly a perspective shown that there was now the opportunity 
for TCCS to become more modern with the creation not only of digital tools (SME6, 
2016; SME15, 2016; SME21, 2016) but also of tools that would assist a team in 
addressing the changing social media landscape (SME21, 2016, p. 3).  This could include 
the design and roll out of an ‘app’ to support the response and automate the existing 
routines. Ultimately, the findings in respect of the tools validate that they, irrespective of 
whether they are plans, checklists or analysis tools, are vital as they provide the 
structure for the response.  Further, they assist in establishing the correct path and in 
creating calmness, while enabling the ostensive process to be effectively performed 
through ensuring that the teams are thinking the ‘right way’ in terms of the crisis 
management response (SME4, 2016; SME8, 2017).  
4.4.2 Observations on Process Deviation 
Having established the importance of the artefacts in guiding the crisis response, the 
data analysis now turns to examining and addressing the central theme of why the 
performative deviation from the ostensive routines occurs in the first place.  As an 
important initial observation, it is noted that all the subject matter experts had observed 
the occurrence of process deviation at some point during their careers, irrespective of 
industry sector, or public or private service. It was further acknowledged that this 
behaviour had inevitably contributed to adverse outcomes, often creating new risks or 
exacerbating the crisis. 
SME14 summed up the situation by stating that the problem stemmed from “the people 
that manage the tools…always its people, it is never the fault of the tool” (SME14, 2016, 
p. 3). This position argues against building a theory that argues that it is the design of 
the tools that impacts their level of use or is the reason for the process deviation to 
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occur.  He went on to observe that while the tools are available “when the IMCR is 
opening, looking for the solution is in some way the priority, more than following the 
process” (SME14, 2016, p. 3).  Building on this was the view that the process deviation 
has two causes. Firstly, ignorance of the existence of the tools. Secondly, an individual’s 
or team’s arrogance in thinking that the tools are not needed as they believe that they 
know how to solve the problem (SME1, 2017).  SME10 observed that the tools sit in the 
background and it is known that they are there. However, the practical reality is that 
when the crisis commences the team becomes focused on ‘looking for the solution’ 
which in some way becomes the priority, rather ‘than the following the procedure’ 
(SME10, 2016, p. 3).  An incorrect team structure, with members thinking that they 
know the solution before addressing the issues by leveraging the tools, leads to 
deviation (SME7, 2017), and it was argued that teams with strong leadership, where the 
coordinator ensures that the tools are utilised, perform the most effectively. SME15 
(2016, p. 2) noted that in the CCEP teams of which he is a member, and from his 
experience, there is no sign of deviation “as the tool is on the table” and since the tools 
are seen as essential, they act as a compass in guiding the team on its journey to 
successfully resolve the event. This is attributed to the training of the individuals, the 
selection of the crisis leader, and the cultures that influence the behaviour (SME8, 2017; 
SME15, 2016). 
Process deviation can result in investigations that have limited structure and, in some 
instances, lack logical direction in their fact-finding endeavours.  One perspective 
following along this line was that team members rely on their own experience rather 
than leveraging the tools within the existing crisis management framework. This is 
compounded by the fact that “some of them may just not be familiar with the tools” 
(SME23, 2016, p. 3), which raises concerns with reference to the level of training 
afforded to the individual team members.  Training can be enhanced through a 
formalised review process, thereby turning tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge 
supporting the utilisation of the artefacts. This will be addressed further in the 
discussions in Chapter 5.  
SME20 (2016, p. 3) argued that “when people are under pressure, then they do not use 
the tools, they embark directly into managing the situation as it emerges.”  This can be 
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linked to culture, which can impact process discipline and result in people running off 
and doing their own thing.  Linked to this is the inexperience of the leader and the team 
members, where “people don’t actually know what they are doing” coupled with a “lack 
of role clarity and people not respecting other people in the room, and I think if I am 
really honest, where I tend to see it go horrible wrong, is where there is not enough 
constructive discussion and debate and review of options at each stage” (SME17, 2016, 
p. 2). These are elements and activities that can be minimised through the correct and 
timely application of the ostensive routines.  
SME19 (2016, p. 3) contended that there is also a human nature element that requires 
the culture of the business to accept that when there is an incident  
“reporting that incident and managing that incident in the proper way shouldn't be 
viewed as a failure but rather as a success.  A success because the processes and 
procedures are working…and recognising the severity of the issue, or recognising 
that the tools, in and of themselves, and the processes provide a framework whereby 
the situation should be properly resolved, if the tools are followed.” 
This requires a positive business culture that accepts that bad things can happen, but 
that it is the way in which the business response is managed that will define the 
business in the eyes of its stakeholders. So, this means a business must be supportive in 
the receipt of ‘bad’ news and also have confidence in the capabilities of their crisis team 
to successfully resolve the issue.  
SME19 went on to argue that there was a second element at play in influencing deviation 
and this related to team dynamics. Specifically, “within many team dynamics, you tend 
to get an element of 'I know better’ ” (2016, p. 5).  That is where the team members 
believe that, as they have handled these types of situations many times before, the 
processes and routines are irrelevant. In these cases they perceive that they can simply 
jump to the solution without understanding what the issue really is (SME19, 2016, p. 4). 
Building on this SME10 (2016, p. 11), also argued along these lines and noted that where 
the team is of the view that they have experienced this type of case before they can fail 
to examine it through a fresh lens and this results in assumptions being made and the 
risk incorrectly addressed.  In respect of this theme, SME9 believed that 
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 “the natural action once you get into the crisis room is to do what you are 
comfortable with, what you understand, what you know.  Now that's a problem in a 
crisis, because very few people have extensive experience in it, so what tends to 
happen is, they don't have time to read the plan, or don't understand what is in that 
plan.”  (SME9, 2016, p. 3) 
Experience, or lack of experience, was also deemed to be an influencing factor as an 
inexperienced team often lacks process knowledge and the team members do not 
actually know what they are doing.  Conversely, the experienced team has the awareness 
to understand that the tools act as a guide and therefore leverage them to drive their 
thinking and response. An aspect that can contribute to the deviation is a “lack of role 
clarity and people not respecting other people in the room, and I think if I am really 
honest, where I tend to see it go horribly wrong is where there is not enough 
constructive discussion and debate and review of options at each stage” (SME17, 2016, 
p. 2).  This lack of constructive dialogue can have a variety of causes.  SME16 (2017, p. 3) 
noted that “deviation can be caused by the desire to have a speedy resolution and the 
formulation of assumptions that we believe we already know the problem and we 
assume something, we don’t want to waste time on this (the process) and that is the 
beginning of the failure.” 
SME21 also reflected that there is a moral and ethical dilemma that sometimes 
influences the utilisation of the process.  He observed that “when things get bad it’s 
because people try and cover up something that went wrong in the beginning, it is more 
of a potential moral or ethical issue than did they use the tools correctly” (SME21, 2016, 
p. 9).  Ultimately, while numerous rationales for the deviation existed the main theme 
related to the crisis leadership and the nature of the team itself.  SME22 (2016, p. 3) 
identified a combination of leadership and culture in stating that: 
 “I think it is leadership, pure and simple, the person leading the meeting will either 
use the tool or they won’t, or they are not a strong person and they are afraid of 
being booed out of the meeting for wanting to instil discipline.”  
The skills and attributes of the crisis leader and their team are critical particularly as 
that knowledge relates to: the broader business objectives; crisis and operational 
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experience; managing internal politics (an area that is often underestimated, according 
to SME3); and culture.  Add to this mix team members and a crisis leader who are 
process adverse, and a formula for process deviation from the ostensive routines is 
established.  It is then imperative that, through training and practice, the process 
framework is embedded, with a focus on highlighting the role that the artefacts play in 
minimising process deviation (SME3, 2016; SME4, 2016; SME8, 2017; SME9, 2016; 
SME10, 2016). This is a core element of the training regime which must be implemented. 
That is, there is a need to build the leader, build the team, and reinforce the ostensive 
routines and the utilisation of the artefacts (SME10, 2016; SME11, 2017). 
In summary, several critical challenges were observed in relation to process deviation 
minimisation.  SME14 acknowledged that the ongoing human interaction was a factor 
and that while the ostensive routines minimise deviation “having the right people in 
place is the most critical challenge” (SME14, 2016, p. 9).  SME 4 (2016) conversely 
argued that the issue was created by the fact that the role of the coordinator is assigned 
by the virtue of their seniority and the nature of their ‘day job’ rather than their 
experience of crisis management. The risk here – and perhaps this can be described as 
an unintended consequence – is that they lapse back into their ‘normal’ role rather than 
focusing on the duties of the coordinator, and this creates a formula for process 
deviation.  Lastly, SME 01 (2017, p. 12) stated that process deviation minimisation is all 
about getting the group dynamics right.  This can be achieved through having a mature 
and professional coordinator, an individual that can interpret the team dynamics, and 
navigate the chatter, the psychology and the personalities, thereby drawing the best 
from the team.  This thinking presents a lead in to the next sub section that addresses 
the role of the team and the crisis leader. 
4.4.3 The role of the team and the crisis leader 
The previous sub-section presented the findings of the value and role that the artefacts 
play as the core pillars, or elements, of the ostensive routines.  This section examines the 
findings as they relate to the team’s involvement in process deviations. The discussion 
on the team incorporates the role of the crisis leader in the application of the ostensive 
routines and the utilisation of the artefacts that support the response. Referencing the 
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cluster map in Figure 21, the interconnectivity of the concept nodes illustrates that there 
are various related themes with respect to the team, with this element having the second 
highest number of referencing results.  The team’s importance to crisis resolution is 
exhibited via the direct linkage to the core concept of the crisis, with related connections 
extending to: the experience of the team; the structure of the team; and the ability to 
enhance the team through training and simulations.  The coordinator, or crisis leader, is 
central to this concept, with an intrinsic link to the personality type of the person 
selected to perform this role. An outlier in this space, but of no less importance, is the 
role that different cultures play and, interestingly, this links to both the leader and the 
process application.  
From the outset, the observations reinforce the importance of the team for, irrespective 
of the tools that exist, it is their application by the team that will critically impact the 
performance.  As SME7 (2017, p. 2) noted, the team is “fundamental to the success of the 
response” with the key being to have the correct team leader to ensure that the 
processes are adhered to.  While the tools may need a little refining, the process failure 
comes from human deviation.  So, it can be argued that with  
“weaker teams, sometimes it is the makeup, there is no clear strong leadership, 
sometimes there is over bearing leadership and other people can't actually get their 
ideas onto the table, which are necessary. Then sometimes it is a general lack of 
structure, and again I think that underpins why the tools are very useful to help 
guide us through in various stages.“ (SME2, 2016, p. 5) 
To begin with, the discussion will focus on the team leader, or, in the language of TCCS, 
the crisis coordinator, and the role that leadership plays in this regard. This is because 
the team works best when there is a “good coordinator” with management consequently 
“trusting the team” (SME14, 2016) and their recommended courses of action. It is the 
strength of that leadership that ensures performative process deviation minimisation. 
In this regard, it is acknowledged that one of the greatest challenges faced by the 
members of the crisis team is that this is very rarely, if ever, their ‘day job’.  The 
members will come from a variety of business disciplines and, while each has 
experienced different types of stress and pressures, crises are unique in their 
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complexity, and the high stakes of the situation can influence behaviour.  SME10  (2016, 
p. 2) described the situation of a team coming together when it is still  underprepared. 
Imagine: “the tiger bursts into the room and starts mauling everybody. And that’s where 
I think they lose it. They are somewhat out of their depth, as it is not what they do as a 
full-time role.”    
That said, it was also argued by SME9 (2016, p. 6) that this does not “mean that a team 
that just comes together for one purpose cannot effectively look at the problem, and I 
think that is where the tools come in, they enable you to sort of step back and have a 
broader look at the problem. It doesn't then matter if you have been together for ten 
minutes or ten years.”  Issues with experience can also come from the fact that the 
careers and personal backgrounds of the team members will influence their behaviour 
in a crisis, as very often members of the team are selected due to the position that they 
hold rather than the result of an assessment of their relevant capabilities.  Compounding 
this is a business perception that an individual is unlucky to be chosen for the crisis 
team rather than there being an acknowledgement as to the importance of the role.  This 
needs behavioural change and to “remedy that it would have to come down from the top 
letting people know that IMCR (crisis management) is a KPI for everyone and that 
everyone in the company will rotate through” the crisis team (SME21, 2016, p. 8). This 
would acknowledge the contribution to crisis response by all relevant managers. 
Within the team dynamics artefacts play a pivotal role in being able to support an 
otherwise novice team in overcoming the complexities of the crisis response.  This is 
linked to the structure of the team and ensuring that the right people representing the 
right areas are present. This ensures that the correct resources are applied to the 
problem at hand.  SME7 observed that it is important not only to have the right functions 
but the right calibre of people in place, and this is part of the process governance during 
the first phase of a crisis. She argued that this is the role of the crisis leader, making sure 
“that there is a clear owner, that everybody knows their roles” (SME7, 2017, p. 6).  
SME14 (2016, p. 5), when commenting on the team, reinforced the importance of  
keeping the team small as “too many actors can add confusion” for he had observed on a 
number of occasions that too many “people inside a meeting, especially a crisis meeting, 
can only add chaos. ” This leads to issues with the quality and timeliness of the decision 
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making. This was noted by SME11 (2017) in his observations on the cases cited in the 
vignettes for 2016. In his market, a lack of leadership direction created an environment 
in which chaos became the norm. In addition, trust within the team is critical and here 
SME20 argued that there is a necessity for the actors to come together to rehearse when 
there is no crisis, for  
“if you don't work on the good days, you cannot work well on the bad days, so that 
is, if I were to recommend something is to do some kind of team building or those 
people who are working on the crisis teams to somehow connect them when things 
are good, make them opportunities, not only put them under pressure” (2016, p. 5).   
Consequently, the composition of the team was a common theme.  Selecting the right 
type of people ensures that not only can a team approach the problem in a more 
effective way, but an understanding of the individuals and their personalities creates an 
environment in which the coordinator can drive effective process compliance. This 
would then lead to a more effective process response. In totality, the SMEs saw similar 
traits as being critical in this regard. SME21 stated that it was important to have 
“people who are responsible and accountable, people who are proactive, don't wait 
for a problem.  So, proactively they would have the inclination to deal with 
something early on rather than wait until it festers.  I would want people who have 
good analytical ability and who can write, who can do scenario planning, and 
people who are good analysts, and proactive, and also good communicators” 
(SME21, 2016, p. 10).   
SME3 commented that in his experience a team is effective and really works well 
together when a strong team spirit exists.  This is created through longevity of the team 
and its members, and he built on this theme by observing that the “longer the team is 
operating the more better [sic] it is going. That is clear” (SME3, 2016, p. 6). Longevity 
through keeping team membership consistent is crucial to success as it builds capability 
through experience. 
A risk, however, existed with respect to the selection of the crisis leader in that while the 
coordination element is critical “one of the undermining factors that happens is that 
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someone looks at a coordinator in a crisis situation as not an equal team member at the 
table, but almost like a note taker or someone who is not critical to the discussion” 
(SME17, 2016, p. 8).  The title utilised creates a perception that they are not an equal 
contributor to the process, versus the use of the title of crisis leader.  Additionally, 
SME21 (2016, p. 6) went on to argue that there is another misconception, which is that 
this role is only important during the response to the crisis. The reality is that the role 
serves a broader purpose from both a pre-crisis and a post crisis perspective. SME7 
agreed with this concept and stated “that there are three things that make the role of the 
coordinator really important. One is before the crisis, always make sure that the 
materials are up to date, that the team knows what to do, that you practice once in a 
while without an audit.” (SME7, 2017, p. 5)  There is also the importance of the post 
incident review and debrief that strengthens capability through critical self-assessment 
of the team’s performance. 
Therefore, the importance of the crisis leader’s role was reinforced.  Respondents 
acknowledged that it is vital that the right person is in place and that due to the 
criticality of the role it is essential to ensure that businesses should think twice about 
whom this position should be assigned to (SME3, 2016, p. 3). This requires the business 
to actively move away from criteria that see selection linked to a specific function such 
as public affairs and communications (PAC). SME17 (2016, p. 4) supported this position 
by arguing that “I think you are looking for a personality style versus functional 
knowledge” yet with strong acknowledgement of the importance of functional expertise. 
In identifying the correct person for the role, SME18 (2016, p. 5) commented that she 
would seek an individual that is  “open and willing to cooperate…open minded looking 
very broadly at the issues…with an ability to listen.”  The listening element is crucial as it 
engenders respect and trust which are the foundations on which the crisis leader creates 
trust within the team.  Without trust amongst the team members the response can 
become dysfunctional and this can create occasions where individuals will ultimately 
“want to verify every single sentence” and piece of information coming from members of 
the team (SME14, 2016, p. 4). 
The importance of the crisis leader was also illustrated via the use of various metaphors 
by the SMEs. This is because the leader is in fact critical in navigating the team through 
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the complexity of the situation, the associated administration and the complexity of the 
correct application of the processes,  routines and utilisation of the artefacts (SME18, 
2016, p. 3).  SME19 (2016, p. 6) commented that “they are the team captain and it 
doesn't mean they are the best player, and in fact they need to recognise when they are 
not the best player” to leverage the team to focus on the problem at hand. Building on 
the acting metaphor that sets the theme of the paper, SME20 (2016, p. 6) saw the crisis 
leader as the conductor of the orchestra. However, with that said, the conductor is only 
as good as the orchestra that they are conducting and their skills and ability to work as a 
team, which can be argued as linking back to the importance of experience within the 
crisis team. SME2 (2016, p. 9) used a slightly different metaphor, seeing the crisis leader 
as: 
 “a ringmaster, who brings the people in, subject matter experts, he frames the 
discussion, tell us what we know now, what's happened here, what don't we know, 
how can we find out, who’s going to take that work forward. Ultimately, when they 
are performing well they also have the ability to ensure that the team remains calm 
and focused.” 
The role has a process orientation, in that the crisis leader must ensure that the artefacts 
are being used, yet it is also critical to “have the right people at the right time, work as a 
team, following the process no matter what the issue is” (SME23, 2016, p. 4). SME23 also 
asserted that he saw the crisis leader as also needing to have some core attributes, 
specifically the ability to be “transparent, responsible, disciplined, experienced, skilful, 
team work, cooperative and have the capability to orchestrate constructive debate. They 
must be independent, being able to raise questions, challenge the boss, and also the 
company” (SME23, 2016, p. 4).  SME2 (2016, p. 3) reinforced the importance of a 
coordinator who has the ability to “step in and kind of help guide the process”, 
particularly in those cases where she observed that  “people’s personalities started to 
take hold and it seemed that whoever spoke the loudest in the room got most of the 
attention.” Additionally, SME1 made the observation that  
“if someone isn't necessarily shepherding that process with a strong sense of 
confidence, open mindedness and willingness to kind of understand what the 
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accomplishments need to be in terms of the process then it doesn't work well. That 
to me is the corner stone right there. A strong capable coordinator with the right 
leadership backing, I think the process works really well” (SME1, 2017, p. 3).  
While having the right people with the correct skill sets around the table is important, it 
is the capability of the crisis leader to leverage those skills to the best possible outcome 
that is critical.  
Within the concept bubble containing the coordinator (crisis leader), which emphasises 
the importance that needs to be placed on the coordination, a further deep dive of the 
findings noted the importance of the leader as being the critical element in ensuring that 
the team works effectively. In this respect SME4 outlined his view of the importance of 
this theme by stating that 
“in my opinion, I think that teams perform well when there is a clear guidance or 
leadership.  In our case this is  the IMCR coordinator, or crisis manager, who is more 
process orientated making sure that everything is being done according to the 
processes, procedures and rules rather than just jumping into conclusions and 
trying to resolve the incident” (SME4, 2016, p. 3). 
Thereby, as the role of the coordinator in TCCS is viewed as that of a leader, the focus 
moves to understanding, in the opinions of the subject matter experts, what are the 
attributes of an effective crisis leader.  SME9 noted that he saw two key elements at play, 
for “what you really need is someone who has the personal and professional skills to 
lead a process as opposed to performing some functional role within it” and “someone 
with a skill set that can facilitate a meeting” (SME9, 2016, p. 5).  SME23 (2016, p. 5) 
argued further that  “the coordinator's main responsibility is making sure the IMCR 
process works well and get everyone on board, timely, and the right people on the team 
and also this coordinator is responsible to connect sufficient information, conduct 
analysis of the problem, timely escalate to senior management for their decision 
making.”  Leadership, and not that conferred by seniority, was critical. As described by 
SME22 (2016, p. 5)  
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“if you had poor leadership, if you had a poor leader, it could exaggerate that aspect 
where people defer to the senior most person who does not uncover, raise concerns, 
questions, doubts, to strengthen the discussion, to strengthen what is known about 
the understanding of the case and how we are going to deal with it.”  
 This acknowledged the importance of leadership skills as a trait that needed to be 
present in an effective crisis leader. SME10 (2016, p. 3) presented the opinion that the 
coordinator needed the following attributes:  
“Definitely self-confidence but not to the point of arrogance. An ability to make 
quick decisions, an ability to assess the evidence that has been put in front of them. 
An ability to give directions for a more thorough investigation to take place to 
verify the evidence, and a very clear ability, having used the process which we 
currently have, and gone through the tools that we currently use, to be able to use 
that information, impose one upon the other to come up with options available and 
then be able to reach that consensus with others.”  
Others  (SME8, 2017; SME11, 2016; SME16, 2017) observed that possessing business 
experience and business insights were critical attributes for the crisis leader as they 
assisted in gaining the respect of the team members. With this respect flowed team 
engagement and cooperation.  This led to SME17 (2016, p. 7) observing that there is a 
need to speak in  “terms of someone who is heavily process orientated and someone 
who has got that intuition, experience, ability to kind of keep moving it along” and that 
additionally there was the importance of having experience in “coordinating things, not 
necessarily crisis management. But someone that works with diverse teams and 
manages the best of people” (SME20, 2016). The individual needs to be detail orientated 
as a priority, with a level head and professional maturity, and to be calm, cool and 
collected.  These attributes of demeanour are seen as contributing considerably to the 
effectiveness of the role through creating the mechanisms for structure and discipline 
(SME1, 2017; SME10, 2016). 
In respect of this element, the crisis leader, in addition to being process driven, with a 
cool head and the ability to lead a team of multi-disciplined members, needs to be a 
strong communicator, ensuring that team members understand the role sort and task 
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allocation. This is because when things really go wrong, in addition to allowing process 
deviation to occur, which can be linked to poor discipline, there is a direct correlation to 
poor and ineffective communication amongst the team members. This is often allowed 
to occur due to a lack of leadership and team coordination (SME6, 2016, pp. 7,8). 
Therefore, effective coordination is essential. 
To close this topic, it is fitting to cite the views of SME13, who encapsulates some of 
these core themes, in particular the element of team trust which allows the team to 
avoid such issues as panic. SME13 (2016, p. 5), in discussing the operational dynamics 
relating to a crisis response spanning over a year, stated that 
“at all times, we did not panic. We did not blink I would say, we understood that at 
one point this crisis would have a finish. So, we try to look to see what are the, how 
do you say, what are the boundaries of what can happen.  What is the worst-case 
scenario and what is the very optimistic scenario pretty much trying to act within 
these boundaries? Because the crisis was not just the risk about losing assets for 
example, or just about the people, but it was also about business continuity.” 
When a team understands all the core elements and the linkage back to other core 
aspects such as risks and worst-case scenarios that are brought into vision by utilisation 
of the tools, the crisis can be effectively managed.  An interesting footnote to the topic of 
teams and crisis leadership is: where ultimately should the focus of the development 
reside – with the crisis leader or with the crisis team, or should there be a balanced 
focus on both?  This guides the presentation of the data findings into the area of people 
development. 
4.4.4 The role of training and suggested process improvements 
Referring again to the concept bubbles in Figure 21, the next of the interrelated themes 
to be examined in more detail relates to the role that training plays.  The importance of 
training was evident both through the observations during the simulation exercises and 
from feedback; it was also a common thread within the SME observations.  Training is 
critical as it enables a team to build on the existing specialised capabilities both of the 
team members and of the team leaders. So, while it is critical to select the right people 
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for the team, people with the correct capabilities, authority, respect and experience, it is 
even more crucial to implement a training program that contributes to the ongoing 
capability development, and at a frequency that ensures that those crisis teams that do 
not experience a live activation on a regular basis remain ‘battle ready’. 
Training therefore is critical to ensuring the overall effectiveness of the crisis response.  
SME18 (2016, p. 3) in her observations said that if we want to enhance capabilities and 
response then  “training is the key”, with some observers noting that it was second in 
importance only to ensuring that the correct people were placed onto the team with the 
training enhancing interoperability and connectivity (SME2, 2016; SME10, 2016).  In 
fact, one of the reasons why the deviation occurs was linked by the SMEs to a lack of 
training due to the environment that crisis team members experience when they are 
thrust into the complexity of an unfamiliar situation. This can drive individuals to 
reverting to thinking that the issue is out of control. SME10 (2016, p. 5) argued that this 
was in his opinion one of the major contributors to process deviation for it is a business 
failure not to exercise and train teams with a high level of frequency. A lack of frequency 
means that the teams miss out on gaining vital pre-crisis experience in the use of the 
artefacts.  These are skills and understanding that can be forgotten, unless tested in real 
life between the training sessions. While simulations may not fully test the team, they 
are central to developing a baseline understanding of the processes and routines 
together while enabling the team members to become comfortable with one another.  
Where, though, should the focus of the training be positioned? One view, as presented by 
SME 10 (2016, p. 11), was that there should be an equal weighting placed towards both 
the crisis leader and the team. Here there is a fine balance to be attained and conversely 
it was argued that an emphasis should be placed on the coordinator. Here SME4 (2016, 
p. 8) noted “that an 80/20 approach in favour of coordinators” would provide the most 
value-add. This would require the training to provide a focus on leadership, decision 
making and the core element of process management.   This was aligned with SME1 
(2017, p. 11), who presented a position that the focus must be on the coordinator, 
particularly as they have the potential to maintain stability while other members of the 
team may come and go. SME21 (2016, p. 12) built on this by arguing that it is vital “to 
have a dedicated coordinator who acts as the nexus for coordination” and from there it 
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becomes that individual’s responsibility to train and educate the team members. 
However, the additional counter argument was presented by SME 23 (2016, p. 8) with 
support from SME14 (2016, p. 9), who argued that the priority should be “focused on 
how the team members act effectively as a strong team rather than as any one 
individual.” 
Ultimately, though, there was a solid argument for ensuring a focus on the crisis leader. 
The reality is that no matter how good the team is, it is the crisis leader who will be 
responsible for providing the fabric of the structure, for ensuring routines are followed 
and for keeping the team on track.  This requires those responsible for the development 
of the training modules to create a stream that builds on the team approach yet enables 
specific time to be allocated for the crisis leader’s development. Here, the focus would be 
on the critical actions that need to be applied to minimise process deviation and the 
mechanisms that can be applied to control a team that attempts to take short cuts. This 
training then needs to be held at a frequency that enables it to become second nature 
and automatic for all participants.  By becoming second nature, the training creates 
confidence in how the crisis team should perform in a real life situation (SME3, 2016; 
SME11, 2017; SME15, 2016).  
Central to the training theme was the importance of the training being strongly aligned 
to real life experiences.  This alignment is generated through effectively capturing the 
lessons learnt from active cases, dissecting them and creating the training scenarios 
from that data.  This requires the creation of models that bring together organisational 
learning and involves structuring the approach to case reviews and their analysis, and to 
dissecting lessons learned. By ensuring a lesson learned and review program is 
integrated into the ostensive routines an organisation is able to ensure that effective 
organisational learning is implemented. It is from this process that a business can 
identify best practices, particularly as they relate to process deviation minimisation. 
This knowledge is then shared and its integration into the training ensures that the team 
avoids similar situations occurring in the preventative stage, and, in the event that a 
situation eventuates, it ensures that the correct protocols are in place to respond to the 
crisis (SME2, 2016; SME17, 2016). 
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One of the challenges faced in gathering this important data is the attitude of the team 
and an inability of the individuals to see past their own real-life experiences and 
recognise different types of crisis warning signals. A position where individuals are not 
willing to look more broadly and acknowledge that a change in direction may be 
required can contribute to making the learning process in both the pre-crisis and post 
crisis stages of the crisis management cycle quite challenging (SME3, 2016). This is 
another dynamic for the crisis leader to consider. The pre-event planning and how a 
team can develop further from the learnings of others.  Post crisis, the lessons learned 
sessions are only accomplished by finding the time to draw the team together after the 
crisis is over. It has been observed that there is often no real desire to do this as the 
crisis team members are simply keen to return to their day jobs. “Everyone is so busy in 
the business that once something is resolved, there is no real opportunity or really an 
appetite to get together and do that” (SME1, 2017, p. 3).  This attitude must be overcome 
to ensure that data sources exist to enhance the training program and participant 
experiences. There are numerous ways to do this. The most effective is for a business to 
formalise it as a governance requirement, thus it becomes mandatory to conduct a 
process review prior to the case closure.  To obtain this executive endorsement is critical 
as it will drive the organisational compliance. 
Linked closely to the discussions and views on training were mechanisms to enhance the 
overall training and actual response capabilities.  A core theme that emerged was the 
importance that technology can play as a response enabler. Some of the subject matter 
experts wondered if, with all the advances in technology since the tools were designed in 
2001, there was a way in which the tools could in fact be automated (SME22, 2016, p. 8).  
SME6 argued that there is an immense opportunity to leverage software and develop by 
way of example an “app to guide the conversation and if you have not yet fulfilled the 
actions that are needed in the process step you are not allowed to the second or third or 
fourth”  (SME6, 2016, p. 4) steps.  However, if the checklist is too rigid it would have the 
potential of becoming a ‘READ-DO’ checklist, controlling the thinking and removing 
innovation which ensure that the resolution is carried out in a timely manner.  
Checklists do have a role to play.  However, this is arguably more with respect to the 
confirmation checklist modelling style. Therefore this would require any application to 
provide flexibility for the team to move efficiently through the processes, while 
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minimising the risk of process deviation (SME11, 2017).  It would be critical here to 
ensure that the automated tools are embraced. Simply creating a new automated 
artefact does not necessarily translate to utilisation and the risk of process deviation 
would not be mitigated if the medium was simply changed. 
4.4.5 The role that culture plays 
Culture, whether organisational or national was a theme that was linked to various 
concept elements.  Referring to Figure 21, culture as a theme was linked to the people 
concept. This dealt with the nature of the people on the team, and the concept that 
addressed the processes themselves in operation and extended to the crisis team 
dynamics and to the crisis leader themselves.  During the simulation observations, the 
role that culture played was particularly evident.  SME8, who has oversight of the crisis 
management response across the CCEP markets (e.g. France, Spain, Germany and the 
‘Nordics’ operations), noted that that culture is a central risk.  Culture has resulted in 
teams going off on tangents and deviating from the process as they think that they know 
best.  This had been observed particularly in the Nordics, where culture had etched 
responses into the team approach, resulting in the routines not being utilised due to the 
fact that the team held the view that they knew what a response should be, simply by the 
scenario presented. The result was that on several occasions this deviation had seen the 
incorrect problem being managed.  Building on culture from an organisational 
perspective, SME3 (2016, p. 7) commented that  
“culture plays a significant role from step one. From problem identification… a lot 
of times people feel that, they will not report IMCRs as they think it will reflect badly 
on themselves, that they made mistake or are not doing their job right, and the 
culture of reporting mistakes, or the fear of you know of punishment or retribution 
is very pronounced. Whereby if you can build a different kind of culture that 
promotes transparency and encourages people to act on issues, to proper 
communications early, sooner rather than later, that is the kind of cultural that we 
would like to have but we don't necessarily have all the time.”  
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Hence, the business culture had the ability to influence the response and this was often 
exacerbated by the dynamics of the national culture. SME14 (2016, p. 7) continued in 
this vein and argued that 
 “culture is fundamental because culture has a direct relation with people which are 
at the centre of the management of the crisis.  Crisis management is not the tool, is 
not the procedure, it is not the policy, it is the person, so culture has a huge impact. 
The important thing is that there is not a right or wrong culture, the important 
point is to know that culture works in that way.”  
Ultimately culture was observed to influence a number of elements. These ranged from 
influencing the manner and extent of process deviation, which will differ across markets 
(SME8, 2017, p. 3), to the nature of leadership that exists and its application in the 
operational response  stemming from cultural interpretations (SME10, 2016, p. 5). 
Culture plays a role as “there are disciplined people and not disciplined people. So the 
more you come to the south the more undisciplined they are, the more you go to the 
centre of Europe, the more disciplined” (SME20, 2016, p. 4). This was in reference to 
European cultural dynamics and an observed behavioural shift across geographic 
regions. This insight links to an example that was noted during the simulation 
observations in a market in southern Europe. As the simulation progressed, the team in 
question became very noisy, disjointed and appeared unstructured in their response.  
The situation at times became extremely chaotic and at one point the General Manager, 
who was sitting with the researcher observing the response, made the comment that 
“we are quite loud and appear somewhat disorganised. You know though that we 
[nationality removed] will get there in the end” (SME11, 2017).  Post this simulation the 
researcher trialled a specific training program for the crisis leader. The focus was on 
process adherence, creating structure, and guidance on managing individuals on the 
team.  Through one on one engagement over several months this crisis leader developed 
significantly, to the point where she became one of the strongest observed.  This 
validated the value of one on one crisis leadership education. 
Returning to the specific simulations and the observations, these were considered from 
the comments of SME11 that related to the performance contrast between southern and 
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northern European cultures. This was a theme which resonated with many of the SMEs.  
This contrast was observed in both the simulation and real case responses in the Balkan 
region and southern Europe, including Italy and Greece. Here a higher level of 
disorganisation was observed (SME11, 2016), including  a lack of adherence to process 
and structure.  This was in sharp contrast to the approaches observed in Poland and 
Switzerland, for example, where adoption of structure and the routines appeared second 
nature.  In respect of the team dynamics and interaction, the cultural element also plays 
a significant role in whether or not members of a team voice their opinions.  This is 
particularly evident in Asian markets, such as Japan and South Korea. Here it has been 
observed that managers will defer to, and not challenge, those that are considered 
‘older’ and ‘wiser’. This can impact decision making, since having an opinion and voicing 
it while on the crisis team is crucial to ensure that processes are followed, and 
innovation and opportunity are leveraged. The examples of cultural dynamics illustrate 
the importance of understanding cultural nuances and adapting the operational 
response guidance and field training to take these into account.     
However, culture also plays a slightly different and perhaps somewhat more critical role 
outside the dynamics of the core response and the linkage to process deviation. This role 
relates to the area of ethics, trust and transparency.  SME19 (2016, p. 8) noted that 
“culture plays a big role in people speaking out and of course during crisis management 
you hope for clarity and transparency, you need that to be able to make the right 
decisions.” This drew the inference that there can be a cultural tendency not only to hide 
the emergence of the crisis itself, but, in the response, to play a specific role in impacting 
the information being provided to the members of the crisis team. SME17 (2016, p. 6) 
built on this theme by observing that as  
“westerners we have a very, fairly clear line in the sand around truth and non-truth 
but for a lot of cultures that line is very grey. It is self-preservation from history, and 
that also makes crisis management very difficult, because people feel if they 
describe what has gone on, that someone will be held to account or blame and 
culturally that just doesn't work”.   
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This creates concerns in respect of the outcomes that may arise and can result in a 
tendency to cover up some aspects while also downplaying events so that they are not 
considered a crisis or an incident (SME23, 2016, p. 4), thereby reducing senior 
management visibility. The response therefore presents a clear linkage both to culture, 
with a strong link to the experience of the people on the team, and the personality types 
of the individuals (SME21, 2016).  
While culture played a role, a critical takeaway was that there was a necessity to focus 
on strengthening the leadership capabilities of the crisis team leader. This included 
educating the leader regarding mechanisms to help in maintaining control, which was as 
easy as a new process involving a clear meeting agenda. These observations on culture 
and personality create the foundation for the next section of the findings which relate to 
personality styles and the role that personality plays with the crisis team members, the 
crisis leader, and the linkage of behaviour to process deviation.  
4.4.6 The role of personality types in crisis team dynamics 
Building on the earlier findings, it was noted that for a team to be effective it was crucial 
that it “first and foremost experiences working together as a team” (SME2, 2016, p. 4). 
Teams must also have the ability to understand the bigger picture with a composition of 
“people who are calm under pressure, people who work well together and have a proven 
track record of working well, people who know what their limitations are and when they 
need to call in subject matter experts” (SME19, 2016, p. 7). In the discussions with the 
SMEs their views consistently support the importance that understanding personality 
can play in the teams’ response.  This supported the direction taken in this research to 
undertake a preliminary analysis of the role that personality plays. As noted previously, 
the abilities and skills of the crisis team members and the crisis leader are fundamental 
to the response, and these abilities directly contribute to minimising process deviation.  
In examining the current approach to creating the structure of the crisis team, it is 
observed that this is often achieved through the placement of functional senior 
managers onto the team. The logic here is that these managers bring with them 
specialised skills, and that due to their position in the organisation and their work 
experience they will operate effectively in a crisis situation.  This has been observed on 
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multiple occasions as not necessarily being the case. Therefore, it is argued that there 
should be a shift to create teams based on skills and attributes versus seniority or role 
sort.  This modelling drove the question: what impact does an understanding of the 
personality types, of both the crisis team leader and the crisis team members 
themselves, have on the effectiveness of the team? This included discussions that 
centred around which function should take the lead in the crisis response.  
In discussing this with the SMEs and with the crisis team participants during the post 
simulation debriefs, it was evident that there was a strong view that a level of 
understanding in respect of personalities would contribute to the overall effectiveness 
of the crisis team. SME20 (SME20, p. 3) noted that “we should be looking for a 
personality style versus functional knowledge”, which is diametrically opposed to the 
common model for selecting crisis team members. Building on the finding that 
effectiveness comes from the experience of working as a team, which is linked to the 
level of team work and collaboration (SME2, 2016, pp. 4,6), it was noted that it was 
important to respect each other’s abilities. It is “not just about getting these things ticked 
off, its let's think this through, let's work at this to get different perspectives and how do 
we come up with the best strategy to leave us in the best possible position” (SME9, 2016, 
p. 6).  Acknowledging the importance of having the right team members, the subject 
matter experts saw the benefit of deep diving into the personalities of the team 
members assigned to the team. In this regard, SME7 noted that it would be an excellent 
idea, as that process would provide “us the most appropriate insight.” Additionally, she 
went on to provide her unprompted view, based on MBTI, of the personality type that in 
her view would make the best leader. She stated, “I think if there is a type, and if you 
asked me, give me a type, I would argue that ESTJ would be the best coordinator” (SME7, 
2017).   SME19 also acknowledged the role that personality assessments could play. 
When presented with the concept he stated that, “any type of psychological profile in 
terms of how people work and then assembling a team that complements each other, 
from a skills and weaknesses, strengths perspective would be useful” (SME19, 2016, p. 
8).    
SME8 (2017, p. 7), while acknowledging the important contribution this could make, did 
extend a caveat in that, while determining the personality type has a role to play, care 
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must be taken to not use that as the mechanism to automatically discount a person. 
Rather, for the crisis team the purpose should be to leverage this understanding and 
utilise that knowledge to implement strategies to enhance the team’s capabilities.  This 
would enable additional discipline to be instilled, ensuring that teams are not composed 
of exactly the same type of qualified people.  This would also ensure that the team has 
the correct balance and competence to address the issue at hand and effectively answer 
all the questions that are posed by the processes and the tools (SME21, 2016, pp. 3,5).  
In this regard, as outlined in the methodology, the research conducted a preliminary 
evaluation of the role of personality by focusing on the application of MBTI against both 
the subject matter experts and the crisis leaders observed in Coca-Cola HBC during 
simulations and ‘real life’ case responses.   Addressing the subject matter experts first, as 
detailed earlier the participants were all experienced crisis management leaders who 
the researcher had had direct experience observing their performance in this field.  As 
part of the interview process each of them agreed to undertake a Myers Briggs 
evaluation3 with the objective of presenting a top line initial evaluation for comparative 
purposes. Figure 22 illustrates the breakdown of the personality types within the 
subject matter expert sample pool. 
Of the SME’s eighteen responded to the survey with the prevailing classification being 
ESTJ (39%) and overall extroversion was the primary factor in the categorisation (67%).  
In discussions with the SMEs about this finding it was noted that while the level of 
extroversion varied in the respondents, extroversion as a trait may enable a crisis leader 
to exert more influence on the dynamics of the team. This, coupled with the sensing 
dynamic or the intuitive dynamic, had the potential to influence thinking and problem 
solving with both potentially influencing the individual’s ability to minimise process 
deviation. 
 
                                                        
3 Myers Briggs Type Indicator methodology and the classification model are addressed in detail 
in Appendix I. 
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Figure 22 – Myers Briggs Assessment of SMEs 
 
The second evaluation focused on an assessment of operational crisis leaders that were 
in position in the field during the period January to March 2017.  As detailed in the 
methodology, there were two elements to this evaluation.  The first was a qualitative 
assessment of the individuals based on the observations of a panel of four SMEs that 
included the researcher.  Each of the observers had the opportunity to evaluate the 
individuals in operation for a period of between six and thirty-six months.  The first 
stage was an evaluation of their capabilities in crisis leadership (Y axis), the second 
being in the field of application of processes and routines (X axis) with a focus on their 
ability to minimise process deviation.  Of the total group of twenty-four (24) SMEs and 
field participants approached to participate in the personality type evaluation, 
seventeen (17) agreed to undertake the Myers Briggs evaluation. These were depicted in 
the coordinator evaluation chart which is shown in Figure 23. 
Having concluded that evaluation, the Myers Briggs data of the respondents was 
assessed. This was then modelled against the capability matrix to identify if there was a 
specific Myers Briggs personality type linked to the high performing individuals on 
either the leadership or process application axis.  For the purpose of classification, the 
highest performing leaders were deemed as rating at eight and above for both 
leadership and process adherence. Six respondents were identified in this quadrant.  
Two additional elements were recorded, these being the nationality of the leader and 
the function that they represented on the crisis team. These were logged to enable an 
evaluation of the inter-relationship of culture (derived from nationality), function and 
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personality type. The evaluation depicted in figure 24 illustrates that in total 44% of the 
coordinators were ENTJ, which may be linked to their actual business role sort. In this 
instance, the majority (8) of the ENTJ respondents had a role in the area of Public Affairs 
and Communications.  Of the six rated as the highest performers, three were ESTJ, one 
was ENTJ, one was ENFP and one was ENFJ.  Of the ESTJs, there was no stand-out 
function, with the roles covering risk, security and sustainability. With respect to the 
respondents from the risk and security field this may be linked to the nature of the roles 
that they had undertaken during their pre-business careers with a strong link to 
disciplined roles in law enforcement and the military. 
In respect of country of nationality of the six identified high performers, the countries 
represented indicated Australia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United 
Kingdom.  This did partially support an inference that a northern European background 
may positively impact the ability and skill set of the crisis leader. It was interesting to 
note that the Bulgarian respondent had a strong business and educational background 
stemming from operating in a northern European environment. It is concluded that 
there is certainly an opportunity for further research into both the personality type that 
best fits with a crisis leader, together with the role that culture plays in process 
deviation. 
Figure 23 – Crisis Leader Skill Evaluation 
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Table 5 – Crisis Leader Personality Data 
Nationality Leader Function MBTI 
Croatian 1 PAC ENTJ 
Dutch 2 Sustainability ENTJ 
Estonian 3 PAC ENTJ 
Belarusian 4 PAC ENFP 
Bulgarian 5 PAC ENFJ 
Macedonian 6 PAC ENTJ 
Greek 7 PAC ENTJ 
Irish 8 PAC ENFP 
American 9 Risk INTP 
Romanian 10 PAC ENFJ 
Russian 11 PAC ENTJ 
Swiss 12 Sustainability ESTJ 
Ukrainian 13 PAC ENTJ 
Australian 14 Risk ESTJ 
Serbian 15 Security INTJ 
Dutch 16 PAC ENTJ 
United Kingdom 17 Security ESTJ 
 
Figure 24 – Myers Briggs Personality Chart - Crisis Coordinators 
 
In respect of the personality assessment itself, the findings validated that there was a 
variance in the views as to which personality assessment provided the most effective 
evaluation of individuals.  As outlined in the methodology, there is specific debate 
questioning the validity of Myers Briggs due to it compartmentalising individuals into 
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specific boxes.   The potential weakness of Myers Briggs was identified by SME17 (2016, 
p. 4), who noted that the  Hogan’s Assessment or Hermann Brain Dominance Index 
(HBDI) may be more effective tools as they do not compartmentalise individuals.  
Additionally, other tools such as NEO Personality Index (NEO PI) exist and have been 
utilised by the researcher as part of his business career.  In this respect the researcher 
has a preference for NEO PI, as it categorises extrovert and introvert traits against 
situations, rather than boxing an individual generically into one of those two spaces.  
That is, the nature of the situation that an individual finds themselves in actually 
determines whether they will exhibit introversion or extroversion tendencies. The 
difficulty with NEO PI is its complexity and length, which for this research meant it was 
not suitable. However, for future research into the specific crisis management 
personality types of crisis team members, it would be argued that this potentially is a 
more appropriate tool.  The findings also identify that future research into cultural 
dynamics and how they can be managed to gain the best out of the crisis team would be 
valuable. 
Ultimately though, irrespective of the tool utilised, the benefit of applying a personality 
assessment was generally observed as an effective next step in the evolution of the 
design and modelling of the crisis team and its leader.  The relevance of the findings will 
be evaluated in further detail in the discussion chapter. 
4.4.7 Perceptions of the role of risk management and business resilience  
The focus now moves to the discussion in respect of how the empirical data addresses 
the overarching theme of risk management and business resilience. This theme is 
evaluated as not only is it a common cluster, but it featured as a common background 
theme within the literature review.  This was commonly observed as a critical pre-crisis 
routine (SME2, 2016; SME10, 2016; SME14, 2016; SME21, 2016) and was observed as 
having a role that “is lessened if it is restricted to the management of an ongoing 
incident and does not feature in pre-mitigation planning” (SME2, 2016, p. 17).  
In the view of SME21, this pre-alignment is linked to a “direct correlation between the 
top risks identified and the actual incidents” (SME21, 2016, p. 12) that were 
experienced.  The importance is related not only to the development of the preventative 
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planning but also to the creation of a positive management mindset that creates a 
difference during the period of a crisis (SME2, 2016, p. 18).  SME23 noted that from a 
process perspective risk management must be more than an incident management tool. 
“It covers the timely detection of the red flags” and due to the pre-work stage prepares 
the crisis team for a “quick response and responsible root cause analysis.” The ultimate 
benefit is that this process enables managers “to take intelligent risk that supports 
healthy business growth” (SME23, 2016, p. 8) while enabling the preparation for risks 
that generate crisis scenarios. 
So, risk management was acknowledged as a critical proactive ostensive routine that is a 
core component of the new business resilience paradigm. Additionally, there was strong 
support for a business resilience design that incorporated proactive risk management 
elements and was supported by effective response routines.  As SME10 stated, 
“preparation for and response to incidents can only work well if it forms part of the 
same structure or function. If one department is charged with proactive work and 
then fails, in the sense that a risk has become critical and become an incident, then 
inevitably the parachuting in of a response function to ‘pick up the pieces and 
repair the damage’ works against the concept of team work” (SME10, 2016, p. 10). 
SME21 supported this thinking by stating that 
“the risks identified through the risk management process are the most likely sorts 
of risks that may turn into a crisis and thus identifying them upfront and making 
mitigation plans should ameliorate any consequences if the identified risks turn into 
a crisis” (SME21, 2016, p. 12). 
Lastly, SME14 argued that  
“having developed proactive and reactive tools gives the possibility to all the 
management to work on the same page, taking responsibility for choices, that is 
what to do with this risk, and then speak the same language during the 
crisis”(SME14, 2016, p. 9). 
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Therefore, there is a need to ensure that the management of deviation is a focus not only 
during the crisis response stage but also for the aligned proactive activities. The pre-
event stage is a critical time and the crisis leader must participate actively in the risk 
assessment and evaluation process.  In this activity, process deviation minimisation also 
needs to be a focus and requires leadership to ensure that crisis management, and by 
default risk management, “is a core competency for all function heads and that they will 
be held accountable” (SME21, 2016). 
 
4.5 Supplementary Thematic Analysis 
4.5.1  Overview 
This section outlines the findings of the thematic analysis from the manual data coding 
process. This activity was undertaken post the initial data evaluation by Leximancer, as a 
strategy that was recommended to validate the accuracy of those findings.  The manual 
coding results are summarised in figure 25 with this depicting the findings in terms of 
1st order codes, 2nd order themes and the thematic aggregation of the data.  This section 
further dives into the findings by illustrating the construction of the 1st order codes by 
outlining in table form (tables 6-8) the supporting data and includes providing 
definitions for the 2nd order themes and contextualising the aggregated data.  While it is 
evident that the resulting codes were not an exact match to the findings from 
Leximancer, as noted in the triangulation section, there was sufficient commonality in 
the outputs to validate that this coding process provided a realistic supportive 
interpretation of the initial data that further strengthened the initial findings. 
As depicted in figure 25, the manual coding process resulted in the creation of ten “1st 
order codes” with these feeding into the six “2nd order themes” and subsequently into 
the three aggregated themes. In order to be rated as a 1st order code, 80% of 
respondents had to have referenced the concept of the code.  The findings have been 
consolidated into three separate tables each capturing one aggregated theme. These 
tables define the theme, and SME quotes provided to illustrate the context. The tables 
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also note the percentage of the SMEs aligning with the concepts as linked to the 
identified themes.  
The three thematic aggregations related broadly to the areas of crisis leadership; CMT 
composition; and a validation of the ostensive routines, artefacts and enhancing the 
performative element. The following sub-sections describe the findings further.  
4.5.2   Aggregated Theme: Context of crisis leadership 
 
This theme addressed the importance of the selection, experience and training of the 
crisis leader (referred to as the coordinator in this research), since they are the lynch pin 
between the ostensive routine and its performance.  It is noted that linked strongly to 
leadership was the second theme relating to the construct of the team.  Three first order 
codes fed into this theme. The first related to the effective selection of the leader and 
avoiding ad hoc approaches based on seniority and role or position with 96% of 
respondents aligned with this conceptual theme. This was because the team works best 
when there is a “good coordinator” with management consequently “trusting the team” 
(SME14, 2016) and their recommended courses of action. It is the strength of the crisis 
team’s leadership that ensures performative process deviation from the ostensive 
routines is minimised. 
The second code related to the importance of ensuring that the individual had the 
correct skill sets, while the third element addressed the role that personality 
assessments could play not only in respect of the leader but of the broader team. This is 
crucial as a key contributor to the deviation from the ostensive routines during their 
performance in a crisis was linked to inexperienced leadership and having “a very 
inexperienced team on the whole.  A lack of process, like people don't actually know 
what they are doing” (SME17, 2016, p. 2)”.  This second concept was endorsed by all 
respondents.  
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Figure 25 – Manual Coding Output   
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Context of crisis leadership 
This theme focuses on the importance of the selection, experience and training of the crisis 
leader which drives adherence to the ostensive routines by a leader’s ability to leverage the 
capabilities of the team. 
Ostensive routine for crisis leader 
selection 
Crisis leader skills and capabilities drive 
performative behaviour 
1st Order Code Statements 
Leadership selection 
is critical – avoid 
selection based on 
business 
seniority/role alone 
 
 
96% 
“it depends on who is leading the team so it is clear that the 
coordinator role is critical” (SME3, 2016, p. 3)  
“do we have the right people at the table and have we made the right 
decision on who is going to lead this crisis” (SME7, 2017, p. 2) 
“subject matter experts, people that don't panic, and people that are 
strong enough professionally” (SME8, 2017, p. 3) 
“I am not a big fan of role based. Actually, I think with team 
dynamics you need someone with a skill set that can facilitate a 
meeting.”(SME9, 2016, p. 5) 
Crisis leaders: 
unique skill sets, and 
experience enhances 
understanding of the 
ostensive routines 
and aligns the 
performance 
 
 
 
 
100% 
“you do need people who are good at dealing with crisis and…there 
are people with certain natural abilities that lend themselves to 
being good crisis management managers” (SME2, 2016, p. 8) 
crisis manager should be “process orientated making sure that 
everything is being done according to the processes, procedures and 
rules rather than just jumping to conclusions” (SME4, 2016, p. 2) 
“best in class leader … that is the key issue…a person who is really 
devoted, committed and understands the thing and manages to 
organise the work in a proper way and to use resources from 
different people different functions” (SME12, 2017, p. 3) 
“the right capability and the experience gives the good result.  I think 
one without the other will not deliver”(SME16, 2017, p. 2) 
Personality testing 
for leaders (and 
teams) strengthens 
the capability to 
adhere to the 
ostensive routines 
 
83% 
“a way of making sure that team are collaborating and peoples 
experiences leveraged” (SME2, 2016, p. 10) 
“we should work closer with HR to spot the people having the right, 
having the potential to play, and manage” crisis situations (SME3, 
2016, p. 9) 
“it is good to know each other’s strengths and weaknesses as it will 
also improve the team dynamics when it is necessary” (SME7, 2017, 
p. 7) 
assessments would “encourage candour, to encourage the type of 
trust that is necessary in a team” (SME22, 2016, p. 7) 
Table 6 – Theme in Manual Coding: Context of crisis leader selection 
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Context of crisis team composition 
This theme integrates the importance of team dynamics, their experience, selection and an 
understanding of skill capabilities to minimise deviation from the ostensive routine 
Team dynamics influencing performative 
routine 
Experience, skills, knowledge minimises 
ostensive routine deviation 
1st Order Code Statements 
Culture: 
Understanding the 
role of culture 
(business/geographic) 
in performance of the 
ostensive routines 
86% 
“culture is always playing a role” (SME3, 2016, p. 5) 
 “culture can influence leadership style and behaviours relating to 
adhering to process” (SME11, 2017, p. 18) 
“if you have got a culture, that is based on hierarchy, it can have a 
huge impact” (SME17, 2016, p. 6) 
CMT members 
selection impacts 
performance of the 
ostensive routines – 
skills v seniority 
96% 
“concept of we should select people that have, the natural traits to 
be good crisis managers” and be part of the team (SME2, 2016, p. 
12) 
“we can be railroaded into selecting people because of their role, as 
opposed to their ability or capability itself” (SME10, 2016, p. 7) 
Crisis team member 
skills contribute to 
deviation from the 
ostensive routines 
 
 
 
100% 
Lack of experience through “having to come up with next steps as 
quickly as possible because this is crisis…we cannot waste no time” 
(SME6, 2016, p. 3) 
“the natural action once you get into the crisis room is to do what 
you are comfortable with, what you understand, what you know.  
Now that's a problem in a crisis, because very few people have 
extensive experience in it” (SME9, 2016, p. 3) 
 “its people, it is never the fault of the tool” (SME14, 2016, p. 3) 
Crisis team members 
lack of experience, a 
belief of knowing best, 
contributes to 
deviation from the 
ostensive routine 
 
91% 
“quite frankly a little bit of arrogance on people’s part. They felt 
that the situation didn't warrant using the tools or even reporting 
the incidents” (SME1, 2017, p. 2) 
“we sometimes jump to the solution…we know what to do, let's 
just do that and get on and back to normal business” (SME2, 2016, 
p. 5) 
“without actually taking into consideration all the other things that 
may have impact on the incident itself” (SME4, 2016, p. 3) 
“when an IMCR is opening, the look for the solution is some way 
the priority, more than the following the procedure” (SME14, 
2016, p. 2) 
Table 7 – Theme in Manual Coding: Context of crisis team composition 
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Validation of ostensive routines and enhancing performance 
This relates to the perception by the respondents as to the operational value of the routines 
and artefacts in supporting the crisis response and the criticality of learning and training in 
strengthening capabilities. 
Creating performative behaviours by 
leveraging routines 
Training and perceptions drives utilisation of 
the ostensive routines 
1st Order Code Statements 
Ostensive routines and 
artefacts are robust 
and value adding with 
positive perceptions 
minimising deviation 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 
“even the most experienced teams benefit from actually going 
through the tools” (SME3, 2016, p. 2) 
“usually in a crisis situation there is a lot of stress and they help 
you not to overlook certain things” (SME8, 2017, p. 3) 
“these tools put the whole concept and work that we have to do in 
crisis situations in proper order” (SME12, 2017, p. 4) 
“tools are essential and provide in fact the backbone to react and to 
analyse the crisis” (SME15, 2016, p. 2) 
 “one of the advantages of tools is that it makes sure that you are 
stopping, checking, and considering all the components”  (SME17, 
2016, p. 2) 
“the crisis response process in place, was a key contributor to the 
fact that we managed to go out of this situation with the business 
growing” (SME5, 2016, p. 4) 
“the right process, the right tools, and the concentration on this 
path that is given through this framework” (SME16, 2017, p. 2) 
Artefact utilisation 
guides the 
performative routine 
while enabling 
performance flexibility 
 
 
91% 
“For me they are very valuable, they are the bread and butter” 
providing the framework and guiding the response. (SME7, 2017, 
p. 2) 
“extremely useful thing that has to be followed, because if you 
don't follow it, nine out of ten you are set up for more trouble” 
(SME8, 2017, p. 2)  
“Checklists I think are really important… they sort of work hand in 
hand with the tools”(SME9, 2016, p. 4).   
“So the tool is essential, the tool is a kind of as I said a compass” 
(SME15, 2016, p. 2) 
“way for people to kind of consider a way to approach a problem 
and an incident in an holistic way”(SME22, 2016, p. 2) 
Review of the 
ostensive routines and 
performance post 
incident and integrate 
lessons into training  
91% 
“how did we manage the IMCR process? How do we think we did, 
let's give each other a grade, what do you think you would have 
done differently?” (SME1, 2017, p. 10)  
“with the proper framework, proper people, proper experience, 
proper training should be as effective” (SME16, 2017, p. 7) 
Table 8 – Theme in Manual Coding: Validation of routines and artefacts   
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As SME 2 commented, deviation from the ostensive routines can come about through 
overbearing leadership where team members are not presented the opportunity to table 
their ideas.  This general lack of structure underpins the importance of following the 
ostensive routines and utilising the artefacts that can guide the team through the various 
stages of the crisis response (SME2, 2016, p. 5). Therefore, in a business context, 
leadership selection should be formalised and structured with a resulting ostensive 
routine (2nd order code) driving the selection process. Importantly, in a business 
environment leadership should not be conferred by seniority or role/title, rather 
through an evaluation of the overall capabilities of an individual. This is important for as 
described earlier by SME22 (2016, p. 5) 
“if you had poor leadership, if you had a poor leader, it could exaggerate that aspect 
where people defer to the senior most person who does not uncover, raise concerns, 
questions, doubts, to strengthen the discussion, to strengthen what is known about 
the understanding of the case and how we are going to deal with it.”  
Additionally, “there are people with certain natural abilities that lend themselves to 
being good crisis management managers” (SME2, 2016, p. 8) with these crisis leaders 
possessing a combination of unique skills.   These include strong process orientation 
coupled with an ability to remain calm, disciplined, be a good listener and decisive as 
and when required.  This combination of skills and attributes contributes to process 
deviation minimisation.    
The final 1st order code in this theme related to an understanding of personality types as 
they related to the leader and to the team, with 83% of respondents aligned with the 
concept.  There was a prevailing view that this understanding would contribute to the 
overall effectiveness of the crisis team with SME20 (SME20, p. 3) stating that “we should 
be looking for a personality style versus functional knowledge”, which is diametrically 
opposed to the common model for selecting crisis team members.  In this respect, SME7 
noted that not only would this give leadership the most appropriate insight but that it 
could be used to confirm the personality type contributing the most to the process, 
which in the context of MBTI she cited as ESTJ (SME7, 2017, p. 7). Reinforcing the 
Leximancer observations it was also noted by SME19 that, “any type of psychological 
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profile in terms of how people work and then assembling a team that complements each 
other, from a skills and weaknesses, strengths perspective would be useful” (SME19, 
2016, p. 8).   
A caveat on the use of personality testing was positioned by SME8 (2017, p. 7) in that, 
while determining the personality type has a role to play, care must be taken to not use 
this as the mechanism to automatically discount a person. Rather, there is an 
opportunity for the crisis leader to leverage their understanding of the team dynamics 
and to thereby implement strategies to enhance the team’s capabilities.  This would 
enable additional discipline to be instilled ensuring linkage between the ostensive 
routines and their performance.  
As SME20 (SME20, 2016, p. 4) asserted, the crisis leader is ultimately the conductor of 
the orchestra and an experienced and skilled conductor needs to be supported by very 
experienced orchestra members who know what they need to do and how to do it.  This 
illustrates the interconnectivity to the 2nd theme relating to composition of the team.  
4.5.3   Aggregated Theme: Context of crisis team composition 
The second theme deals with the context of crisis team composition and integrates the 
importance of team dynamics, their experience; and understanding their skills and 
capabilities which when leveraged correctly minimises process deviation.  There was a 
strong correlation to effective leadership for while the leader should drive performance, 
a role must be played by the team members to course correct back to the ostensive 
routine if a deviation occurs. This is reliant on several factors and the 1st order codes 
against this theme related to the role that culture plays; the selection of the members; 
the skills that they bring to the table; and their level of experience with training 
presenting as a strong correlation between the first order codes. 
Addressing culture SME21 (SME21, 2016, p. 7) saw a correlation in the composition of 
the crisis team as they noted that culture can play a role in members of the team 
speaking out, articulating the issues, and where this does not occur this can lead to a lack 
of clarity and transparency, both of which are critical behaviours during the 
management of a crisis. SME3 (2016, p. 5) also had the view that in respect of team 
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performance and adherence to the ostensive routines “culture is always playing a role”  
which was supported by SME11 who argued that “culture can influence leadership style 
and behaviours relating to adhering to process” (SME11, 2017, p. 18). 
The concept of culture was seen as influencing a number of additional elements 
including the manner in which it could affect deviation from ostensive routines both 
positively and negatively across different markets (SME8, 2017, p. 3); its influence on 
leadership; together with its application in the operational response  stemming from 
cultural interpretations (SME10, 2016, p. 5). The concept was described as playing a 
pivotal role as “there are disciplined people and not disciplined people. So the more you 
come to the south the more undisciplined they are, the more you go to the centre of 
Europe, the more disciplined” (SME20, 2016, p. 4). This posed the question of whether a 
cultural approach can be modified through specialised training and, as outlined in sub-
section 4.4.5, this was tested through one on one engagement with a crisis leader over 
several months during the course of this research.  This structured training delivered 
strong talent development and illustrated that the role that culture plays from all facets 
must be understood as from this understanding remedial strategies can be introduced. 
As noted previously in this paper, this validated the importance of one on one crisis 
leadership education as an addition to the existing structured team training and testing. 
The next code related to the areas of selection and skills that are again intrinsically 
linked.  This is driven by the fact that one of the greatest challenges faced by managers 
placed onto a crisis team is that this is very rarely, if ever, their ‘day job’.  CMT members 
by default come from a variety of business disciplines and, while each has experienced 
different types of stress and pressures, crises are unique in their complexity, and the 
high stakes of the situation can influence behaviour.  As illustrated in the Leximancer 
section and with the same relevance in the manual coding, SME10 (2016, p. 2) described 
the situation of a team coming together when it is still  underprepared. He described this 
as “the tiger bursts into the room and starts mauling everybody. And that’s where I think 
they lose it. They are somewhat out of their depth, as it is not what they do as a full-time 
role.” This point aside, as presented by SME9 (2016, p. 6) this does not “mean that a 
team that just comes together for one purpose cannot effectively look at the problem, 
and I think that is where the tools come in, they enable you to sort of step back and have 
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a broader look at the problem. It doesn't then matter if you have been together for ten 
minutes or ten years.”   
Ostensive routine deviation minimisation was viewed by the respondents as being 
directly linked to the experience of the leader and the team members, with all 
respondents aligned with the importance of CMT members possessing the requisite 
skills and experience levels. Where these elements existed, process deviation was 
minimised. It must be noted that the business reality is that the careers and personal 
backgrounds of the team members will influence their behaviour in a crisis, as very 
often members of the team are selected due to the position that they hold rather than 
through any formal assessment of their relevant capabilities.  This links back to the first 
aggregated theme whereby appointment to a crisis team based on position or seniority 
needs to be avoided.  The problem however, is exacerbated by the fact that there is often 
in business a prevailing perception that an individual is unlucky to be chosen for the 
crisis team rather than there being an acknowledgement by the executive that this is in 
fact a critical and important role.  This requires behavioural change and to “remedy that 
it would have to come down from the top letting people know that IMCR (crisis 
management) is a KPI for everyone and that everyone in the company will rotate 
through” the crisis team (SME21, 2016, p. 8). This would acknowledge the contribution 
to crisis response by all relevant managers. 
Selecting the correct members thus ensures that a team does not only approach the 
problem in a more effective way, but an understanding of the individuals and their 
personalities creates an environment in which the leader can drive effective compliance 
with the ostensive routines. By having the correct team composition, a more effective 
overall crisis response is achieved. The SMEs agreed that similar traits were critical in 
this space with SME21 (SME21, 2016, p. 10) noting that it was critical to have team 
members that were responsible and accountable, proactive, analytical, planning and 
strong communicators.  Building on this, SME3 commented that in his experience a team 
is effective and works effectively together when a strong team spirit exists.  This is 
created through longevity of the team and its members, and he built on this theme by 
observing that the “longer the team is operating the more better [sic] it is going. That is 
 
 
 
 
152 
clear” (SME3, 2016, p. 6). Longevity is achieved by keeping team membership consistent 
and it builds capability through experience.  
The final code in this theme with 91% alignment was the concept of team member 
experience as it related to process compliance and a belief by the individuals on the 
team, supported by poor leadership, that they know best.  This lack of constructive 
dialogue can have a variety of causes.  SME16 (2017, p. 3) noted that “deviation can be 
caused by the desire to have a speedy resolution and the formulation of assumptions 
that we believe we already know the problem and we assume something, we don’t want 
to waste time on this (the process) and that is the beginning of the failure.” This clearly 
links back to the fact that this is not an individual’s day job and they often automatically 
revert back to what they are comfortable with.   
This belief that “I know best” is a common fault, and as SME 1 (2017, p. 2) describes the 
CMT members lack of experience lulls them into a false sense of security and potentially 
arrogance creating a belief that following routines will not add any value and therefore 
why follow the ostensive routines. This is because “we sometimes jump to the 
solution…we know what to do, let's just do that and get on and back to normal business” 
(SME2, 2016, p. 5) without understanding the complexity of the issue that they are 
facing. This links to the fact that when a crisis is commencing finding “the solution is 
some way the priority, more than the following the procedure” (SME14, 2016, p. 2) and 
this is undertaken “without actually taking into consideration all the other things that 
may have impact on the incident itself” (SME4, 2016, p. 3) 
The following captures the essence of this first order code for as SME 18 noted 
experience is critical and this embraces “experience in working together, at ease with 
the majority of the team members on real IMCR cases, so we know how to work 
together, what to expect from each other and what role everybody has in the team” 
(SME18, 2016, p. 2), for this in turn relates to the position of SME20 whereby she argued 
that there is a necessity to build trust and for the actors to come together to rehearse 
when there is no crisis, for “if you don't work on the good days, you cannot work well on 
the bad days, so that is, if I were to recommend something is to do some kind of team 
building or those people who are working on the crisis teams to somehow connect them 
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when things are good, make them opportunities, not only put them under pressure” 
(2016, p. 5).   This experience lends itself to the utilisation of the ostensive routines and 
strategies to enhance performance which are discussed in the following sub-section. 
4.5.4   Aggregated Theme: Validation of ostensive routines and enhancing 
performance 
The third aggregated theme related to the SMEs confirming the value of the ostensive 
routines and associated artefacts, together with the importance of training to enhance 
operational performance and preparedness.  This was an important consideration in 
answering the research question as one of the potential reasons for deviation from the 
ostensive routine could have resided with the routines themselves.  In this theme, three 
1st order codes consolidated the various elements of the commentary. They related 
firstly to the perception of robustness of the ostensive routines and artefacts, including 
the overall perceived value add and observations that experience with their utilisation 
leads to a positive perception as to their value. The second code confirmed that the use 
of the artefacts effectively guides the response while still allowing innovation and 
flexibility in the crisis response.  The third 1st order code consolidated the views relating 
to conducting post incident assessments of the ostensive routines and performance and 
the integration of associated learning into training.  
Examining the value of the ostensive routines and artefacts, all the respondents were 
aligned with their value in ensuring that crisis situations were effectively managed and 
in respect of the specific utilisation of the artefacts a clear majority (91%) of the 
respondents aligned with this code.  As SME3 commented “even the most experienced 
teams benefit from actually going through the tools” (SME3, 2016, p. 2) for in a “crisis 
situation there is a lot of stress and they help you not to overlook certain things” (SME8, 
2017, p. 3) by providing the guiding framework within the ostensive routines that 
ensures critical elements are not missed. This is because “the right process, the right 
tools” are integrated into the ostensive routines that create the path for the crisis leader 
and the team to follow (SME16, 2017, p. 2), with a respondent noting that it was the 
existence of the processes and routines and the ability of the team to follow them in a 
real situation that enabled the business to manage the crisis while at the same time 
growing the business (SME5, 2016, p. 4). 
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Building on the value of the ostensive routines and the artefacts, SME21 stated that in 
respect of the artefacts that the “tools provide a good framework to ensure that we do 
not miss any of the basics when we are gathering information on the incident and when 
dealing with the incident” (SME21, 2016, p. 2).  The routines and artefacts enable the 
CMT to consolidate the data and workflows from the crisis situation into a proper order  
(SME12, 2017; SME15, 2016), with one of the main advantages being that the process 
and tools make “sure that you are stopping, checking, and considering all the 
components”  (SME17, 2016, p. 2).  An experienced CMT and leader have the awareness 
to understand that the ostensive routines and the artefacts act as a guide while allowing 
for flexibility in the response. They thereby leverage them to drive their thinking and 
response. 
Taking this theme further, SME22 (2016, p. 2) confirmed that the “tools are absolutely 
essential because they provide cues to consider things that people would not necessarily 
do. It is a way for people to consider their approach to a problem and an incident in a 
holistic way.” SME8 (2017, p. 2) further argued that 
 “the tools are fundamental and vital…and it is very important that you follow the 
process and that you don't get deviated and that you don't start panicking. 
Deviation occurs when the coordinator does not follow the process… and when 
people start to panic, or senior people exert a presence that results in process 
deviation. The tools provide the structure.”    
In essence, the tools, as part of the ostensive routine, were consistently acknowledged 
by the SMEs as providing the framework for the establishment of the most effective 
crisis management response (SME16, 2017), with all of the artefacts linked to the core 
ostensive routines as documented in the relevant crisis management plan.  
As an additional observation, while the value of the ostensive routines was clear, two 
elements were contributing to the performative deviation and link to the interrelated 
aggregated themes of the crisis leader and the team composition. One of the elements 
was the lack of role clarity in the team, the lack of experience and familiarity with the 
routines, and where due to the processes not being followed constructive debate and 
discussion does not occur (SME17, 2016, p. 2). This can be linked to a cultural mindset 
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that there is no need to follow the process and checklist correctly (SME10, 2016, p. 7).  
This was of course coupled with a perception that individual experience outweighed the 
necessity to follow a routine or utilise the relevant artefacts (SME23, 2016, p. 3).  
Ultimately, while numerous rationales for the deviation existed, the main theme related 
to the crisis leadership and the nature of the team itself.  SME22 (2016, p. 3) identified a 
combination of leadership, experience and culture in this respect, and noted that a 
strong leader will be prepared to instil discipline around the ostensive routines and use 
of the tools. 
The final 1st order code for this aggregated theme, with 91% of the respondents strongly 
aligned, related to post incident evaluation of the ostensive routines, the artefacts and 
the performance of the CMT and linking the observed behaviours from a live response 
into the training programs.  However, this was consistently observed as an area of 
challenge. This is due to the fact that post the crisis, evaluations and lessons learned 
sessions are only accomplished by finding the time to draw the team together which is 
complicated by the fact that the CMT members are keen to return to their day jobs and 
this can lead to a lack of motivation. As SME1 (2017, p. 3) commented “everyone is so 
busy in the business that once something is resolved, there is no real opportunity or 
really an appetite to get together and do that”.  
Central to this theme was the importance of the training being strongly aligned to real 
life experiences.  This alignment is generated through effectively capturing the lessons 
learnt from active cases, dissecting them and creating the training scenarios from that 
data.  This requires the creation of models that bring together organisational learning 
and involves structuring the approach to case reviews and their analysis, and to 
dissecting lessons learned. By ensuring a formal debrief and review program is 
integrated into the ostensive routines an organisation can ensure that effective 
organisational learning is implemented. It is from this process that a business can 
identify best practices, particularly as they relate to process deviation minimisation. 
This knowledge is then shared and its integration into the training ensures that the team 
avoids similar situations occurring in the preventative stage, and, in the event that a 
situation eventuates, it ensures that the correct protocols are in place to respond to the 
crisis (SME2, 2016; SME17, 2016). 
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 The crisis leader plays a pivotal role in ensuring that this attitude is overcome as the 
evaluation ensures that a critical analysis of the ostensive routines versus performance 
is undertaken. The findings are then inculcated into the training program to ensure that 
capabilities are enhanced.  A strategy here is to ensure that the post incident analysis 
exists as an ostensive routine.   
Learning from experience and training were perceived as critical in the business 
environment and could be obtained by leveraging strategies as adopted by law 
enforcement and the military where training is imbedded. As SME18 (2016, p. 3) noted, 
if a business is serious and wants to enhance capabilities and response then regular and 
focused training is the key. As illustrated also in the Leximancer analysis the SME 
respondents perceived that understanding the ostensive routines and practicing them 
we second only to composition of the team and its leaders drawing the additionally 
linkages between the three aggregate themes (SME2, 2016; SME10, 2016; SME18, 2016; 
SME21, 2016).   
As noted previously, a lack of training can contribute to deviation from the ostensive 
routines which can lead to CMT members reverting to thinking that the issue is out of 
control. SME10 (2016, p. 5) argued that this was in his opinion one of the major 
contributors to process deviation, for it is a business failure not to exercise and train 
teams with a high level of frequency. A lack of frequency means that the teams miss out 
on drawing from previous reviews and gaining vital pre-crisis experience in the use of 
the artefacts. Training and simulations supported by leadership commitment to the 
process are central to developing a baseline understanding of the ostensive routines and 
the artefacts, together with building trust within the CMT.   The respondents also 
presented the perspective that the training needed to focus, both on the CMT and the 
crisis leader. While team interaction has in the past been the focus, building the 
specialised crisis leader for a business was critical with  SME4 (2016, p. 8) commenting 
“that an 80/20 approach in favour of coordinators” would provide the most value-add. 
This would require the training to provide a focus on leadership, decision making and 
the core element of process management.   SME1 (2017, p. 11) supported this by arguing 
that the focus must be on the leader as they have the potential to maintain stability 
while other members of the team may come and go.  While conceptually supporting this, 
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SME14 (2016, p. 9) argued that a priority should be “on how the team members act 
effectively as a strong team rather than as any one individual.” 
 
4.6 Method Triangulation  
While commonalities in the data analysis were flagged in the previous sub-section, this 
section undertakes the formal method triangulation to analyse the findings from the 
Leximancer output and the manual coding thematic results. Triangulation is the process 
for utilising more than one approach to researching a question, with the objective to 
increase confidence in the findings by using two or more independent measures. This 
combination of the findings from two or more rigorous approaches, in this case 
automated results from Leximancer and the manual coding that produced the thematic 
analysis, aims to provide a more comprehensive picture of the results than either 
approach could do alone. The triangulation compares, and contrasts observed 
similarities and differences between the two analysis techniques.     
Table 9 details a consolidation of the key themes from Leximancer, the central themes as 
identified in the thematic analysis and the observations in respect of the commonalities 
and differences between the two analysis streams.  For this triangulation exercise the 
core automated (A) findings were labelled A1 – A4 and the manual (M) were labelled M1 
– M3 respectively.   
A comparison of the findings, as outlined in sections 4.4 (Leximancer) and 4.5 (Manual 
coding) and summarised in table 9, confirmed that strong linkages existed between the 
two data sets. It is noted that while the three aggregated themes and their 1st order 
codes were not an exact match with the data extracted from the automated Leximancer 
output sufficient commonality in the thematic outputs existed to validate that the 
manual coding process provided a realistic supportive interpretation of the data 
extracted in the first analysis stream from Leximancer, thereby further strengthening 
the research findings
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Table 9 – Method triangulation of Leximancer and Thematic analysis data 
Leximancer: Automated (A)  Thematic Analysis: Manual (M) Observations 
A1 Role of the key artefacts – tools and 
checklists: this theme focussed on the value of 
the ostensive routines and the importance of 
utilisation of the artefacts in guiding the 
response.   
M1 Context of crisis leadership:  this theme 
focused on the importance of the selection, 
experience and training of the crisis leader.  
This drives adherence to the ostensive routines 
by a leader’s ability to leverage the capabilities 
of the team. Personality evaluation state within 
this theme. 
1. A1 and M3 are linked, with the theme 
relating to the operational value of the 
ostensive routines and the supporting 
artefacts as seen by the SMEs.   
2. A2 aligned with M1 and M2.  These themes 
related to the composition of the teams, the 
importance of skills and selection of 
members and the CMT leader.  
3. A3 and M3 are linked through the 
relationship to learning and training. In 
both instances, the data to varying degrees 
supported post incident review of the 
performative aspect and modification to 
ostensive routines as required. 
4. A4 is linked to M1 and M2 in respect of the 
role that personality and culture 
respectively play in deviation from 
routines 
5. While the strength of the relationships 
between A and M categories was not 
evaluated, there is still sufficient 
commonality in the data streams to 
support a finding that the ostensive crisis 
management routines are robust and that 
it is the human element, driven by a 
multitude of factors that drives the 
deviation. 
A2 Role of the team and crisis leader: this 
theme focussed on elements including the 
selection and composition of the crisis team 
and the crisis leader. It also focussed on team 
and leader dynamics in respect of deviation 
from the ostensive routines.  
M2 Context of crisis team composition: this 
theme integrates the importance of team 
dynamics, their experience, selection and an 
understanding of skill capabilities to minimise 
deviation from the ostensive routine. Culture 
was also linked to this theme. 
A3 Role of training and process 
improvements: this theme centred on the 
importance of training in ensuring that process 
deviations were minimised. It linked to 
learning from cases and the development of 
improvements to the ostensive routines based 
on learning. 
M3 Validation of ostensive routines and 
enhancing performance: this relates to the 
perception by the respondents as to the 
operational value of the routines and artefacts 
in supporting the crisis response and the 
criticality of learning and training in 
strengthening capabilities. 
A4 Culture and personality types in team 
dynamics: these themes centred on the role 
that culture, both business and national, played 
in influencing the crisis response and deviation 
from the routines. It also discussed the role of 
personality in crisis team dynamics and crisis 
leadership. 
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the findings of the research.  The data was collected from a 
variety of sources including: documented observations of crisis teams during training 
and simulation; interviews with subject matter experts; evaluations of crisis leader 
capabilities; and vignettes of real case responses.  It commenced with a summary of the 
SMEs’ backgrounds to position their level of experience and competence in crisis 
management.  
Having established the benchmark for the SMEs, the focus moved on to the findings 
relating to the data itself, as extracted from Leximancer.  As noted in the methodology, 
the data was subjected to initial researcher analysis, which provided the first 
interpretation of the data. During the next stage the connectivity of themes was 
evaluated utilising the software, thereby mitigating researcher bias risk.  The software 
analysis process involved the uploading of data pool into Leximancer for the simulation 
modelling. This then compartmentalised the findings from Leximancer into the 
categories of: 
▪ Concept findings overview; 
▪ Role of the artefacts; 
▪ Observations on process deviation; 
▪ Role of the team and the crisis leader; 
▪ Role of training and process improvements;  
▪ Culture and personality in team dynamics; and 
▪ Perceptions of risk management and business resilience. 
Lastly, the chapter examined the findings obtained from the manual coding and the 
thematic analysis results. This manual coding data was added due to a recommendation 
arising from an earlier iteration of this paper, as a strategy to validate the accuracy of 
the Leximancer outputs.  The findings from both Leximancer and the thematic analysis 
were then subjected to triangulation to compare and contrast observed similarities and 
differences. As shown, while the resulting manual coding and the thematic analysis 
results were not an exact match to the automated findings from Leximancer, there was 
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sufficient commonality in the thematic outputs to validate that the manual coding 
process provided a realistic supportive interpretation of the data as presented by 
Leximancer, thereby further strengthening the initial findings. 
The empirical data findings addressed the question of how the ostensive and 
performative routines interact in a crisis management situation and what factors 
contribute to deviations from those routines.  From the material obtained, a theory was 
developed to explain the deviation with this theory being that while the ostensive crisis 
routines and the related artefacts are robust the process deviation during a crisis 
response occurs due to the human dynamics. This incorporate the behaviours of the 
members of the crisis team and the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are 
ineffective crisis leadership and weaknesses in the crisis team structure. 
With this chapter having detailed the findings in respect of the research, the next 
chapter will discuss the findings through an evaluation of their meanings as contrasted 
with the extant literature that was evaluated as part of this research.  
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Chapter 5 – DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research was to identify the reasons for process deviation during 
the performance of ostensive routines within crisis management.  Specifically, the 
objective was to examine empirical data to understand how ostensive and performative 
routines interact in a crisis management situation in a business context and to 
understand what factors contribute to deviations from the routines. By answering this 
question, it aimed to develop a theory to establish the reasons for the occurrence of this 
phenomenon. In doing so the research focused on the analysis of two data streams.  The 
first stream challenged whether the deviation occurred due to the fact that the crisis 
routines supporting the artefacts are either considered inappropriate in their current 
form or are not modified and strengthened in response to lessons that are learned 
during a post incident review. This discussion would establish if the processes were the 
underlying cause.  
The second stream examined whether the deviation occurred due to an ineffective 
approach to the composition, leadership and coordination of the CMT: that is, the actors 
who are the team members and include the leader, are not cast correctly, so that their 
behaviour and skill sets contribute to the deviation. This would establish a theory that 
was focused on the human dynamics.  To evaluate the data in these two streams the 
discussion brings together the field work as presented in Chapter 4 with the bodies of 
literature that were evaluated in Chapter 2. This combination enables ‘data and theory 
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coupling’ (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007, p. 52) to occur and provides for an examination 
of the field work data concepts against existing theory.  
This process can be described as creating a bridge between the academic world and 
findings from professional practice as identified through the conduct of this research. As 
noted by Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007, p. 53), the process aims to theorise fragments 
of life as identified in the study.  In this research, the bridge is created through an 
analysis of the data excerpts that are related to the core concepts, as extracted through 
the Leximancer analysis and illustrated in figure 21 in chapter 4. As noted previously, 
feedback from an earlier version of this thesis recommended that manual coding also be 
conducted to develop a thematic analysis that would validate the accuracy of the 
Leximancer output. The output from that process was captured in figure 25 and the 
commonalities described in the method triangulation.   
For each of the core concepts, a cross analysis was made against the literature review.  
This was done in order to provide theoretical support to the field findings of this 
research and to confirm gaps in the literature.  In support of this, further literature 
reviews were undertaken against the field data and analysis, creating a double testing of 
the validity of the findings as they related to the theoretical framework. Through this 
evaluation and discussion, the theory in respect of how the process deviation occurs was 
constructed.  
Analysis of the combined data sources confirms that the routines and artefacts are not 
the cause of the deviation.  Rather, the findings confirm that the deviation derives from 
the structure and leadership of the crisis management team.   Therefore, by identifying 
the answer to the research question, the following theory has been developed to explain 
the process deviation within a business context:  
“Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The process 
deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response occurs due to human 
dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the members of the crisis team and 
the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are ineffective crisis leadership and 
weaknesses in the crisis team structure.” 
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The data supporting this theory is captured in this chapter. The discussion will address: 
the streams in business resilience and risk management; processes and routines; and 
ultimately the core element of crisis management. While addressing the various 
dynamics of crisis management this last part of the discussion will have a focus on the 
composition of the crisis team and elements impacting the capabilities of the CMT and 
the crisis leader. 
 
5.2   Business Resilience and Risk Management 
It has been argued that the business resilience paradigm has undergone significant 
transformation over the past decade. The complexities of the definition of resilience has 
been illustrated (Cole, 2015; Marchese et al., 2018) and for the purposes of this research 
business resilience was defined as the ability of a business to manage uncertainty and 
maintain positive adjustment under challenging conditions while enabling growth. This 
is achieved through the implementation of preparedness measures (e.g. ERM, security, 
training) and effective reactive measures (e.g. crisis management, business continuity, 
disaster recovery) that provide fundamental response mechanisms (Anderson, 2014; 
Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003).  This definition derives from the fact 
that the literature generally supports the position that resilience has transformed from 
the traditional conceptual model of being purely reactive to one that embraces strong 
proactive and preventative elements (Cole, 2015; Marchese et al., 2018).  
The construct of the definition utilised differs from the recent work of Toe et al (2017) 
and an earlier study by Kantor et al (2012), in which the concept is still framed as the 
capacity of an organisation purely to bounce back from an adverse position, rather than 
integrating the components that create both a preventative and a reactive capability. 
The main weakness of that argument is that it is rigid in its focus on recovery. In 
contrast, Filament (2009) argue the importance within resilience of having 
organisational flexibility as opposed to rigidity.  This position is supported by Sutcliffe 
and Vogus (2003), who contend that resiliency emerges from an ability to adapt and 
maintain positive adjustments under challenging circumstances.  Flexibility aligns to the 
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concept of examining business resilience within the proactive and reactive 
compartments and that the combination of elements including crisis management 
enhance an organisation’s overall capabilities (Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017).   In fact, it could 
be argued that a model of constant positive adjustment is the new norm, driven by a 
global business environment that creates new business challenges daily. 
This position is in line with the findings of this research and the observations provided 
by the SMEs both through the Leximancer automated analysis (figure 21), and as 
observed while conducting the thematic analysis through the manual coding (figures 
25). The consensus is that capabilities are lessened if business resilience is restricted to 
recovery and, in the context of this work, the management of an ongoing crisis, as this 
can impact the threat identification process resulting in ineffective resource allocation 
(Taarup-Esbensen, 2018; Watkins & Bazerman, 2003).  Uniformly, the SMEs argued the 
importance and value of preventative planning through thorough enterprise risk 
management (SME2, 2016; SME10, 2016; SME21, 2016).  As seen in the concept map 
(figure 21), risk management is intertwined with crisis management, highlighting the 
interconnectivity of the concept themes. In this respect, ERM is considered a process 
enabler within the overarching business resilience umbrella that enables and guides the 
management of uncertainty, which includes those risks that could generated a crisis, 
while at the same time supporting business growth through the identification of 
opportunities for business growth (SME10, 2016; SME21, 2016).  Through applying the 
ERM processes and addressing the mitigation of the identified risks, the process 
establishes a positive mindset that establishes an operational difference during crisis 
response.  Here again, the SMEs were aligned on the importance of identifying, 
interpreting and preparing the crisis teams for the correct response.  
The upfront identification of risks is therefore confirmed as being a critical activity, as it 
guides an organisation’s response to uncertainty (Watkins & Bazerman, 2003) by 
engaging with stakeholders through system level collaboration (Prezelj & Doerfel, 2017, 
p. 120). Not only does it support the creation of mitigation plans for the uncertain 
events, it allows for the testing of the crisis routines against identified scenarios (Comer, 
2012).  Risk management culture needs to drive the integration of the program and 
requires “rich and varied risk management ecology which is not biased to a logic of audit 
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and its demands for evidence” (Senior, 1997, p. 852).  Through preparation, a business 
can limit impact, and this confirms the view that companies can contribute to their own 
crisis situations through their actions and poor and ‘sloppy’ management behaviours in 
the lead up to the incident (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Turner, 1994) and then exacerbate 
this element during the management of the crisis response leading to even greater 
issues. Fischbacher-Smith (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014b, 2016a; Fischbacher-Smith, 
2016b)  reinforced this view by arguing that management can play a role in the 
generation of crisis events and that through actions and inactions of management a 
crisis can incubate. As he noted, this is because crisis response is not “simply about the 
operational phase or even the processes by which turnaround processes occur but it is a 
function of the core activities of management” (2016, p. 935).  Fischbacher-Smith and 
Fischbacher-Smith (2012) also commented that it is critical for management to utilise 
mechanisms that enable the consideration of the broader aspects that can create 
vulnerabilities and this can require an organisation to “ensure that they have 
frameworks and capabilities to cope with high levels of uncertainty” (Smith, 1990, p. 
268).  In the management of uncertainty it is also suggested that the role of ERM has 
shifted to embrace risk sensemaking whereby management engages with their social 
and physical environments, both internal and external to the organisation (as depicted 
in figure two), to gather data that can indicate how future events may unfold (Taarup-
Esbensen, 2018).  Therefore, by using ERM as a formalised process to understand the 
business uncertainty, appropriate management strategies can be developed, and 
potential crises prevented.  
Within this proactive stream the importance of ensuring the existence of sound 
ostensive routines and the minimisation of process deviation was also highlighted.  
SME10 (2016, p. 9) contended that, in the preparation for incidents, ERM plays a critical 
role.  However, the process only works if it forms part of the business structure and is 
embedded in a function. The SMEs were aligned with this thinking that ostensive 
routines relating to ERM are a component of the wider business resilience response.  
Therefore, there is a need to ensure that deviation is managed within all streams.    
This requires the presence of routines that drive a cultural mindset change in 
management thinking from focusing on potential losses to focusing on potential gains.  It 
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was evident that it needs to be a focus of the management across the business to ensure 
that enterprise risk management, and by default the intrinsically linked element of crisis 
management, “is a core competency of all function heads and that they be held 
accountable” (SME21, 2016).  This requires ostensive routines that are embedded and 
accepted as a strategy that enables business growth (Alesi, 2008; Hubert, 2011).  Within 
this space sits the concept of turning a crisis into an opportunity. Effective leadership 
during the management of a crisis event provides more latitude to explore opportunities 
and innovate (Langan-Reikhof, Avanni, & Janetti, 2017).   
In summary, there is a strong argument for the existence of processes and routines that 
enable a structured approach to the identification and management of risks that could 
evolve into crises. The main identified inconsistency resides within the interpretation 
and definition of business resilience.  Putting this difference relating to the proactive 
versus reactive nature of business resilience to one side, it is evident that crisis 
management remains a core response component with preparedness and the ability to 
respond to a crisis contributing to business resilience (Staupe-Delgado & Kruke, 2017, p. 
215).  It is also evident that effective execution of the crisis response is critical in order 
to ensure a speedy and successful resolution to a crisis situation.  This in turn depends 
on robust processes and routines and a reliance on their effective execution. 
 
5.3   Processes and Routines 
Having established the interconnectivity of risk management and crisis response, the 
discussion now shifts to the concepts of processes and routines. As illustrated in figure 
21 the Leximancer output indicated that the element of process resides within the 
concept bubble that captures the crisis tools that are linked to routines.  The intensity of 
the connectivity was depicted in the third largest heat bubble in size and colour after the 
concept of the team and, by default, the crisis coordinator.  For ease of reference in this 
thesis the ‘coordinator’ is interchangeable with the term ‘crisis leader’.  The importance 
of the ostensive routines and the related artefacts were also identified as key elements 
within the supplementary manual coding outputs.  
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In regard to the processes and routines for crisis management, it is argued that Mitroff 
et al (2003) established the initial ground work in respect of crisis response theory.  
They present the argument that the risk of a crisis prepares companies not only to 
develop plans, but to have plans and routines to cater for a wide array of emergencies. It 
is these routines and the interrelated actions companies take that make major crises less 
likely to occur.  To be successful, crisis teams require executive engagement, 
understanding and support. So, as confirmed in this research, while serious incidents 
can and will occur, it is management action that will determine the severity and 
potential extent of the crisis (Mitroff & Pauchant, 1990).  
5.3.1 Artefacts – Plans, tools and checklists 
This section discusses the findings as they relate to the various identified components of 
the ostensive routines and their performance.  It focuses on the role of the artefacts 
within the routines together with the observed reasons for the process deviation. 
It is clear from both the Leximancer output and supplementary thematic analysis that 
the ostensive routines and the associated artefacts support the effective execution of a 
crisis response. While the focus of this research was on the processes designed for and 
applied within TCCS, the presence of routines and tools to guide a crisis response is 
common across business sectors. As documented in the Belgium case study, the 
ostensive routines and artefacts (including the tools and checklists) that are currently 
used within TCCS were designed and implemented post the crisis in order to bridge an 
identified gap.   
When examining this crisis management program, it is evident that the behaviours as 
presented by Feldman and Pentland are present in the adapted model. As noted 
previously, “the ostensive aspect of the routine is the idea; the performative aspect, the 
enactments.  Both aspects are necessary to constitute what we understand to be the 
routine” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p. 102). From an ostensive perspective, the 
routines that support crisis management incorporate artefacts, including tools and 
checklists.  It is evident that the presence of the ostensive routines, which find their 
roots in the crisis plan, and which incorporate the core artefacts, provide a crisis team, 
irrespective of experience and location, with a framework that can guide uniform 
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responses. The SMEs unanimously endorsed the importance of the artefacts for a 
number of reasons. 
The artefacts not only act as a guide by providing cues, but they also construct the 
framework from which the response can be driven. By using this structure, a team is 
provided with the framework that establishes set parameters for the response.  The 
artefacts have been described as providing a visual guide and process clarity, which can 
support less experienced teams. This is important, as teams can drift away on a tangent 
from their destination plan (SME10, 2016). While acknowledging the importance of the 
tools, there was conflicting opinion as to the level of utilisation that is required. Some 
argued (SME7, 2017; SME18, 2016) that the tools should be leveraged at all times. 
D’Adderio (2010) supports this position and argues that the artefacts perform a critical 
role in directing the performance of the actor.  The more successful performative 
programs manage to utilise an array of materials and tools to create the most effective 
response environment.  Applying this metaphor to crisis management, the script 
embraces the plans, tools and checklists, which in combination provide the backbone of 
the ostensive routines. These scripts are the recurrent activities and observable patterns 
of interaction (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) during the crisis response.   Other researchers in 
the extant literature, together with the participants in this research, contended that 
while the framework should be there, it should not be utilised to the extent that 
innovation is stifled (SME3, 2016; SME10, 2016). This aligned with the position of 
Iannacci and Hatzaras (2012) in respect of routines not being accepted as a single level 
of reality being flat and horizontal which diminished the existence of emergent 
properties.  
While acknowledging the value of the routines and artefacts, there was also a consensus 
that process deviation did not occur simply due to a negative perception of the value of 
the tools. Feldman (2000) noted that deviations could occur for a number of reasons. 
These included a perception by the user that the routines were not achieving their 
intended outcome or because other opportunities were revealed.  This position was not 
reflected in this current research in which the evidence indicated that the routines and 
the associated artefacts were universally perceived as value adding. Rather it was 
argued that a lack of direction and structure within the crisis team and the crisis team’s 
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leadership, were the core contributors to the process deviation. This supports previous 
findings that the use of the artefacts must in fact become ingrained into team member 
behaviour and where this occurred, positive perceptions resulted.  The most effective 
way of achieving this is through continuous rehearsals by the actors.  In this way the 
routines can become second nature and automatic, at least to the extent of reaching for, 
and utilising, the supporting artefacts.  
It was observed that teams tended to utilise a combination of what could be described as 
tools and checklists.  The tools, such as the problem-solving tool served as a thought 
prompt and guide that established for the crisis team lines of investigation and 
specialised thinking.  The checklist provided a different approach from that of a guiding 
tool having several objectives including memory recall, standardisation and providing a 
framework (Hales & Pronovost, 2006) and ultimately minimising human error (Degani 
& Wiener, 1997; Gawande, 2011; Hales & Pronovost, 2006; Seifert, 2009; Thomassen et 
al., 2014). In the context of crisis management, a checklist is a mechanism that allows the 
crisis leader or a crisis team member to ensure that specific steps of the process have 
been adhered to. SME17 emphasised the importance of the confirmation checklist, as it 
provided a tool for members of the team to run their eyes across during any stage of the 
response.  SME9 built on this, by arguing that since crises are not linear events the 
checklists ensure sure core requirements are revisited, particularly as it refers to 
communication to stakeholders. Building on this Gawande (2011, p. 79)  argued that 
routines need to balance a number of virtues, in particular freedom and discipline, craft 
and protocol, and specialised ability, while most importantly fostering collaboration 
within the group. Ultimately the routines “supply a set of checks to ensure that the 
stupid but critical stuff is not overlooked, and they ensure another set of checks to 
ensure people talk and coordinate and accept responsibility while nonetheless being left 
the power to manage the nuances and unpredictability” (Gawande, 2011, p. 79) that will 
be experienced in a crisis response. Mistake minimisation is an overarching objective 
from the use of the checklist (Degani & Wiener, 1997; Thomassen et al., 2014). That said, 
one factor to bear in mind is that there is a risk that “checklist users may also become 
dependent on these tools in practice, which can interfere both with their professional 
judgement and the objectivity of their decision-making processes” (Hales & Pronovost, 
2006, p. 234) and the leader needs to be cognisant of this risk. 
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The perspective of the importance of checklists was supported in the findings by 
confirmation from the SMEs, supported by the observations of the researcher, that the 
artefacts utilised by the crisis teams were extremely effective due to their ability to 
easily guide thought processes. This is linked to the ability of the checklist to provide 
operational structure and reduce errors (Degani & Wiener, 1997; Gawande, 2011; 
Thomassen et al., 2014).  While the artefacts in their current form were confirmed as 
solid, there was discussion about potentially automating the process.  This discussion 
related to leveraging technology to transform the artefacts into tools that would further 
enhance the capability of the crisis leader, and thereby enable them to provide more 
effective leadership.  The considerations here mainly focused on consolidation of the 
existing artefacts into applications that could be utilised with smart technology.  
Having validated the value of the ostensive routines and the artefacts, the question 
moves to the reasons for process deviations during crisis activation. 
5.3.2 Reasons for process deviation 
The central objective of this research was to understand the reason for the deviation by 
a business crisis management team from the ostensive routines during the performative 
stage of the crisis response. From this the presented theory was developed.  The 
research has confirmed the importance of routines and artefacts, which is supportive of 
the extant literature.  Previous research, however, has not examined this aspect of 
process deviation from a crisis management perspective, hence the existence of a gap in 
the extant literature.   
The extant literature does confirm a general issue in respect to process deviation. It is 
worth reiterating that Feldman (2000) concluded that deviations occurred where there 
was a perception that the routine was not achieving an intended outcome, or because 
the outcomes identified new possibilities. In these instances, the subjects strove to 
adjust the tools through trial and error and learning adjustment. Others argued that 
process deviation may not in itself be negative, as long as positive benefits eventuate 
from the improvement (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011).  In this regard, the 
findings of this research present a different perspective on the issue.  
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Firstly, without exception each of the SMEs had observed the occurrence of process 
deviation by crisis teams. This had been observed by the individuals both in real cases 
and during crisis simulations.  This was irrespective of the industry in which they had 
worked, or whether it was in the public or private sector. That said, the SMEs 
consistently reported that the routines and the tools themselves were not the issue, 
pointing rather to human dynamics which included perceptions as to the value of both 
the ostensive routines and the artefacts.  In addition to this, rather than contributing to a 
positive adjustment, the deviations inevitably resulted in adverse outcomes and, 
through the creation of new risks, exacerbated the crisis.  
Unanimously, the SMEs formed the opinion that the ostensive routine and the artefacts, 
be they tools, checklists or plans, were not the cause of the process deviation. That is, the 
deviation did not occur because of a perception among the users that the tools were in 
some way inadequate or ineffective.  This is of course contrary to the general position as 
outlined by Feldman and others.  While various arguments have been presented to 
explain process deviation, the central theme in this research was linked by the 
respondents to either the role the crisis team, or the leadership provided by the crisis 
leader.  This observation may stem from the fact that human nature dictates that teams 
often want to jump to the conclusion, solve the problem, and return to normal at speed, 
rather than leverage the tools to take them in the appropriate direction. This role of the 
actor, in this case the CMT member, was noted by Barley and Tolbert (Barley & Tolbert, 
1997, p. 98) for they observed that while the “scripts are observable, recurrent activities 
and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting” the institution is reliant 
on the actors interpretation. Barley et al (1997, p. 102) in their findings determined that 
actions created deviation and “in many cases, however, enactment does not involve 
awareness or intentionality: actors simply behave according to their perception of the 
way things are.”   Of course the challenge here is that improvised behaviour can have a 
negative consequence and the appropriateness of the behaviour can only be evaluated in 
the aftermath (Martínez‐Córcoles, 2018, p. 241).   
It was also noted that the pressure of the crisis situation can contribute to the deviation. 
“When people are under pressure, then they do not use the tools, and they embark 
directly into managing the situation as it emerges” (SME20, 2016) and this can be 
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contributed to the fact that the CMT is working in a dynamic environment under 
suboptimal conditions (Lapierre et al., 2015).  Others argued that the deviation stemmed 
from a lack of experience. Teams with longevity accepted the artefacts as they had used 
them previously to achieve a successful resolution. On other occasions, the crisis team 
made assumptions, often incorrectly, based on prior experience. They assumed that as 
they had managed cases of a similar nature in the past that they could go with intuition 
rather than following processes and leveraging the tools. This was presented by some 
SMEs as illustrating a level of arrogance in the crisis team. Additionally, the SMEs noted 
that there needs to be an understanding that the tools are a guide and they are not 
designed to stifle creativity in the response, for creativity per se is not deviation 
(Sonenshein, 2016), rather it can be described as a process in itself of thinking ‘outside 
the box’ to resolve the issue at hand (SME6, 2016). 
In respect of crisis management in general, it is critical to note that no two crisis 
situations are the same. They are unique in many ways, and while bringing experience to 
the table is a positive attribute it cannot come with the loss of structure.  Therefore, the 
construction of the team is critical, as is the selection and development of the crisis team 
leader.  What needs to be stressed at this point is that the crisis team leader is not 
necessarily the company leader.  Both roles are important, however, they have distinctly 
different parts to play. This will be addressed in more detail shortly. 
Time and again the experience of the crisis leader and their control of the crisis team 
were also raised as contributing to the deviation. The lack of experience of the crisis 
team and a potential lack of awareness of the performative routines were evaluated as 
having a direct correlation to the level of training, practice in simulations, and real case 
activities undertaken by the crisis team and their leader. The crisis leader may lack 
experience and practice, with the situation being compounded by an inability to manage 
the dynamics of the team and the establishment of core procedures.  The crisis leader 
needs to be proficient in decision making under pressure and complexity, established by 
experience in crisis response (Dionne et al., 2018, pp. 97, 104) and they need to ensure 
that they leverage the capabilities of the team and also to ensure that they control any 
perception among the team members that individually they may know best and that 
routines can be ignored. As SME9 (2016) noted, the  
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“natural reaction once you get into the crisis room is to do what you are 
comfortable with, what you understand, what you know. Now that’s a problem in a 
crisis, because very few people have extensive crisis experience, so what tends to 
happen is they do not have time to read the plan, or do not understand what is in 
the plan.”  
This concept of managers reverting to what they are comfortable with is supported by 
scholars (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2012), who note that managers 
under pressure behave differently to their normal management approach. This links not 
only to experience but is where command and control by the crisis leader must come to 
the fore. Therefore, it is concluded that tools are not the reason for the process 
deviation.  The deviation occurs due to an ineffective approach to the structure, 
leadership and coordination of the CMT; that is, actors are not cast correctly, so that 
their behaviour and skill sets contribute to the deviation. This became the central 
concept of the developed theory. 
As this is the basis for the theory development, various elements require reviewing and 
further discussion.  There is the requirement to further discuss the construction of the 
team and this incorporates the elements of selection, personality and culture.  The 
second component relates to the selection of the crisis leader and the performance of 
their role.  This again necessitates an evaluation of personality.  Intrinsically linked to 
both the casting of the actors and the selection of the director is the way in which 
capabilities are developed.   This links into the role that rehearsals, together with real 
life experience, play. This extends to the importance of capturing ‘real case’ learnings as 
these are critical in both individual and team development. The discussion will now 
examine the specifics of these elements. 
 
5.4 Crisis Management: Teams, Leaders and Rehearsal  
The discussion now turns to the actions of the crisis team, its leadership and the role 
that training and simulations play in minimising the process deviation. Referring again 
to figure 21 the concept of team was the second largest identified. Within this concept 
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bubble also resided the role of the coordinator who in this research is the crisis team 
leader. The role of the leader, crisis team composition, culture, personality and training 
were identified as intertwined themes during the supplementary manual coding process 
and was seen as pivotal to the deviation from ostensive routines during performance.  It 
is noted that in respect to the extant literature on crisis management that it has at times 
been described as fragmented (Bundy et al., 2016) and that while elements of the 
literature that deal with crisis management examined aspects relating to the 
construction of the team and its leadership the role that the multiple facets play in 
respect of  process deviation in a business context has not subject to previous research.  
This section of the chapter will focus on: team composition; the crisis leader; culture and 
personality; and, lastly, preparation and training.  As part of the discussion, the 
definition of ‘leadership’ needs to be addressed. In the sphere of crisis management, it 
can be concluded that this is specifically at odds with the business leader who plays a 
different yet very specific role as the figurehead, and potentially the spokesperson, of 
the business. 
5.4.1 Team Composition 
At its basic level a crisis team comprises “individuals who share interactions and 
experience in decision making” (Sommer & Pearson, 2007, p. 1243), and who, while 
following processes, can arrive at conclusions that are novel and contribute to effective 
resolution of the situation. This requires experience in both business management and 
crisis response.  King (2002)observed that a CMT is a cross functional group of people 
brought in to handle a crisis with Robert and Lathe (2002, p. 187) describing a crisis 
team as a chemically unstable mixture of people that has its own personality, history and 
emotional dynamics.  As identified in this research, the reality is that members of a crisis 
team are generally not selected due to their experience in, or exposure to, crisis 
management. By default, and due to resourcing, it is extremely rare for this to be 
classified as any manager’s ‘day job’. The reality is that it is generally the business role 
that the individual holds, together with their seniority, that dictates their participation in 
the team, rather than their possession of crisis experience or skill sets. Often lacking 
‘crisis response’ skills, managers are thrust into situations where they do not know what 
 
 
 
 
175 
they are doing, with limitations of the clarity of their role and objectives (SME20 p3) and 
this can adversely impact the process of decision making under conditions of pressure 
when managing a threat (Smith, 2000).  Taking all this into consideration and reflective 
of the Leximancer and supplementary manual coding results, the research concluded 
that the selection and combination of the crisis team members is critical as this has a 
direct correlation to the team’s adherence to process and utilisation of the artefacts. 
Smith and Fischbacher (2009, p. 72) support this by noting that “the selection of the 
CMT members should reflect the individual’s ability to fulfil key roles and tasks within 
the context of a functional specialism or positional affiliation.” Effective selection 
requires the implementation of a more formalised strategy, one that focuses on skills, 
expertise and personality. 
Acknowledging the importance of the correct team construction, it is important to ask: 
what are the elements that should be considered?  Rerup (2006) contended that a crisis 
team needed the ability to focus on many issues at the same time, as well as the ability to 
analyse and interpret the complex and often contradictory information that arises.  This 
was supported by the SMEs who argued that central to the success was having the right 
people, from the right areas of the business, thereby ensuring correct knowledge is 
brought to bear.   This extends, however, from the simple ability to interpret elements of 
one’s day job and to apply those skill sets under the pressure of a crisis response. Smits 
and Ezzat (2003) noted that the desirable core attributes of the CMT’s members are that 
they must be dependable, calm, self-confident and assertive.  These attributes were also 
described by the SMEs, with SME21 noting that an additional attribute was the ability to 
be proactive.   
Within the discussion of a the team’s composition Rerup and Feldman (2011) also 
argued the importance of longevity. In their research into routines and their impact on 
organisational change they recognised the complexity of the relationship between 
routines and the trial and error learning process. They deduced that trial and error 
during crisis management built capability and that longevity of the team is therefore 
critical. This was because routines to be applied both during and after the performance 
can improve over time.  Pentland et al (2010) noted that, with each performance or 
iteration of a pattern of action, actions can be evaluated against the prior actions, and 
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thereby linked to the performance of the routine. This enables revisions and 
improvements to occur over time. 
Longevity was also perceived by the SMEs as being a vital element in minimising process 
deviation and this was also reflected in the data relating to the SMEs. SME3 specifically 
noted that teams with a strong team spirit were the most effective, and that the building 
of the team spirit was linked to the longevity of the team. What was illustrated by the 
experience of the SMEs was that longevity in the specialist field played a significant role 
in capability, and it can be argued that maintaining a solid crisis structure built on 
longevity strengthens the overall response. 
The additional benefit stemming from team longevity is the creation of trust.  Early 
research (Roberts & O'Reilly (3rd), 1974) theorised that a lack of trust was one of the 
elements, together with influence and mobility, that contributed to communication 
failure in business. In the context of this research, communication would translate to 
both within, and external to, the crisis management team.  Trust was also raised by King 
(2002) as a critical element of a cohesive team, and that team trust can be influenced by 
factors of time, information resources, procedural conflict, poor leadership and prior 
interactions. Again, contrasting this to the current research, in the context of trust, time 
can be linked to longevity, procedural conflict can be linked to understanding and 
application of the routines, and poor leadership can be linked to the capabilities of the 
crisis leader.   
5.4.2 The importance of the crisis leader 
There has been an enduring interest shown in the role of leadership within a crisis 
management team (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016a; Pearson et al., 1997).  In fact, it was 
concluded that leadership within the context of a crisis team’s operations was a critical 
area of further study. The context specifically related to whether the leadership skills, 
attributes and approaches required in a crisis mirrored normal operations. It is 
contended that the answer lies at the heart of the examination of minimising process 
deviation. 
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This research clearly supports King’s (2002) position that a cohesive team is critical to 
success. Cohesion, though, does not come automatically. Here the role of the crisis leader 
becomes crucial, for a team can have the right people in place, with the right 
personalities yet may still be dysfunctional and the transformational leader’s role is to 
leverage capabilities to meet expectations (LePine et al., 2011), rather than let a team 
become dysfunctional . With dysfunction and lack of cohesion comes process deviation. 
Perhaps, therefore, the most important element to address is the selection of the crisis 
management team leader and as Dionne et al (2018, p. 117) concluded, the best person 
to lead the team many not be a formal leader holding the highest position of authority. 
As noted earlier, it is important firstly to validate who is being referred to during 
discussions in respect of the crisis leader.  With regard to the role of the crisis leader, 
there can be confusion between the role of the business leader versus the crisis leader.  
This can be confusing for, as King (2002) argued, crisis leaders must display confidence 
while at the same time expressing empathy. In this perspective, it is argued by this 
researcher that King is referring to the senior spokesperson, who by default should 
generally be the CEO of the organisation.  By the very nature of their role the CEO must 
have the ability to appear empathetic in order to ensure that they establish and maintain 
the trust of both their internal and external stakeholders.  This is important as there 
have been many crises where this has not occurred.  For example, during BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon crisis, CEO Tony Hayward is remembered for his quote that lacked 
empathy: "I'm sorry. We're sorry for the massive disruption it's caused their lives. 
There's no one who wants this over more than I do. I'd like my life back" (Lubin, 2010). 
This was observed as not being empathetic due to the extreme loss of life experienced in 
the event.  It also links back and is an illustration of the Hubris Syndrome as described 
by Owen which permeated the BP culture and potentially contributed to that 
catastrophe (Owen, 2008, 2011).  This was in stark contrast to the approach of Richard 
Branson in respect of the Cumbrian rail crash involving Virgin Rail in February 2007.  In 
that case, which involved a fatality and multiple injuries, Branson clearly was not the 
leader of the crisis team, but the spokesperson of the business, and he followed the 
communication CAP technique of Concern, Action and Perspective. This illustrates the 
separate yet critical role of the business leader. 
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The role of the business leader is to provide the external face, and there must be a clear 
delineation between the role of the senior spokesperson and that of the crisis team 
leader. It is argued that empathy in leading the CMT’s response is not necessarily a 
critical trait, whereas calmness is vitally important. It is stressed that, while there is a 
difference in the interpretation of the role of the leader, one of the functions of the crisis 
team is to ensure that the correct spokesperson is identified and that they have 
undergone relevant media training.  The crisis team must take responsibility for 
ensuring that the correct messaging is provided to the spokesperson, and this should be 
established in the routines.  
There are a variety of attributes that should be considered when moving to a discussion 
of the relevant skills of the team and its leader. Smits and Ezzat (2003) contended that 
crisis team members needed to be dependable, calm and self-confident, with 
personalities that can influence perception and decision making. Barley and Tolbert 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997) noted that possession of a stock of practical knowledge relating 
to behaviours was beneficial, and this was supported by the SMEs who contended that 
this was a way to positively influence team dynamics.  Certainly, it will be argued that 
these traits are even more critical for the crisis leader.  
In his research Weick discussed the role of the bricoleur and routines in high pressure 
situations. He argued that “recovery lies not in thinking then doing, but in thinking while 
doing and in thinking by doing” (Weick, 2002).  A bricoleur by design applies a high level 
of innovation in a crisis response and by default is creative while under pressure, having 
the ability to routinely act in chaotic conditions and to achieve order during chaos. This 
position was supported by Mallak (1998) in his study of adaptive behaviour. He argued 
that having individuals who could respond quickly to change confirmed the relevance of 
the bricoleur, because for them a crisis is the normal operating environment. However, 
this poses the question: where should the bricoleur reside?  Should they be an 
innovative member of the crisis team or the leader of the crisis team?  Innovation is 
certainly a characteristic that needs to be present.  Yet it raises a question as to whether 
innovation is potentially counter intuitive to enabling a focus on process minimisation. 
Or, perhaps, do the two elements potentially complement each other? From the 
observations and the SME feedback it was confirmed that innovation is a 
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complementary skill and comfortably sits alongside process discipline. Therefore, 
innovative thinking is a trait that should be present in an effective crisis leader, or if not 
within the leader definitely within members of the team. 
In this research, the SMEs categorically agreed that the crisis leader is the linchpin. This 
person held the team together by ensuring that processes and routines are followed.  
Various metaphors were used by the SMEs to describe the role of the crisis leader.  
These included being the ‘team captain’, the ‘conductor of the orchestra’, or the ‘ring 
master’. This aligns with the metaphor of this research: that the crisis leader is the 
director and the role is to align the actors to the script. These metaphors relating to 
leadership have a commonality in that they create the framework for a uniform and 
consistent response while always embracing innovative adjustments, however with 
discussion and alignment.   
In aspect of the selection of the crisis leader, a common risk was identified.  This risk 
emanates from the fact that many organisations have traditionally assigned this role to a 
‘function’ rather than identifying an individual with the attributes of an effective crisis 
leader.  For example, in many instances within TCCS the Public Affairs and 
Communications (PA&C) Director has been selected.  While there is no clear rationale 
for this, there is a possibility that traditionally this was related to an incorrect 
perception that crisis management equalled crisis communication. Hence the crisis 
leadership role defaulted to the PA&C director, which created the risk of drawing a key 
resource away from their area of specialisation. The risk here is that the specialisation of 
focus is lost, or that the individual focuses on their specialisation rather than the 
leadership and the processes.  To counteract this role allocation by function, there is a 
need to have a process in place that formalises the identification of the crisis leader to 
ensure that they have at least a majority of the core attributes. Specifically, SME18 
(2016, p. 5) stated that she would seek an individual who is open and willing to 
cooperate, open minded, with the ability to look broadly and analytically at issues, and 
most importantly, had the ability to listen.  The coordinator also needs to be process 
orientated. In this way, they can minimise process deviation by ensuring that routines 
are followed and that they have the right people in place, at the right time, working as a 
team and adhering to the processes.   
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SME23 (2016, p. 4) saw the core attributes of the crisis leader as being transparency, 
responsibility, discipline, and cooperativeness, as well as the ability to encourage 
constructive debate.  The crisis leader also needs the ability to manage personalities 
within the team, to identify and understand an individual’s strengths and weaknesses 
and leverage their capabilities (SME2, 2016, p. 3).  This aligns to the views of Martinez-
Corcoles (2018) that a leader’s openness to differing perceptions and allowing team 
members to voice opinions  can stem from their knowledge of the team dynamics.  SME 
10 (2016, p. 5) described the coordinator (leader) as needing to have: self-confidence, 
but not to the point of arrogance; an ability to make quick decisions; and an analytical 
mind.  These need to be coupled with a strong business knowledge – that is, the ability to 
take the available material and utilise it within the context of the overarching business 
strategy and environment.  
In summary, the identified attributes of the crisis leader as described in the extant 
literature mirrored the findings of this research. A comparative table is contained in 
Table 10. It is argued that these attributes should be formally categorised and 
considered in the selection of the individuals to perform this crucial role.  It is concluded 
that the model of selecting a crisis leader based on the functional role that they perform 
is outdated in concept and approach, because it does not necessarily provide the team 
Table 10 – Crisis leader attributes 
Literature Subject Matter Experts 
Calm Analytical 
Creative Calm 
Dependable Cooperative 
Empathetic Disciplined 
Influencer Listener 
Innovative Responsible 
Self-Confident Self-Confident 
 Transparent 
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with the correct calibre of leader with the right skill sets or personality. There is an 
opportunity moving forward to confirm the criteria to drive the selection of the crisis 
team members and thereby shift from appointments based on role and seniority. As will 
be touched on in the section on training (5.4.4), there is also the interlinked question of 
whether these attributes can be taught to a crisis leader, and what elements the training 
should focus on.  
5.4.3 Personality Types and Culture 
Acknowledging that there are commonalities in the attributes of an effective crisis 
leader, the research posed an additional question: is there a personality type that 
incorporates attributes that enhance sense making, thereby creating an effective crisis 
leader? The importance of understanding personality is due to the fact that skill set and 
dynamics directly influence the approach adopted by the crisis leader and the team. 
Within the literature, Weick and Sutcliffe ( 2006, p. 516) examined personalities and 
argued that when individuals are paying attention to failure, simplification and 
resilience then mindfulness can result.  This mindfulness can broaden environmental 
scanning, generate interpretations that are more context relevant, and produce 
behaviours that are described as more discriminating.  These elements can become 
critical in the evaluation of information.  Yin and Jing (2014, p. 30) built on this and 
found that the broader the nature of the crisis the more complex and dynamic the 
environmental pressure becomes. This can impact the team by adversely affecting 
critical thinking, communication and judgement. These are all elements that can be 
linked to the personality traits of the team members. The importance of critical thinking 
drove the focus on personality types and the potential link to process minimisation. 
In discussing this aspect with the SMEs, there was a strong consensus that there would 
be a benefit in gaining a greater understanding of the personality types within a crisis 
team and how this influenced behaviour. This was seen not so much in respect of 
selecting the members of the team, but rather to enable the crisis leader to understand 
the team dynamics in order to leverage their capabilities in the most effective way. 
There was however a view that this should be specifically relevant to the selection of the 
crisis leader. In order to evaluate this concept, the research utilised MBTI as the 
personality assessment tool. MBTI was selected as in management analysis it informs 
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individuals regarding “their innate preferences for interaction with each dimension 
representing both opportunity and liability in a given situation” with the its usefulness 
being in “helping individuals to understand their innate preferred behavioural styles” 
(Brown & Reilly, 2009, p. 927).   While there is debate as to the benefits and value of 
using MBTI, it was leveraged primarily since it was readily accessible to the participants.  
Most importantly, from the discussions with respondents it was clear that it was well 
known and accepted amongst them principally because they had utilised the process 
previously during their business careers.  Additionally, as Furnham found (1996) there 
is sufficient replicated overlap between the MBTI and other formats to validate the 
suitability of its utilisation. 
The findings in this study identified that the majority of the recipients of the test were 
extrovert in nature, with differences primarily in the area of sensing versus 
intuitiveness.  Interestingly, there was a difference observed in the findings between the 
classifications as they related to SMEs and the independently evaluated crisis leaders. 
While a high level of extroversion was identified across the board, within the SMEs the 
classification of ESTJ dominated.  In the evaluation of the operational crisis leaders the 
focus was on those located in the top quadrant in the field of process management 
(sector 8+) and crisis leadership (8+).  Here the contrast was highest, with those who 
were members of the PA&C community being ENTJ and those who were within the risk 
management or quality management fields being ESTJ.   So, extroversion was confirmed 
as a common characteristic, the variance being in the aspect of whether the subject was 
more sensing (S) versus intuitive (N).  This therefore indicated that crisis leaders, who 
were deemed as strong, had a process orientation toward extroversion, with the level of 
extroversion varying. It is argued that this extroversion potentially leads to the ability of 
the crisis leader to exert control, and in this way mitigate the process deviation.  While 
the basic nature of this initial evaluation means that no definitive conclusions can be 
drawn from this snapshot into personalities, the path is now open for a more detailed 
examination of this element as part of future research.  
It was also found that there was a variance in perceptions regarding which personality 
assessment methodology provided the most effective evaluation of the individuals.  In 
respect of the MBTI methodology, there is ongoing debate as to its validity (Brown & 
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Reilly, 2009; Furnham, 1996)  due to the compartmentalising of individuals into specific 
categories.  The potential weakness of MBTI was flagged by SME17 (2016, p. 4), who 
noted that potentially the Hogan’s Assessment or Hermann Brain Dominance Index 
(HBDI) may be more effective tools as they do not compartmentalise the subjects.  
Additionally, other tools such as NEO PI exist and have been utilised by the researcher. 
While the NEO PI contains over 200 questions, there is a preference on the part of this 
researcher for its utilisation in future research. This is because the tool categorises 
extrovert and introvert traits in different situations, rather than boxing an individual 
generically into one category regardless of the external environment.  Ultimately, 
irrespective of the tool utilised, for as observed there is sufficient replicated overlap 
between systems (Furnham, 1996), the use of a personality assessment was generally 
thought to be an effective next step in the evolution of the design and modelling of the 
crisis team and the selection of the crisis leader and confirm literature findings which 
support “the notion that team personality composition can act as a relevant social cue 
that influences individual personality-behaviour relationship” (LePine et al., 2011, p. 
321).  It is recommended that future research be undertaken to focus on this specific 
aspect. This would be undertaken by firstly identifying and agreeing on the most 
appropriate type of personality tool and then utilising this in a study of crisis 
management team behaviours.   
The research also confirmed the role that culture plays in team effectiveness and, by 
default, adherence to processes and deviation minimisation. In Figure 25, culture is 
clearly linked to the people / human theme.  The people concept dealt with the 
construction of the team; the work element that addressed the processes and extended 
to team dynamics.  Culture was identified as having a bearing in respect of both business 
and national/country elements and a common element in an effective crisis 
management program is the presence of a responsive corporate culture that facilitates 
strong communication and develops internal support during a crisis (Smith, 1990).  
Breaking the concept of culture down, business culture encompassed vision, values, 
norms and language. With nationality or country, this incorporated the customs, social 
structure, practices and communication of a country, or in some cases within a country.  
In respect of the business culture, it was observed that adherence to processes, 
including reporting, was driven by the value that was placed in that culture on ensuring 
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that the correct crisis response existed.  This involved ensuring, as part of the business 
values and the norms, that escalating incidents to ensure visibility was seen as a positive 
activity, not a negative.  As noted by SME 3 (2016, p. 7), this required a culture of 
transparency within the business, one which encourages people to act on issues, and to 
report the issues knowing that there will be no retribution for the delivery of ‘bad news’.    
In regard to national culture, it was observed during the simulations that both process 
discipline and team dynamics can be influenced. As a general position, the SMEs noted 
that there are disciplined people and there are people that are less disciplined in their 
approach. This cultural discipline can contribute to process deviation and the cultural 
contrast was specifically evident between northern and southern Europe. It was 
observed that the further south one moved, structures ran a greater risk of becoming 
less formal, often with an ad hoc approach (Calori & Seidel, 1994).  In respect of the team 
dynamics and interaction, the cultural element was noted in the findings as playing a 
significant role in whether or not members of a team voiced their opinion.  This is 
particularly evident in some markets, such as Japan and Korea, where managers will 
defer to and not challenge those that are considered ‘older’ and ‘wiser’. This can impact 
decision making, for having an opinion and voicing it while on the crisis team is crucial 
in ensuring that processes are followed, and that innovation and opportunity are 
leveraged.  
The reality is that culture will always be an influencer in cases where a business utilises 
a crisis model that leverages localised country crisis teams that are required to think 
globally while acting locally.  These dynamics need to be understood, not necessarily to 
influence the construction of the crisis team, but in order to specifically re-design 
training to ensure it provides a culturally specific focus on the process requirements. 
This training would focus specifically on enhancing capabilities to minimise process 
deviation. This was tested in a southern European market where one on one training 
and coaching was provided to the crisis leader during a specific response.  The results 
showed an enhancement in performance levels, particularly in regard to control of the 
team, and a minimisation of process deviation.  In a separate space, there is also the 
need for the central teams that are remote from the countries to understand the 
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nuances, capabilities and cultural dynamics that exist in order to enable the most 
effective support to be provided to the local team. 
5.4.4 Training and Rehearsals: The Art of Preparation  
Preparation through the delivery of training and the testing of capabilities plays a crucial 
role in process deviation minimisation and ensures that crisis preparation is aligned 
with broader recovery mechanisms (Normandin & Therrien, 2016, p. 116).  This 
importance is flagged within the extant literature and supported by the findings of this 
research. Referring again to figure 21, training can be seen as a bridge between the crisis 
team and the utilisation of the tools. This interconnectivity of themes was also observed 
in the manual coding exercise and method triangulation.  This linked the importance and 
use of the tools with the specific capabilities of the crisis team. Smits and Ezzat (2003) 
contended that how well an action is implemented depends firstly on the quality of the 
plan and the supporting structures, including the artefacts, and then, perhaps more 
importantly, on the readiness of the crisis management team. Readiness can only be 
achieved through training and experience. Labas (2017, p. 8) confirmed this by 
concluding that “lots of firms are crisis prone and a few were really crisis prepared, the 
results obtained stress the importance of adequately implementing organizational crisis 
preparedness.” This built on the position of Robert and Lajtha (2002, p. 187), who 
argued the need for a structured and continuous learning process.   
Training in the routines and the use of the processes and procedures forms one dynamic 
in this space. The second dynamic relates to the practice or rehearsals that occur via the 
utilisation of crisis simulation exercises. This second stage provides an evaluation of 
what has been learned by the crisis team in the course of the training. This evaluation 
enables the crisis team to gain awareness of associated pressures of crisis management 
and awareness of decision making and the potential implications of their decisions 
(Sommer & Pearson, 2007).  As Pearson (1997, p. 53) concluded, while practice does not 
necessarily make perfect “it does seem to lead to clearer thinking and smoother action 
under duress”.  While agreeing with the importance of training, the frequency is in fact a 
critical element.  Low frequency of training coupled with a low rate of real case 
activations creates the risk of knowledge loss by the team. This can result in a team 
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performing well in a simulation and then forgetting what they have learnt.  Then, when 
the real case occurs, the team can lapse into old habits and throw the ‘script’ out of the 
window.  Therefore, a business must make the critical call to invest in capability 
development.  By creating a well-practised team, the value of the processes and the 
artefacts are reinforced, and process adherence becomes second nature. 
Focusing on minimising process deviation, SME18 (2016, p. 3) stated succinctly that 
“training is the key”.  Other SMEs argued that training is second only to ensuring that the 
composition of the team, including its leadership, is correct (SME2, 2016; SME10, 2016).  
This was because without the right team, training may not necessarily be effective. It 
was also argued that a lack of training contributes to the occurrence of process 
deviation.  Individuals were being placed into unfamiliar environments, outside their 
comfort zone, and dealing with the complexity of a situation to which they had limited 
exposure and experience.  As SME 10 (2016, p. 5) noted, frequency of training equals the 
creation of experience.  If a business does not take this aspect seriously, teams miss out 
on gaining pre-crisis experience with the use of the artefacts and with low frequency of 
utilisation, subsequently forget their application when it comes to the real-life 
activation.  
Training within TCCS is currently focused on the development of the team. Conflicting 
views exist as to whether there should be a continuation of equal weighting on the 
delivery of training to the full crisis management team or whether there should there be 
a shift that brings greater focus to the crisis leader. Surugiu and Surugiu (2012, p. 305) 
formed the view that there should be specific training for the crisis manager due to the 
specialist nature of the leadership role as this focus and would enhance overall 
performance. (SME11, 2017).  A move to provide specialised training to the crisis leader, 
to enhance their specific capabilities, would require a mind shift in respect of the nature 
of training content and its manner of delivery. That said, there were views that this shift 
would enable a specific focus to be applied to the elements that contribute to a crisis 
leader allowing process deviation to occur. Therefore, it was important to focus on the 
skills that the crisis leader must apply to minimise this deviation.  This process and its 
value was highlighted and discussed earlier, with the example of the transformation of 
the crisis leader in a southern European market. 
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Irrespective of the direction that the training and simulation take, in development of the 
program there must be a focus maintained on ensuring simulation realism by aligning 
the scenarios to real-life experiences.  To enable this there is an ongoing requirement to 
capture data from crisis response activations and this involves a detailed evaluation of 
what worked and what did not work. From this the development of training and 
simulation scenarios that are based on actual occurrences results.  This removes the 
possibility for a crisis team to argue that the scenario is unrealistic and/or the belief that 
this ‘could not happen here’. The creation of realistic simulations requires all crisis 
teams to embrace the post crisis activation review process. The issue is complicated by 
the fact that generally, once a crisis is resolved, the team members simply want to return 
to their ‘day job’.  This is because “everyone is so busy in the business that once 
something is resolved, there is no real opportunity or really an appetite to get together” 
(SME1, 2017) and conduct the review. Therefore, before the team is allowed to return to 
the norm, it is critical that the organisational learning process be undertaken.  This 
knowledge, in addition to integration into the development of scenarios, can be shared 
with stakeholders to enable prevention of similar cases, or, in the event of a case, 
enables an evaluation of the previous responses in order to evaluate applicability in the 
new case.    
The importance of the routine of learning post a crisis can be traced back to the early 
work of Turner where he noted that “when the immediate effects [of a disaster] have 
subsided, it becomes possible to move toward something like a full cultural 
readjustment . . . of beliefs, norms and precautions, making them compatible with the 
newly gained understanding of the world” (Turner, 1976 p. 382). Despite this 
importance and the fact that a crisis creates a context in which challenges to existing 
thinking and routines may be made, full cultural readjustment is an ideal that is rarely 
achieved (Smith & Elliott, 2007).  There are multiple barriers to learning including 
beliefs that catastrophic events are unique and restricted in both space and time 
together with organisational cultures which may give rise to single loop learning. In this 
case while some learning occurs “it tends to occur within the dominant organizational 
paradigm which may well have given rise to the conditions for the failure in the first 
place” (Smith & Elliott, 2007, p. 532). 
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The learning loop should therefore form part of the ostensive crisis management 
routines, as sensemaking is a central part of returning to normality post the crisis and 
the climate must be created to facilitate effective crisis reviews and learning (Broekema 
et al., 2017).  As with any other part of the routines, deviation at this point must also be 
avoided, or at the very least minimised. There is a value in self-assessment, and effective 
teams embrace this concept as the developmental tool that it is. Ultimately, it enables 
the crisis team to form closure in respect of the issue that they were managing.  
Embracing organisational learning is highly conditional and can be linked to elements 
such as the business culture and climate (Bundy et al., 2016, p. 1678; Margaryan et al., 
2018) and the associated dynamics need to be understood  by the leader and managed.  
It is through self-assessment that capabilities and skills are enhanced, thereby preparing 
a CMT for the management of future crisis scenarios.  This has a linkage to the position 
on enhancement of routines based on the learning process as discussed by Pentland et al 
(2010) and the view that enacted sensemaking can establish the basis for the prevention 
of future crisis as individuals think about and highlight their own actions (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010).  It is also noted that not all resolutions will be successful and failures 
will occur yet these failures “do not need to be catastrophic after all most organisational 
learning is achieved on a trial and error basis” (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014a, p. 344). This 
would also tie into the ways that organizational learning around crisis can be 
constrained due to a range of barriers to learning (Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
Lastly, feedback from the SMEs confirmed the importance of keeping training fresh and 
relevant and looking for ways to further utilise technology in this space (SME21, 2016). 
This goes beyond simply ensuring that simulation scenarios are based on replicating 
true events. In recent years social media has been embedded into training, with live 
engagement that places real time pressure on participants to respond correctly to the 
dynamics created in this space.  As technology solutions continue to evolve, additional 
avenues to training and testing of capabilities must be pursed. For example, Abertay 
University in Scotland recently designed a computer game for Interpol that is focused on 
enhancing and then testing investigator capability in the area of intellectual property 
crime. In fact, as a direct consequence from this research a project is currently underway 
with that university, with the researcher working with third year undergraduates to 
develop a prototype computer game.  This will enable evaluation of this learning 
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technique as a way of enhancing crisis leader and CMT member capabilities and 
performance. It is proposed that this element could become the focus of future research.  
In conclusion, this research confirms the extant literature regarding the importance of 
ongoing crisis training and practice through realistic simulations.  
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to present a discussion of the findings of this research and 
how they link to, and/or differ from, the existing body of literature. The discussion 
merged the theoretical framework and literature review outlined in Section 2 of this 
thesis with the research data.  Building on the derived concepts outlined in the literature 
review, cross referencing was undertaken to evaluate the findings, including those 
derived from the Leximancer output and the supplementary manual coding, in respect of 
that literature. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 presented a range of concepts linked with the 
literature review. The concepts addressed business resilience and risk management 
before moving on to processes and routines.  Lastly, the chapter examined in detail team 
composition and leadership, focusing on the sub-concepts in respect of team 
composition, the role of the team leader, the elements of culture and personality, and 
finally the role of training. In this respect, the discussion supports the development of 
the theory depicted below to explain the deviation.  From here strategies to address the 
process deviation can be created.  
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the research has derived empirical data and 
evidence from the case study research to address the question of how the ostensive and 
performative routines interact in a crisis management situation, and what factors 
contribute to deviations from the routines. By answering this question, a theory was 
developed to explain the deviation. That is:  
“Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The process 
deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response occurs due to human 
dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the members of the crisis team and 
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the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are ineffective crisis leadership and 
weaknesses in the crisis team structure.” 
The next chapter will provide the concluding comments for this research. It will contain 
a summary of the main points of this thesis and articulate how the objectives were 
achieved, the way the findings contribute to the body of knowledge and concludes by 
outlining limitations together with recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 6 – CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
6.1  Summary of the Thesis 
The research stemmed from observed behaviours during crisis responses in a business 
context, whereby the actors within a crisis team deviated from their scripts, these being 
the ostensive routines and associated artefacts.  Such deviations had, on numerous 
occasions, created additional complexities in the crisis response by derailing a team’s 
strategies.  This research set out to address the question of how the ostensive and 
performative routines interact in a crisis management situation and explore the potential 
factors that contribute to deviations from the routines. The thesis addresses a research 
gap in the existing narratives as it directly relates to the lack of specificity in respect to 
crisis management deviation in a business context and leadership. These elements are 
critical areas for business as today, more than ever, businesses need to be prepared to 
respond to crisis in a world in which managing uncertainty is the new norm.  
This thesis commenced by linking together the literature of the interrelated concepts. It 
began with a discussion on the core theme of crisis management with a specific focus on 
teams and the way they respond to a crisis before examining the literature in the sub-
stream of ostensive and performative routines.  Lastly, it delved into the literature as it 
related to the linked concepts in respect of ERM and business resilience.  
Reviewing the existing crisis management theories as they relate to these core themes 
enabled the researcher to validate the appropriate approach for the research journey.  It 
was identified that the development of a conceptual framework combining these three 
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concepts supported the development of the theory to explain process deviation via a 
deep dive analysis of the empirical data collected within the two strands. Adopting an 
acting metaphor, the first strand in broad terms examined the script. In this context, the 
focus was on the ostensive routines and the artefacts that supported these routines. The 
task was to evaluate the artefacts, their relevance, and whether they were the cause of 
the deviation. The second strand, in broad terms, focused on the actors, or those cast to 
act out the script.  The task was to test whether the actors, their level of skill, and their 
leadership were a contributing factor.  Through an understanding of the deviation, 
potential solutions could be designed to mitigate and minimise the potential for 
deviation in the future.  
Through this research the question of how the ostensive and performative routines 
interact in a crisis management situation and the factors that contribute to deviations 
from the routines was addressed. This led to the following theory being developed to 
explain the causes of the process deviation. It has been concluded that:  
“Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The process 
deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response occurs due to human 
dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the members of the crisis team and 
the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are ineffective crisis leadership and 
weaknesses in the crisis team structure.” 
In order to establish this theory, the research adopted a multiple case study approach. It 
cited historical cases such as TCCS’s Belgium crisis of 1999, which not only established 
the importance of a robust crisis management program, but also the source of the 
ostensive routines currently guiding TCCS’s response. Through observation, it evaluated 
crisis teams responding in ‘real-life’ situations and contrasted these with crisis teams 
during simulations.  Lastly, through interviews with SMEs it elicited critical views on 
crisis team performance against the ostensive routines that were articulated in crisis 
plans and the value of the associated artefacts.  These are the tools and checklists that 
support a crisis team.  This multiple observational approach provided the researcher 
with access to a wide spectrum of empirical data.    
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It is noted that TCCS created a compelling research context for several reasons. These 
included the global reach of the company and its bottling partners with operations in 
over two hundred (200) countries; its high brand profile; an employee base of over 
seven hundred thousand (700,000); owning twenty (20) brands each generating a 
billion-dollars; and delivering 1.9 billion servings of their products globally daily (TCCC, 
2018).  As a leader in the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) field the system’s 
product quality and brand reputation is of critical importance. Intentional product 
tampering or threats or accidental product quality issues, have the potential to erode 
consumer trust and damage brand equity.  Within this overall context, the role of a 
major franchise bottling partner, who has been actively engaged in enhancing business 
resilience capabilities is critical.  These multi dynamics ensure that the case study 
context as it relates to TCCS and CCHBC is compelling at multiple levels and was highly 
relevant as a mechanism for investigating the research question. 
The simulation observations were undertaken over a twelve-month period (1 February 
2016 to 31 January 2017). The live cases were observed over a fourteen-month period 
(1 January 2016 to 28 February 2017) and the SME interviews over a seventeen-month 
period (1 February 2016 to 30 June 2017).  This breadth of data collection enabled the 
creation of a rich data set, including: vignettes from the researcher’s observations; 
records from the simulation sessions; and transcripts from the interviews.  These were 
firstly reviewed and evaluated by the researcher during the collection process and then 
subjected to ‘unbiased’ qualitative analysis using the Leximancer software tool.  
Subsequently, building on critical feedback on an earlier iteration of this thesis, manual 
coding was undertaken to validate the Leximancer outputs. This was based on feedback 
that the use of Leximancer alone had the potential to suppress the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data. Through this method triangulation exercise, it was observed 
that while the resulting manual codes were not an exact match to the automated 
findings from Leximancer, there was sufficient commonality in the thematic outputs to 
validate that the manual coding process provided a realistic supportive interpretation of 
the data.  This resulted in a further strengthening of the initial findings. 
Addressing firstly the Leximancer output, by adopting the arguments of Rynes and 
Gephart (2004), the Leximancer software tool played an integral role as it is a computer-
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aided computer textual analysis tool. This allowed for a systematic, comprehensive and 
unbiased analysis of the data sources.  Through the creation of the concept maps the 
research established links between the core themes through the identification and 
validation of interrelated concepts and themes.  These themes aligned to the literature 
review in overarching terms while driving a focus on various sub-elements.  These were 
categorised, and the following areas examined: 
I. Business Resilience 
a. risk management 
b. crisis response 
II. Processes and Routines 
a. role of the artefacts (e.g. tools, plans, checklists) 
b. reasons for process deviation 
III. Crisis Teams and Crisis Leadership 
a. crisis team composition 
b. role of the crisis Leader 
c. the influence of culture and personality  
d. rehearsals and training to support artefact utilisation 
Overall, there was a range of strong, moderate and minor linkages identified among the 
theoretical concepts.  Strong links appeared between the concepts of tools, checklists 
and training, which have an operational alignment to organisational learning.  The links 
were also strong within the concepts of teams and personalities, and role sorts and 
culture, with a more moderate commentary in respect of crisis and risk management.  
What this analysis proved was that the ostensive artefacts played a crucial role in 
enabling a crisis team to perform their duties and formulate the appropriate responses.  
The artefacts were clearly identified as being appropriate and, when correctly utilised, 
contributed to sustainable outcomes.  This therefore shifted the thinking from the 
creation of a theory that would perceive the process deviation as being driven by the 
nature of the routines and the associated artefacts to one that is influenced by human 
dynamics. 
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The data analysis and concept clustering validated that this human factor is the critical 
influencer in respect of process deviation. This stemmed from two elements.  The first 
was the construction of the crisis team itself, so in this respect the choice of actors.   The 
second, and perhaps the more critical, was the performance of the crisis team leader, or 
in an acting metaphor, the director. The director has the critical responsibility of keeping 
the cast on track, following the script, allowing creativity and innovation where relevant, 
but always being there to steer the cast in the right direction in the live performance.   
The data was also subject to detailed triangulation in that supplementary manual coding 
was performed as part of the thematic analysis. This established that while the output of 
the thematic analysis, while not an exact match to the Leximancer material, had strong 
commonalities with the Leximancer results.  It was noted that the 1st order codes 
showed a similar linkage to the importance of both the selection of the crisis leader and 
the composition of the crisis team. This included the role that culture could play in 
respect of team performance together with the perceived value in undertaking 
personality testing.  The 1st order codes also illustrated strong support relating to the 
effectiveness of the ostensive routines and the fact that a positive perception as to their 
value drives utilisation. The artefacts were also seen as being robust and additionally the 
importance of reviewing the lessons post incident and the role of training were strong 
sentiments that rolled up into the overarching aggregated themes.  
The finding in respect of the human dynamic validated the creation of a theory that 
focused on the crisis team and the crisis leader. From here, potential solutions to 
develop both the crisis team and the crisis leader, to effectively minimise process 
deviation, have been identified. 
 
6.2  Achievement of Objectives 
As described at the outset, the objective of the research was straightforward and was 
directed at understanding how the ostensive and performative routines interact in a 
crisis management situation in a business context and the factors that contribute to 
deviations from the routines.  The observed behaviour was the deviation during 
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performance by a crisis team from the ostensive routines applicable to crisis activation.  
While the literature review indicated that there was significant research regarding the 
interrelated themes of business resilience and risk management, processes and routines, 
and crisis management, no research existed that addressed this specific phenomenon 
within a business.  This would in part link to the observations of Bundy et al (2016) in 
respect of the fragmented nature of crisis management research.   
The project was qualitative in nature and was designed to collect empirical data from 
which to understand how ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis 
management situation, what factors contribute to deviations from routines and to 
formulate a theory to explain the process deviation. The secondary objective was, 
through understanding the core contributors to the deviation, to formulate 
recommendations to minimise the deviation, and for areas of future research in this 
area.  Through the comprehensive and systematic review of the literature across the 
interrelated themes, a theoretical framework was developed to guide the research 
thinking. By deep diving into the concepts it was possible to understand the deviation.   
The theoretical framework depicted in figure two illustrated the interaction of the 
various elements existing within an organisation relevant to this study.  It illustrated the 
interconnectivity between the ostensive and performative routines together with the 
business resilience linkages with a focus on risk management and crisis response.  From 
there the examination of how the ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis 
management situation and what factors contribute to deviations from the routines was 
established. The framework depicted the time bound nature of organisational events 
and the influence created by the organisation’s dynamic external and internal 
environment on resilience, risk and crisis management which are influenced by time. In 
the context of this research real time was utilised as a reference point against which 
activities are mapped.  It was from this theoretical framework and the literature review 
that the research derived the critical sub-streams for further evaluation.   
The analysis determined that the appropriate research methodology involved adopting a 
critical realist approach leveraging a multiple case study review that incorporated 
interviewing subject matter experts in the field of crisis management focused on their 
perceptions and experience relating to routines and the deviation from routines during a 
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crisis response. This was coupled with observations by the researcher of real case 
responses and simulations that were integrated into vignettes for analysis. The rationale 
for researching the phenomenon within the context of TCCS was also provided. 
This multi-case study approach enabled the collection of a wealth of qualitative 
information that was extracted from historical research; real time incident simulation 
observations; vignettes from the researcher’s observations of crisis response during the 
period of the research; and from structure interviews with identified subject matter 
experts.  The collected data was then subjected to detailed analysis, firstly by the 
researcher as the data collection process occurred. To remove researcher bias from the 
equation, the use of a computer-aided textual analysis tool then allowed systematic, 
comprehensive and unbiased analysis of the data to occur.  The identified tool was 
Leximancer. Leximancer utilised machine learning to derive concepts to identify 
relationships between the concepts.  This in turn eliminated the human bias that can 
occur through a researcher’s manual coding of the data. This way of analysing data 
provided greater rigour and a robust approach, enabling unbiased answers to the 
research questions.  Building on the automated analysis and adopting a 
recommendation from an earlier review of the thesis manual coding was undertaken 
providing thematic analysis which was aimed at validating the accuracy of the 
Leximancer data.  While it is evident that the resulting codes from the thematic analysis 
were not an exact match to the Leximancer findings, there was sufficient commonality in 
the outputs to validate that this additional coding process provided a realistic 
supportive interpretation to the initial data thereby strengthening the findings.  
This overall methodology and approach to analysing the data was outlined in detail in 
the methodology (Chapter 3). 
The findings from the collected data have been outlined in Chapter 4.  Moving to the 
discussion section of the thesis, this section involved interpreting the findings against 
the theoretical synthesis and constructing a theory.  This entailed interpreting the 
findings through data triangulation utilising the outputs from the Leximancer analysis 
and supplementary manual coding exercise and analysing this through the lens of the 
literature review.  From this, further literature was sought to validate the extant 
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literature against the empirical findings.  This element of the process was explained in 
detail in the discussion which is contained in Chapter 5.  From the analysis of these 
findings and the associated discussion, the research identified the elements that 
influenced the process deviation. From these findings the strategies that could 
potentially be applied to minimise the process deviation were articulated. This 
facilitated a review of the original theoretical framework and challenged the way that 
the findings might influence the overall model, concepts and theories as depicted in the 
theoretical framework.  The next section will delve into the specific contributions to the 
theory and the body of research in respect of crisis management. 
 
6.3  Research Contributions  
6.3.1 Contributions to Theory 
The research has confirmed the critical role and the high level of accountability that is 
placed on the effective performance of a crisis management team within a business 
context.  It has confirmed that core contributors to deviation from the ostensive routines 
during their performance are weakness in crisis management team’s construction and 
cohesion; their level of experience; and the capabilities of the crisis leader. The ostensive 
routines and the associated artefacts used in a business context have been evaluated as 
appropriate and value adding, and it is confirmed that human intervention, 
interpretation and behaviour creates the deviations. Capabilities of the crisis 
management team and the crisis leader can be built through rehearsals, with a central 
requirement being that these simulated rehearsals are realistic and occur on a regular 
basis. Training is therefore paramount in building a team’s capability in the use of the 
artefacts and confidence in their contribution to the crisis response (see section 6.3.4).  
Having a direct relationship to the team cohesion is the trust that is established during 
the performance of ‘live’ situations.  Through experience and crisis exposure, teams 
come to appreciate the value of the ostensive routines and the supporting artefacts. This 
experience enables a team to leverage the process even in instances where the 
coordinator, or crisis leader, is ineffective in their guidance.  A risk arises when teams 
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lack experience and trust, driving ineffective cohesion which, when coupled with poor 
crisis leadership, creates a situation that is conducive to process deviation.  
Therefore, the key contribution from this research into the understanding of how 
ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management situation and what 
factors contribute to deviations from routines is the development of the theory to 
explain the deviation and thereby enable responses to be developed. The finalised 
theory to explain the process deviation is that:  
“Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The process 
deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response occurs due to human 
dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the members of the crisis team and 
the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are ineffective crisis leadership and 
weaknesses in the crisis team structure.” 
6.3.2 Validating ostensive routines and use of artefacts 
The research has validated the role played by the ostensive routines and the importance 
of the minimisation of process deviation during the performative stages.  It has 
examined a stream of data that evaluated the effectiveness of the ostensive routines and 
the associated artefacts and concludes that, in the context of crisis management, the 
ostensive routines that encapsulate the crisis plans, together with the artefacts such as 
tools and checklists, are robust.  It has concluded that the reason for process deviation 
does not rest with the routines and associated artefacts due to either a negative 
perception as to their effectiveness or any evidence of deficiencies in their construction. 
Rather, the deviation results from the human dynamics, be that from the team 
composition or the leadership of the crisis team. 
6.3.3 The composition and skill of the CMT 
Acknowledging the value of the ostensive routines, the research has confirmed that 
deficiencies in a business crisis team’s structure and the capabilities of the crisis leader 
lead to the deviation.  It confirms that the composition of the crisis management team 
and the skills that they possess need to be leveraged in order to minimise process 
deviation.  Within this element, it is noted that further research in relation to the 
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personality traits of crisis team members would be beneficial. This is not necessarily in 
relation to using the results of the data for the specific construction of the team but 
would be of particular relevance to the crisis team leader in order to most effectively 
leverage the team’s capabilities during the crisis response activation.  As a next step, 
there is an opportunity to confirm the criteria for driving the selection of the crisis team 
members and thereby shift from appointments based on both the position/role held and 
seniority. 
6.3.4 The role of leadership in crisis management 
The research has confirmed the importance of effective leadership for the crisis 
management team within a business.  Within this context, it has identified and 
confirmed multiple traits that can be leveraged in the selection of the crisis team leader.  
It also concludes that nomination of a crisis leader on the basis of functional experience 
is inadequate.  There is a necessity for businesses to formalise the process of the 
identification and selection of the crisis team leader. This key position cannot be based 
on position or seniority but rather on experience and exposure to crisis situations.  This 
process should consider the listed attributes together with demonstrated experience in 
the successful management of crisis teams.  It is important to note that ‘successful 
management’ may not necessarily equate to successful resolution, for this may be 
outside the crisis leader’s control.  What is evaluated is the manner in which the crisis 
leader approached the response and the strategies adopted to minimise process 
deviation.  Within this space of crisis leader selection, there is a role to play for 
personality assessments and this should be incorporated into the selection process.  As 
previously noted, a personality assessment should not in itself be the sole determining 
factor, rather, it needs to be leveraged as an additional tool in the selection process.  The 
personality assessment can also be leveraged from the perspective of enabling a crisis 
leader to understand their team and effectively utilise their capabilities. 
6.3.5 Contribution to methodology 
The management of a research investigator’s bias during the undertaking of qualitative 
research remains an ongoing challenge and a conventional shortcoming in this field.  
The utilisation of Leximancer largely offset this shortcoming and further validated the 
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value of the program in qualitative research.  This approach effectively enabled 
researcher bias to be countered through the lexicographic analysis of data based on 
words and synonyms existing within the theoretically defined concepts. This further 
validation of the software’s applicability in qualitative analysis is considered, while small 
in nature, an important contribution for future study in qualitative research.  These 
points aside, feedback on an earlier iteration of this thesis recommended that manual 
coding also be utilised to enable and support method triangulation and enable further 
validation of the findings as produced by Leximancer. 
6.3.6  Contributions to business 
The conclusions of the research have been consolidated and are being applied in the 
refinement of the crisis management system within CCHBC. These refinements are in 
three areas. The first is with the artefacts, for while they were evaluated as robust, it was 
acknowledged that their enhancement by leveraging technology would be beneficial and 
potentially aid a crisis leader in minimising deviation. The second is strengthening the 
process for the selection of members of the crisis team through confirming the required 
skills and attributes. Ostensive routines have been developed in this area and are being 
rolled out in the first half of 2019.  The third is using these findings to examine 
mechanisms to enhance training for both the crisis team and its leader. This has 
commenced with the researcher working with students at Abertay University, Scotland, 
in the development of a computer game prototype as the major project work for the 
2018/2019 third year students. It is anticipated that this program will step change the 
approach to crisis training and enable enhanced evaluations of crisis decision making 
within a business context. 
 
6.4  Limitations 
While the context for focusing TCCS has been discussed and confirmed, the main 
limitation of this research stems from the fact that the focus of the source data is from 
within the FMCG sector. This posed the question as to whether the results would be 
replicated across other industry streams. The choice of a multifaceted case study 
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approach that involved observations and interviews within one sector was guided by 
Yin’s (2009, pp. 47-50) identification of two important rationales; the industry was 
perceived to be typical or representative of a broader environment, and could be studied 
longitudinally. This is the case, as it is understood and accepted that businesses have 
similar ostensive routines in place to manage crisis situations and are exposed to the 
same concerns in respect to deviation. A difference will be driven by the sector and the 
nature of the risks that they are responding to. 
Another limitation existed in respect to the volume of cases that could be observed and 
the number of SMEs that were accessible during the research period. Despite this, it is 
argued that the balance achieved by the multi-case approach of interviewing the range 
of SMEs together with vignette creation mitigates this limitation.  Linked to this element 
was the timeframe, with an expanded observational period potentially enriching the 
empirical data. 
In addition, it can be argued that the initial chosen methodology had limitations. For 
example, while the Leximancer software identified references in the concepts and 
concepts in the references, the researcher played a pivotal role in the analysis and 
interpretation of the data at their disposal.  This analysis and interpretation extended to 
the supplementary manual coding process.  
Within the methodology, the utilisation of MBTI as the personality assessment tool can 
be considered a limitation. This is for a number of reasons, including that it was used in 
its base format, together with the conflicting opinions as to its capability to effectively 
evaluate personality.  That limitation aside, the MBTI assessment provided a sound 
initial construct for future research into the aspect of personality as it relates to the 
creation and operation of crisis teams. 
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6.5  Future Research 
This research validated the applicability of the multiple case study approach for 
qualitative research of this nature and illustrated the richness of data that can be 
sourced. Additional future value would be derived by undertaking further observational 
research of business crisis team and crisis leader dynamics.  A line of inquiry would 
involve creating sample variants of the research subjects.  The first sample pool would 
comprise business crisis teams that are required to adopt the improvements as detailed 
in this thesis. That is, the recommended selection criteria involving personality and 
cultural analysis would be used in the team construction and, more importantly, in the 
selection of the crisis leader. This team would also utilise redesigned artefacts.  The 
second team would maintain the status quo. A comparative analysis would then be 
undertaken between the two subject teams, over a nominated period of time, to validate 
the conclusions that were drawn in this research. 
The research was undertaken within a limited time span. Observations of simulations 
and ‘real-life’ activations took place over a twelve to fourteen-month period. This time 
frame could be expanded to capture additional rich data for vignette creation. The field 
covered by the pool of SMEs could be expanded across different industry sectors, 
incorporating additional cultures and countries to validate the applicability of the 
findings on a broader global scale. Here the sourcing of additional vignettes would also 
be beneficial. 
The lessons learned from a crisis response directly contribute to organisational 
knowledge and learning. A validation of how organisational learning in crisis 
management contributes to the resilience of the business would be appropriate and 
would support the ongoing investment in crisis team development.  Whilst some 
authorities have rebelled against the need for further research in organisational learning 
(Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007), further research into the link between 
organisational learning and strategic flexibility, particularly in respect of business 
resilience, would be beneficial due to the increased uncertainty and volatility of the 
environment in which businesses operate. 
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Additionally, there is the opportunity to deep dive further into the construction of the 
crisis team in a business and the role that personality assessments can play.  This is both 
in respect of the selection of the crisis leader and more generically to understand the 
personality types of the crisis team members. In this space this would include selecting 
and utilising a different personality tool, such as NEO PI to deep dive further into this 
aspect. 
Lastly, future researchers may benefit through exploring the additional analytical 
opportunities available in the lexicographical analysis capabilities of Leximancer. For 
example, further in-depth utilisation of Leximancer’s ‘discovery’ mode may offer 
additional insights in relation to the extracted data. 
 
6.6. Closing Observations 
The complex nature of the global business environment, driven by volatility, ambiguity 
and uncertainty, is such that businesses will continue to face a growing number of crisis 
situations and the way that a company responds to these will influence its viability. This 
means that the ability of a crisis team to effectively respond to a business crisis situation, 
irrespective of its nature, is even more critical than ever before. To address this 
important topic, this thesis set out to understand a specific observed behaviour within 
crisis teams.  This was the deviation from the ostensive routines during the application 
of the performative routines. Within this context it set out to address the question of 
how the ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management situation 
and what factors contribute to deviations from the routines. 
Ostensive routines and the nature of their performance form the foundation of guiding a 
crisis team to an effective response in a crisis situation.  The crisis leader is essentially 
the director of a production and plays a pivotal role in guiding the response.  What has 
been concluded is that the scripts themselves provide a strong foundation and do not 
themselves create the deviation.  This research, having addressed the question of how 
the ostensive and performative routines interact in a crisis management situation and 
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what factors contribute to deviations from the routines, has resulted in the development 
of a specific theory to explain the deviation. It is concluded that this theory is: 
“Ostensive crisis routines and their related artefacts are robust. The process 
deviation from the ostensive routines during a crisis response occurs due to human 
dynamics which incorporate the behaviours of the members of the crisis team and 
the crisis leader. The core causes of deviation are ineffective crisis leadership and 
weaknesses in the crisis team structure.” 
Therefore, as concluded in this thesis, the focus in a business must be on the correct 
casting of the actors (the team composition) and the choice of the director (the crisis 
leader).  Team composition and its leadership can be driven by confirmation of the skills 
and attributes required, together with the role that personality plays, and by building a 
selection model that moves from appointment by role and seniority. Then, through the 
provision of ongoing training together with exposure to real life experience, enhanced 
capabilities can be developed   
By drawing all these elements together, process deviation can be minimised, thereby 
strengthening a response that in turn contributes to an organisation’s resilience.  While 
it will take time, the importance cannot be underplayed, and through dedication by 
those crisis leaders in the field the process deviation from routines can be minimised 
and the resilience of a business strengthened. 
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Appendix A: Full Case Study – 1999 Belgium Crisis  
Introduction 
The value of a well-designed crisis management program is that it brings to a company 
the ability to prepare and respond to any contingency. As Pourkomailian (SME14, 2016) 
notes, when an incident does occur, success results when the business can prevent panic 
and chaos, and stops the incident from becoming a crisis.  The basic doctrine of crisis 
management is that there exists a link to effective planning through establishing 
processes and procedures, preparation and response, including an understanding of the 
problem at hand and the sensitivities of the market, which can influence the response.   
In establishing the context of this research, which examines incident response within 
The Coca-Cola Systems (TCCS) with a focus on deviation between ostensive and 
performative routines, it important to understand the source of the current crisis 
management program. It was created because of TCCS’s ineffective response to the 
Belgium recall of 1999. This case study examines that recall, which was the most 
significant in the history of TCCS. This was a case that illustrated key program 
deficiencies and in effect was the catalyst for reengineering the systems crisis response 
methodology.  
This study illustrates a number of key dynamics that are central to this research and in 
developing an understanding of the dynamics that contribute to process deviation.  
These include: the importance of having the right people in place at the right time; 
ensuring that processes and procedures exist and are understood and followed; the 
provision of training that ensures the CMT is prepared to respond to the crisis; and 
lastly, the importance of understanding and responding within the context of the local 
environment.  This case study examines the event, the market sensitivities leading up to 
the incident occurring, the nature of TCCS’s response, and the lessons that were learnt 
which drove the development of a more effective crisis management model for the 
system.  
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The Incident 
The Coca-Cola Belgium tainting crisis began on June 8, 1999, when reports were 
received that a number of school children at a middle school in Bornem had fallen ill 
after consuming Coca-Cola. "Their main symptoms consisted of abdominal discomfort, 
headache, nausea, malaise, respiratory problems, trembling, and dizziness (SME21, 
2016).”  As John Parker (2013) from Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE) recounts, “the children 
experiencing the symptoms reported that they had drunk Coca-Cola during their break. 
The school made an announcement to see if others were affected.  The news spread 
quickly, first throughout the school, and then, after ambulances came racing to the 
schoolhouse doors, throughout the community”.  While it is a fact that TCCS took initial 
basic actions, complications arose when two days later school children in Bruges 
reported illness after consuming Coca-Cola products.  
This expansion of the impacted area exacerbated the issue, with the resulting publicity 
driving the expected increase in consumer complaints.   On 14 June 1999, the Belgian 
government intervened and took decisive action by directing the withdrawal of all Coca-
Cola products and prohibiting their distribution until further notice (Nemery et al., 
2002, p. 1658).  The directive was driven by a perception within the government that 
TCCS was slow in its response, which had the effect of removing control of the 
management of the crisis from the team.  This was linked to a failure by TCCS to 
articulate the nature of the issue or the cause of the illness (two probable scenarios 
emerged) or satisfy stakeholders as to the safety of their products, and to what was 
perceived by key stakeholders (government and consumers) as a lack of urgency in their 
response. As Nemery et al (2002) contend, the company appeared to have been caught 
by surprise, their explanations appeared confused, and their spokespersons in the media 
and press conferences did not correspond to the brand’s image of youth and energy. 
Moreover, they were very casual in providing data from the chemical analyses of their 
products, which in effect broke the trust of the stakeholders in a market already the 
subject of an earlier food scandal.  On 15 June, the crisis expanded further when the 
governments of Spain and France accused the company of selling tainted products, 
which created a multi-jurisdictional expansion of the issue that further complicated the 
crisis response.   
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The result was that "approximately 17 million-unit cases of Coca-Cola and other soft 
drinks were recalled, and existing stocks were destroyed, at an estimated cost of US$103 
million.” (Johnson & Peppas, 2003; Mitroff, 2002; Parker, 2004) The initial phase of the 
crisis concluded on 23 June, when the authorities allowed the sale of Coca-Cola products 
again, having been satisfied that the alleged causes had been remedied, and that the 
production sites involved had been cleaned up and were operating according to normal 
standards.  What was most concerning in this instance was that TCCS failed to effectively 
protect their brand and ultimately “brands are the most valuable assets in business 
today. They drive demand, motivate staff, secure business partners and reassure 
financial markets” (Nemery et al., 2002, p. 1665).4  
Various aspects of the response failed and, while there were multiple dynamics at play, 
some specific elements stand out. These include: the failure to identify the nature of the 
illness and communicate this effectively; the inability of the team to understand the 
market sensitivities; and the application of a US-centric crisis communication approach 
in a European market, which failed to address cultural nuances.   
The Cause of the Illness 
The failure to understand the illness and to convey a message of product safety to the 
stakeholders was central to the inability of TCCS to exercise control of the situation. This 
was linked to the fact that there were two possible technical explanations for the 
contamination incident. As Philippe Lefant, General Manager of Coca-Cola Belgium, later 
communicated to the media, separate errors occurred at two Coca-Cola plants, one in 
Dunkirk, France, just across the Belgian border, and the other in the northern Belgian 
city of Antwerp (Nemery et al., 2002, p. 1657).  Firstly, initial tests indicated that the 
outside of the beverage containers had been in contact with a fungicide 
(parachlorometacresol) that had been applied to the wooden pallets used to transport 
the product.  The pesticide treatment of the pallets occurred in the Dunkirk operation 
and the consumers who drank from these cans probably fell ill after inhaling the 
substance.  Lefant insisted the pesticide had not leaked into drinks, but had been 
                                                        
4 Ultimately, for TCCC, the valuation and brand trust was restored. In the Brand Finance report for 2012 Coca-Cola 
was ranked at 8th, up from 16th in 2011, and the only FMCG manufacturer in the top ten. 
 
 
 
 
210 
absorbed by an anticorrosive lacquer painted on the bottom of the cans (Haigh, 2012, p. 
1). This resulted in the authorities in France directing TCCS to shut down its plant in 
Dunkirk until the situation could be rectified and confirmation of product safety 
validated.   
A second explanation was that at the other plant in Antwerp, a tainted supply of carbon 
dioxide, the gas that produces the carbonation in soft drinks, probably caused the ‘off’ 
smell as reported by some of the children in Belgium and this may have contributed to 
the children feeling ill (Hays, 1999). While there were two potential explanations for the 
source of the illness, neither was communicated effectively to the stakeholders, leaving 
an information vacuum. 
Ultimately, a third scenario emerged to explain the high illness/complaint ratio across 
multiple locations as experienced in this case. This related to mass sociogenic illness 
being a potential explanation for the majority of the cases (Hays, 1999).  The research 
indicated that something was undoubtedly wrong with the bottled Coca-Cola, and it is 
plausible that the presence of CO2 contaminated by carbonyl sulphide (COS), which 
hydrolyses to form the odorous hydrogen sulphide (H2S), triggered various bodily 
reactions without gravity in the children (Gallay et al., 2002; Taylor, 2000).  However, 
this did not explain the broader expansion of the complaints and the research of Gallay 
et al focused on the aspect of mass sociogenic illness.  Mass sociogenic or psychogenic 
illness, which is sometimes also wrongly labelled mass hysteria, has been defined as ‘‘a 
constellation of symptoms suggestive of an organic illness, but without identifiable 
cause, which occurs among two or more persons who share beliefs related to those 
symptoms’’ (Gallay et al., 2002; Nemery, Fischler, Boogaerts, & Lison, 1999; Nemery et 
al., 2002). The high level of media coverage, the visual impact of seeing ambulances and 
sick children in hospital, and the complexity of the market sensitivity on food safety 
contributed to creating an atmosphere conducive to this scenario.  This explanation, 
however, came out post event through specific research and, while it is likely that it may 
have been a factor in consideration by the CMT at the time, it is a factor that would not 
normally be factored into their response methodology.  Even if this was factual at the 
time, the team had to manage stakeholder perception, and that was that the product was 
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unsafe. To do otherwise was to apportion blame to the consumer, a strategy to be 
avoided. 
The Crisis Response: What Went Wrong? 
What ultimately went wrong with the response? The purpose here is not to extensively 
deep dive, as this case has been subjected to extensive previous research. Rather, this 
case study seeks to analyse the process failures most relevant to the topic of ostensive 
processes and performative deviations.  As Mitroff (2002) noted, “how Coke responded 
to the crisis not only revealed how deeply flawed Coke’s understanding of crisis 
management was, but it also revealed how easily and quickly Coke became trapped into 
solving the wrong problem.”  
While Mitroff noted the company was focused on the wrong problem, there were 
broader issues with TCCS’s response in that they failed to follow the basic concepts of 
crisis management response including well prepared local teams (as illustrated by their 
ineffective response) and effective early warning indicators, as displayed in the inability 
to correctly understand the problem and the manner in which the incident would be 
perceived based on local market sensitivities.  Perpetuating this may have been the 
perspective of the CEO of TCCC Doug Ivester.  Known as a CEO who thrived on ensuring 
he had all the right information, he “had all the data but missed their larger meaning. He 
determined that what had made the schoolchildren sick was that Coca-Cola had been 
made with a bad batch of carbon dioxide. It was a minor problem, hardly a health 
hazard, he judged. By the time he addressed the issue publicly, it was a full-blown crisis” 
(Philen, Kilbourne, McKinley, & Parrish, 1989).  This aspect may also have been reflected 
locally, where the severity of the children’s illness was potentially downplayed, creating 
the apparent lack of empathy and thus the environment for an unstructured and 
inadequate crisis response.  
In relation to the understanding of the problem, TCCS reacted in a way that saw them 
discounting the claims of product contamination.  This lack of acceptance of 
responsibility for the creation of the incident suggested to the public that they did not 
care and were blaming the resultant hysteria on the consumers.  While testing was being 
carried out, no reassurance was provided.  When the results were known it was 
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concluded that the documentation of the findings was very poor, since the sampling 
conditions, analytical procedures and other essential quality control criteria were at no 
point provided for scrutiny. Specific evidence of the CO2 being out of specification was 
also not provided at any time (Mitroff, 2002).  Ultimately, the information that came 
from the company to fill the void was too little and too late. Ultimately it was in the form 
of a press release in which “Coca-Cola admitted some problems with product quality and 
stated that although there was no health risk, the possibility existed that consumption of 
their product could cause headaches, nausea and abdominal cramps" (Morris & Sellers, 
2000).  Certainly not a reassuring message to convey to the stakeholders and just one of 
the many communication failures. 
Building on this was TCCS’s inability to respond correctly within the context of the 
market sensitivities and it seems certain that its management, and in particular its top 
management, did not appreciate and interpret the potential seriousness of the situation 
in the wake of the ongoing dioxin crisis.  A CMT needs to be aware of the prevailing 
market sensitivities as these contextualise the event from the perspective of the 
stakeholders. Market sensitivity relates to the climate that is present in the market at the 
time and which if not understood can impact the successful resolution of the event. This 
includes the Government’s position, since they as a specific stakeholder are influential in 
the successful resolution of any crisis.  The CMT needs to be cognisant of the fact that 
consumers are faced with a wide range of competitively priced food products of 
consistently high quality. Each food item must be safe, aesthetically pleasing, good 
tasting, and consistent with the product image. Variations within the same batch or 
between batches of a product must be kept to a minimum since consumers interpret 
them as an indication of production faults.  A further relevant factor is that the literature 
indicates “that, overall, consumer attitudes towards food safety in general differ 
according to demographic and socio-economic factors such as gender, age, educational 
level and economic status”  (Nemery et al., 2002, p. 1663).  This is an important concept 
in regard to understanding existing market sensitivities. 
This crisis was playing out in a country that had already been plagued by an ongoing 
major food crisis.  A crisis involving dioxin contamination of animal feed that had 
erupted earlier in the year and was gripping Belgian society played a pivotal role in 
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heightening the anxiety of the population, including adolescents, about the quality of 
modern food.  Political dynamics were at play and the Coke crisis emerged at a pivotal 
time in the dioxin case and in the lead up to the national elections. During this period a 
number of key ministers had resigned over the dioxin scandal and “the 13 June election 
toppled the center-left Christian-Democrat/Socialist coalition after 12 years in power 
and brought in the center-right Liberals and the Green Party as the main winners” 
(Nemery et al., 2002, p. 1658).  This was a critical turning point in the crisis and one that 
the CMT should have identified as a key risk and worked to mitigate accordingly.  
Unfortunately, TCCS failed to acknowledge the criticality of this shift in political 
dynamics, and the next day the incoming Government took immediate action on the 
incident involving Coca-Cola. As Nemery (Nemery et al., 2002)correctly states within 
this context, it cannot be due to chance that it was Coca-Cola that became the very 
target—some might say the sacrificial victim or scapegoat of this food scare. 
As an interesting addendum concerning market sensitivity, it was noted that during the 
dioxin crisis 
 “any Belgian poultry or egg was suspected to be contaminated. In contrast, risk 
perceptions were only triggered for the Coca-Cola soft drink brand during the Coca-
Cola crisis in 1999, while other soft drink brands maintained their ‘safe’ image. 
Furthermore, newness, believability and uncertainty heightened the panic value of 
the crises at hand” (Lok & Powell, 2000).   
For the Coca-Cola system, it was their own crisis response that created the focus on their 
brand, and theirs alone, rather than a broader issue that could have impacted any 
beverage manufacturer.  
The problems were of course exacerbated by the company’s public relations response, 
which is described by Taylor (2002, p. 1663) as foot dragging and a poor attempt at 
damage control. She noted that Coca-Cola’s communication strategy was based on 
American cultural norms rather than those of the host nation and failed to meet the 
needs of its international stakeholders.  “When an organization lacks competence in 
understanding the cultural norms of host nations, then unfortunate incidents can 
become enormous crises that damage the relationship between an organization and its 
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publics” (Verbeke, Frewer, Scholderer, & De Braban, 2007). This of course raises the 
question as to where the CMT control lay: locally or within the headquarters in Atlanta.  
Overall communications were fragmented and ineffective rather than structured and 
consistent with a desired stakeholder management objective. Ultimately “the Chairman 
of The Coca-Cola Company published full-page apologies in the newspapers. The new 
bottles and cans of Coca-Cola products received green caps and lids, and all Belgian 
families received a voucher for a free bottle of Coke" (Taylor, 2000).  
The Lessons Learned 
This was indeed a dark hour for TCCS, and the ramifications were wide ranging.  In 
addition to the financial cost of the recall (including destruction of product), TCCS 
experienced a 5% decline in the bottlers’ revenues and a 6% decline in cash operating 
profit. The event resulted in disenfranchised consumers who no longer trusted the 
brand. Ultimately, it was a factor that had a bearing on the CEO’s ability to retain his role.  
Doug Daft, who replaced Doug Ivester as TCCC’s CEO in early 2000, implemented a new 
global strategy, to ensure that while the company was thinking globally it acted locally. 
In an interview with The New York Times, he summed up the Belgian situation and the 
US-centric nature of the response by saying that “maybe there was no one there who 
understood the environment. Or, if we had people who understood the environment, we 
didn’t listen to them” (Taylor, 2000, p. 278).  Ultimately, either position was a failing for 
the system, and Daft went on to initiate a full review of the crisis response program. In 
an interesting contrast as to the perceived effectiveness of the response, the cited 
perspective of Parker (Nemery et al., 2002)  is of note.  He concluded that “because of 
extensive pre-crisis preparation, we handled many aspects of the crisis extremely well.”  
This is certainly an observation that is in contrast to the end result.  The lessons learned 
led to a reshaping of the crisis response program and can be captured under the 
headings of processes and procedures, teams and their development and 
communications.  
Process and Procedures: 
Hays (2000) noted that Parker stated that predetermined and clearly defined 
procedures are core to effective crisis management and argued that this was indeed the 
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case in CCE. While a plan existed, the questions were whether it was the correct one and 
whether it was followed. The lesson arising is that there is a necessity for a well-
designed crisis management plan to firstly exist. This plan should provide the 
framework, checklist and tools that effectively guide the CMT in understanding the 
fundamental issues that they are dealing with and the risks that are emerging, and to 
drive their thinking as to the appropriate ways in which to manage those risks. The 
processes and procedures need to be standardised across the business to ensure that all 
managers working on a CMT speak the same language and understand the same 
concepts. As a subset of this, business continuity plans need to exist and these can 
address various aspects including product recall.  Tools need to exist to guide the 
thinking on the nature of the problem, the market sensitivities, and stakeholder 
management, with the tools being important to enable calm thinking during the stress of 
the crisis response. 
From an enterprise risk management perspective, understanding the areas that could 
create a crisis need to be understood through risk assessment. For FMCG companies, 
quality is a critical concern and Robb (2004) recommends that all firms develop quality 
management plans covering quality control and crisis handling – from recalls to 
communication. He believes that at any point before, during, and after a crisis there is 
always at least one way to do what is right – a way that both complies with regulations 
and is consistent with the brand.   
People:  
Irrespective of how good the processes and procedures are they are reliant on the CMT 
firstly to use the plans and secondly to ensure that deviation from the process is 
minimised.  Therefore, having the right people, representing the right areas of the 
business and at the correct management level, are central to effective crisis 
management.  In the case of a complex system such as that which exists with Coca-Cola, 
it is vital that there is local bottling representation together with members of TCCC as 
the brand owner. This local understanding of the market is crucial and enables the team 
to avoid bringing a US-centric crisis response into a market that may have unique 
sensitivities. So, correct team composition is the start, and in the case of TCCS this is 
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based on a defined number of roles, which are focused on the position versus the skill 
set of the person holding that position.  Once the team is identified and in place, it is 
important to ensure that the team is crisis prepared. This preparedness needs to be 
supported through investment in regular training, including the conduct of realistic 
exercises. Ideally these exercises are conducted in a ‘dawn raid’ style, where no warning 
is given to CMTs beforehand, therefore increasing the pressure and experience. So, 
reinforcing the central theme here is the importance of team structure and taking the 
time to plan and prepare.  
Communications:  
Effective and timely communication is critical to the successful resolution of a crisis. A 
central requirement is to ensure that the company is being transparent and honest.  This 
requires the communication team to ensure that messaging is correct and that an 
information vacuum does not occur. The communication needs to be consistent and 
delivered through one voice to avoid inaccurate or inconsistent information 
dissemination. As Parker acknowledges (2004)  
“we hesitated to say what we knew – there was nothing harmful to health in our 
products – because we feared the public reaction. If you do not talk, somebody will 
talk for you, and having the government, the media, a competitor or anyone other 
than you as the source of information is highly risky.”  
This requires the correct communication response plan to be in place, a situation that – 
while complex in 1999 – is even more complex and important in these days of social 
media. Linked to this is the importance of developing relationships with stakeholders 
before a crisis occurs.  The middle of the crisis should not be first time you engage with 
key stakeholders, as trust has not previously been established. So, it is important to 
build the relationships early and then not to be afraid to ask for help during the course 
of a crisis response.  
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Conclusion 
This was indeed a crisis of immense magnitude for TCCS and one that highlighted 
multiple process and system deficiencies in the manner in which crisis management 
concepts were applied. Ultimately, from this event a new program emerged, one that 
provided the framework and support tools to assist in the successful resolution of crisis 
situations. As noted in the literature review, the plans, tools and frameworks provide the 
ostensive routines that the CMT should follow in order to effectively manage the event.  
There is little doubt that while routines existed at the time, deviation occurred, deviation 
that impacted the ability of the CMT to respond effectively.  It is within the context of 
this new framework against which incidents are now managed that the structure of the 
teams is examined, asking the questions: do we have the right teams in the right place 
and if the tools exist, what influences the deviation from the ostensive routine? 
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Appendix B: CMT Subject Matter Experts Interviewed 
 
The research included conducting ‘one on one’ recorded interviews with subject matter 
experts (SMEs) in the field of crisis management.  The participants came from both 
inside and outside TCCS.  Each SME had significant experience and perspectives gained 
from private or public-sector exposure to crisis management.  The following data details 
background and experience referenced numerically.  The master file with full identities 
is retained by the researcher.  
 
 
Table 11 – Subject matter expert key data 
SME1 Sex Age Range Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 20+ yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
USA USA Security ENFJ 
     
SME2 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 20+ yrs. PhD 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
British United Kingdom Security ESTJ 
     
SME3 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 11-15yrs PhD 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
French Austria Supply Chain ESTJ 
     
SME4 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 30-39 5-10 yrs. Undergraduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Serbian Serbia Security INTJ 
     
SME5 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 40-49 5-10 yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Ukrainian Ukraine Public Affairs ENTJ      
SME6 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 40-49 11-15 yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Thai Thailand Public Affairs INFJ 
     
SME7 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Female 50-59 5-10 yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
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Dutch Netherlands Public Affairs ENTJ 
     
SME8 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 20+ yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Belgium Belgium Legal ESTJ 
     
SME9 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 20+ yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Australian Australia Security ESTJ 
     
SME10 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 20+ yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
British Greece Security ESTJ 
     
SME11 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 50-59 20+ yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Australian Netherlands Risk ESTJ 
     
SME12 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male  50-59 Nov-15 Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Polish Poland Legal Not completed 
     
SME13 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 40-49 5-10 yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Romanian Ukraine Finance Not completed 
     
SME14 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 40-49 15-20 yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Italian Italy Security Not completed 
SME15 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 60+  20+ yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
French France Security Not completed 
     
SME16 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 60+  11-15 yrs. Post Graduate 
     
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Polish Poland Risk ESFJ 
     
SME17 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Female 40-49 20+ yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
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Australian USA Public Affairs ISTJ      
SME18 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Female 50-59 11-15 yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Polish Poland Public Affairs ESTJ      
SME19 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male 40-49 11-15 yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Canadian USA Public Affairs ISFP      
SME20 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Female 50-59 15-20 yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Greek Greece Public Affairs ENFJ      
SME21 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male  50-59 11-15 yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
USA China Risk ENFJ      
SME22 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male  40-49 5-10 yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
USA Nigeria Risk INTP      
SME23 Sex Age Crisis Experience Education  
 
Male  30-39 5-10 yrs. Post Graduate      
 
Nationality Location Function Myers Briggs 
 
Chinese China Risk INFJ      
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Appendix C: Subject Matter Expert Interview Example 
TRANSCRIPT  
INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT SME2 
UNEDITED RAW TRANSCRIPT 
 
Date:   Saturday, 16 July 2016 
Type:   Interview – iPhone recorded 
Consent Form: On File  
GK: This is a research interview with SME2 from the Coca-Cola Company in Uithoorn 
in the Netherlands. Thanks for participating in the research, you know the 
background from our chat and having seen the material.  If I could just go through 
and get some basic details, what is your highest level of education? 
SME That would be a PhD Doctorate.  
GK: How long have you been in the Coke system? 
SME Seven years. 
GK And over that time how many crisis management cases do you think you have 
been involved in? 
SME Wide involvement I would say about 30. 
GK Have you during that time been the actual coordinator on the IMCR? 
SME Yeap, probably I would say about a dozen.  
GK And that was over the seven years? 
SME Yes, about a dozen out of that thirty over the seven years I had a principal role to 
play. 
GK If you had to present a specific function, of the subject matter expertise that you 
brought to the crisis team, is in which field? 
SME In security. 
GK What was your previous work experience? 
SME I spent 32 years as a police officer in London.  
GK Obviously you would have attended crisis situations in that role? 
SME Many of those, yeap. 
GK Can you give me a number? 
SME I would probably say that you are looking at in the hundreds. I certainly did 
twenty-three murder investigations probably around thirty extortion kidnaps 
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and then many other types of crisis. But I was mainly as a detective, so they were 
operational based. 
GK Trainings attended for IMCR – have you attended any of the trainings? I know 
provided a lot. 
SME Yeah, I probably provided fifteen trainings of either one on one through to whole 
groups but have never formally been trained. I sat in, when I first joined the 
system, I sat in the first couple as an observer and watched other SSD colleagues 
and then took it from there. I have never actually undergone a validation.  
GK So total years doing crisis response? 
SME Probably I would say through my police career and into this role, about 20 years.  
GK During your time in the system, what kind of cases have you been involved in? 
SME Quite varied, the ones I tend to be most involved in and have more of a lead 
position have been around contaminations or extortions, I would say I have been 
involved in five extortions, and probably double that, say ten to twelve 
contaminations where we have never actually had a formal demand made of us 
and sometimes the motivation for the contamination is unknown.  
GK As you know in the system we have designed a number of tools, academically we 
are calling them artefacts as you know, that help to guide the response of a crisis 
team. What value do you think that they bring to the table? 
SME From my actual use in the field and particularly from my perspective of doing 
probably thirty validations and trainings, I actually feel that the use of the tool 
gives a very good tried and tested structure to the team of any make up of 
experience. Even the most experienced teams benefit from actually going through 
the tools with the known information and as importantly the unknown 
information. What do we know, what don’t we know and what are our strategies 
to find out and the stronger teams to me are the ones that go back to it as further 
information becomes available, just to check that the decisions that were made at 
an early stage are still valid as more information comes through. The reverse of 
that is that I have seen weaker teams either not apply the tools at all or pay lips 
service to them. They may at the initial onset use the tools and then never revisit 
and that can end up with them going off on a tangent, so for me, the tools that we 
offer and are there, give a structure to a team, whether that team is inexperienced 
or actually very experienced.  
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GK Often it has been observed that when a team forms they actually don’t adhere to 
the routines. Have you observed that and if you have why do you think the 
deviation in the process occurs? 
SME Yes, I have seen that happen many times, people will work through when you do 
a validation they will work through the tools, some teams better than others, in 
real life sometimes the tools are not evident, they are never produced or if they 
are they are not really applied to the thinking and the decision making. 
Personally, I think that that is partly to do with culture.  When I first joined the 
company, I noticed that some teams, particularly experienced teams, had the 
attitude that this is what we do as a management team.  Things go wrong, we put 
them right and we are very good at it and indeed they were. There are other ways 
of solving issues and crisis situations but you need a structure of some sort. Now 
we have labelled our structure within the Coca-Cola system in a certain way, 
there are many other types of crisis management structures, but I still feel 
strongly that a team benefits from having a structure to follow, because it keeps 
the thinking and the decision making honest. So, I kind of think partly its culture 
and personality stroke experience of people on the team. Sometimes they do a 
very good job without intensively going through a system but I think that quite 
honestly, using the system would always add some benefit to a team.  
GK We have a number of tools, problem solving, market sensitivities, etc., if you look 
at their structure would you consider them to be a checklist? 
SME They can be misconstrued as a checklist and I have seen that happen in 
validations where people feel that they have to have an answer for every piece of 
it.  For me the tools will not solve a problem. If I pull my previous detective 
experience it won’t solve the investigation however they are steps and 
instructions, and literally I think tools is a very good word, because you bring 
them out of your tool box as you need and quite honestly I think having them 
there gives you almost a route map to go through, but it is the experiences in that 
room of that group that will resolve an issue and we should use the pieces of the 
tools that help guide our thinking and not try to come up with there has to be an 
answer for every one of these boxes. That was never really the intention of the 
system as a whole. 
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GK Perfectly agree with that one. Obviously, you have seen a lot of teams perform 
well is there a case you can take me through that illustrates a team working well 
and if so, why do you think that they worked well? 
 SME I think one that really stuck with me of the team coming together in a difficult 
time for a number of reasons is [case identifiers removed] So, for a number of 
reasons this was difficult, because people were away. Where I thought it worked 
really well is that the general manager in the [location removed] office and the 
general manager in the [location removed] office led by example. They both 
physically turned up when we went out to collect the product from the street and 
we got a tremendous assistance from staff who were actually on their holidays. 
Over one hundred people gave up their holiday time to come in and assist but 
they were lead from the front and I felt that that sent a very strong message. In 
terms of management we broke the work down into six sections and it helped for 
in the early calls we would meander through the information and get to an 
outcome, over two and a half hours. We delegated work into six operational 
teams, each of those teams gave and update and it became a far more concise 
forty to forty-five-minute call.  That was one of the big strengths that came from 
it. A number of things worked really well, the relationship [case identifiers 
removed] We had a very open relationship with them and we had a very poor 
relationship with the food standards agency, but in this case, we were, we 
managed to convince them that we were a victim and not the cause of the 
problem which our relationship with them in a slightly different position. That 
relationship actually benefited from going through here. So, there was a number 
of things that were put into place during a very difficult and demanding time that 
I think led the way in which other countries teams could respond. 
GK Where a team hasn't performed well why do you think that has happened? 
SME Partly for the reverse of that where they haven't used the tools to give the 
investigation any form of structure. Quite often I have come across it where we 
have very dominant personalities within the IMCR team who don't give due 
credit and air time to others. Or one of the problems also seen is if the issue we 
are dealing with is a common recurring one, we sometimes jump to the solution. 
We have this happen time and time again. We know exactly what causes it, we 
known what to do, let's just do that and get on and back to normal business. I feel 
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that is one of the pits that we fall into when we look at a business solution and 
sometimes totally miss the outside emotion that surrounds the actual issue  and 
we could be trying to trip the wrong thing, for example if we have a report that 
some children are sick following drinking a product that may be less than a 
perfect serve, some mould etc. which sometimes happens with some of the 
products and we know about the mould, we know what causes the mould, we 
know how to cure it, we often forget that the real issue is the emotion around sick 
kids. The potential concern if not fear in our consumers, is it safe for me to drink. 
Also of course it’s our workforce because they are our consumers. So sometimes I 
think we fall into the trap of going to the business solution, particularly in a 
common recurring problem. So, weaker teams, sometimes it is the makeup, there 
is not clear strong leadership, sometimes there is over bearing leadership and 
other people can't actually get their ideas onto the table which are necessary. 
Then sometimes it is generally lack of structure, and again I think that underpins 
why the tools are very useful to help guide us through in various stages.  
GK You mentioned culture earlier, what role do you think culture plays? 
SME When I first joined I think it play a very strong culture not only in the way we 
dealt with an IMCR type situation but also the reporting of an IMCR situation. I 
encountered a belief in certain country teams and tended to be more established 
that this incident isn't something that we need to tell Atlanta about. In 
manufacturing things go wrong from time to time that's why we are here to deal 
with these, we don't have to go and tell people and the reverse side was put to me 
that it we tell people we then have a whole host of extra work to do as people are 
coming in demanding things where they should just let us get on and deal with 
this. We are good at this. So, part of it was the culture around we know what we 
are doing and we can get on and deal with it and I can understand it to a certain 
degree. The problem comes is they are very isolative and if they were to step back 
and think is this an issue that has just happened in this country, could it be 
happening in other countries. When I first joined we had a case I can give of [case 
identifier removed] and it is something that is a recurring issue. I came across it 
in the [location removed] and it hadn’t been reported as an IMCR and I am still 
very new but I had to go to [location removed] and I picked up the fact that they 
had a problem that hadn't been reported and it was a very similar problem. But 
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because it hadn't been reported in the system by either country we hadn't picked 
up the fact that this was. When we actually started to get the reports in was 
affecting [locations removed], none of which had reported back to Atlanta and 
none had been reported around the actual business unit so everything was being 
dealt with in isolation. So, I can understand that sometimes there is a case that 
this really isn't something that needs to be reported, it is an everyday occurrence 
and we deal with it, but I equally can see from the point of view that from a global 
perspective if you keep everything localised you really are blind from a global 
perspective or even a European region perspective.  
GK That is very much focused on business culture, flip it now to national culture. 
Having seen a lot of different countries at play. Does the cultural dynamic in your 
view impact the approach to the response? 
SME I think the country that stands out for me when I first joined for not reporting 
IMCR incidents and not using the process was [location removed]. Having said 
that they were a very experienced team and they dealt very efficiently with 
things. They had this reluctance to put it in. I worked with that team quite a lot 
and I was impressed by the abilities on the team but the case was that ultimately 
no one else was learning from this. You have dealt with this very effectively but if 
the country next door is having the same problem and does not have such an 
experienced team they can't look to you to give that guidance because we don't 
know and the argument I put forward was, if you are not reporting things in and 
up and it comes to knowledge in another way, maybe through media and Atlanta 
come back there is a natural suspicion. What are you hiding? So ultimately if we 
do have something happen and you are dealing with it effectively I think you are 
missing the opportunity as a management team not telling your bosses, this is 
what has happened, this is what we are doing, don't worry you have your best 
team dealing with it. Control the message. I think that certainly in working 
[location removed] that has helped change some of the culture and thinking that 
we should be telling people and we should be telling them just how good we are 
at how we are dealing with things. 
GK Funny you should mention [location removed] as anecdotally heard when I was 
talking to [name removed] last week and when they were running a system up 
there, and if you compare them to the [country removed], and we know that 
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there is quite a dominant leader up there. I would say extremely dominant 
everyone had to put their hand up before they could speak. Go back to last week 
we are running the validation in [country removed], the level of white noise was 
such that I did not, I could not work out how they could understand what was 
going on with the level of what sounds like arguments, but what the [country 
removed] told me, it sounds like we are arguing but we are not, but your ability to 
concentrate and have structure it is questionable and I think that was quite 
evident with the way they were scored last week. I thought they did actually quite 
a good job and with our scoring system it was quite interesting to see the 
deviation in the scores, from having sat there and there in the noise, from the 
people who were inputting, seeing a different level of communication, let's put it 
that way, so the role of coordinator plays is very important. Now I don't know if 
having to put your hand up before you make a comment is quite the best way of 
doing it but people yelling all the time is definitely not a good thing.  
SME My personal experience and I link back to the earlier question about what were 
the positives that I saw in a good case I had actually validated the [location 
removed] team, the joint bottler KO team in November and we had this issue in 
December Christmas time. The early calls were that monkey type with everyone 
talking across each other and things ran on for two and half hours, in the end we 
were getting concise meetings of forty-five minutes because we had actually sub 
divided the work, we had given a lead, we had agendas for the meetings. So 
Gerold, tell us where we are now from yesterday, John tell me on the security 
side, the structure came. The [location removed] became very good at using it. 
They actually felt, and one of the things I took away is I believe that the [location 
removed] team grew into this issue and this incident. At first it was a little bit 
loose, as we got a grip and went forward, I saw the team and certainly the leaders 
of the team, grow in confidence, you know what, we can do this. We are actually 
doing quite a good job and I could actually see them physically grow and they 
went from a team of you know we have been validate and god forbid we get 
caught with one of these to we have a big issue here, it could go horrible but we 
are on top of it and doing a good job. So, they grew in stature all the way through.  
GK Who was the IMCR coordinator for [location removed], do you remember?  I 
know the GM was involved. 
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SME It was you GM who just got promoted, the other GM was [name removed] who is 
gone, the coordinator is the CPAC lady who I can picture her face but cannot think 
of her name. She actually was on holiday and was phoning in. 
GK From your side? 
SME Yeah and the coordinator from your side was a gentleman who left your 
company. 
GK [Name removed]. Working for [Name removed]. 
SME  Yeah went pretty early into the New Year. I would say the dominant coordinator 
was the PAC director from [location removed] whose name escapes me. 
GK  That is alright. One of the things we know in the Coke system is that people end 
up on a crisis team because of the role they have not necessarily their experience. 
What's your thinking on that approach? 
SME  I do feel that because crisis management is one part of a person’s role, you do 
need people who are good at dealing with crisis and to an extent it can be trained 
but otherwise in another way, there are people with certain natural abilities that 
lend themselves to being good crisis management managers. So, it is almost like, 
if people are just around the table because that's the job they got, that doesn't 
necessarily give you the best team. However, if we need people with that 
decision-making level we still need to have them plugged in. What we do need is 
to identify good crisis management people, because when we think about crisis 
management it’s not a rank structure in my view.  There are two ways to look at 
this and one we need a level of expertise in the field of PAC and technical and the 
level of decision making but equally I think we need good crisis management as a 
discipline in its own right. So, I feel that there is benefit in identifying people, 
whatever their role is that are good crisis management to be brought together as 
a crisis management team and have then the experience of subject matter experts 
and others. I have seen it many times in my police career where irrespective of 
your rank the person who has the right abilities makes that decision or takes it 
forward.  We see it particularly in firearms type incidents because people are 
there because they have the right training and the right experience to deal with 
that part of an overall operation and they are brought in to do that. I can see that 
there is the potential to radicalise the way we do IMCR training, and IMCRs in the 
field is to use dedicated people who are experience and have done many of these 
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and have built up a body of experience to actually pull it together. Then in 
amongst that you have if you like the decision makers the PAC leads etc. so you 
either have those technical leads, PAC leads, legal etc. and bring crisis 
management in as subject matter experts or you actually form the team around a 
crisis management team and then you bring the others in and almost as though, 
we are the crisis management team and we need the technical ability etc. to come 
through but we make the recommendations. Now they are then signed off and 
reviewed by the decision-making level. Rather than necessarily have the decision-
making level being the crisis management team.  
GK Just on that point and I don't know if you have seen it, there have been a number 
of cases where the decision maker has injected themselves into the team, for 
want of a better description, and suddenly the ability to think more broadly 
disappears because suddenly everyone thinks the boss is here we need to align 
what he or she is coming up with.  
SME  And that is where I believe we need clear water between the actual IMCR team 
doing the work, pulling it together and making recommendations, and the 
decision maker who they are then going to refer it to who is then going to 
consider it. For as you describe it if you have that person in they are a) too close 
to it - they play a very important role, sit back and not actually involved 
emotionally in this and where these decisions are grown from. So, you bring it to 
me and you state your case and I will be that third set of eyes. And then the other 
reason of course is by bringing someone of rank in it will have an effect on how 
open people will be prepared to be particularly if that person has a defined view 
it is going to be difficult for other, maybe lesser ranked people to challenge that 
because ultimately when we finish this we go back into our day jobs. So, I think 
there needs to be a clear water between the decision maker and the IMCR team. 
GK  If you had to pick a couple of characteristics that you would want to see in a good 
team, what would they be? 
SME It would be experiences of the various component parts. Technical is very 
important to us, PAC is a very important thing because communications is an 
important part of going through internal external, the different types of 
communications, the different types of stakeholders, but also I think a legal, is 
quite often a main player there but I think also people who have the traits of a 
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good problem solver under pressure because a lot of people when the pressure 
comes on they are not used to it, they are not trained to deal with it, and then 
things can go array, the decision making can be off, so actually I actually see some 
benefit in actually investing in a cadre of people who come together whenever, 
when things are tough to deal with IMCRs. Rather than this one has happened in 
your country and you happen to be holding the chair for PAC, or you happen to be 
holding the chair, so you are catapulted forwarded to be on it, irrespective of the 
quality you bring to the team.  
GK If you had to think back to an example of a person who was a really good crisis 
management coordinator within the Coke system, who would that be and why? 
SME One for me that stood out and I am struggling for the name, and he is the 
coordinator in the [location removed]. I am going to go with [location removed], 
but it could be [location removed] I will double check. He is ex-military, he is very 
good, he has clearly had a background in dealing with crisis pressurised 
situations in his former trade or calling, he is a very calm headed person and he 
keeps the detached from the debates and the decision making. So, he works as a 
ringmaster and he brings the people in, subject matter experts, he frames the 
discussion so 'tell us what we know now, what's happened here, what don't we 
know, how can we find out, who’s going to take that forward.' We have clear 
actions that fall out of it so I call him a ring master because of his slight 
detachment but his framework and structure he gives to his team and then allows 
the team to do the thinking through from their expertise. But he keeps them on 
track, he is the sheep dog that keeps the flock going till we get to the final result.  
And I have seen one or two of that ilk around. We have a very good one in 
London, [name removed], very experienced, different background, but he has 
been in the CPAC industry for a long time working for different companies, very 
calm very experienced, can manage a tam very well. So, there are a number of 
people I have come across but they are in the minority when I go and work with 
teams. 
GK Myers Briggs, one of many tools to look at management and personality traits.  
Have you done Myers Briggs? 
SME Yeah, I haven't done it for a couple of years and I would have to actually have to 
dig out my results. I first did it when I went to Atlanta. For me the things that I do 
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recall is influencing and collaboration are two of the strong points that came out 
and certainly when you put it into an IMCR situation, they are absolutely key in 
my view. You have to find a way of making sure that team are collaborating and 
peoples experiences, and we don't have excluded, and they may be the junior and 
I have seen this happen with my own eyes, quite recently during a validation 
ahead of the Euros, where this was the third global special event that this 
particular young lady had been involved in but she found herself on a table 
during a workshop with a number of fairly senior leaders and she was quite 
junior, and she was a female and they were men and they were almost leaning 
across her and excluding her out and I saw her sit back and her shoulders drop 
and you know, no one wanted to hear from her. I actually spoke to her afterwards 
and she said "I had so much to offer but they just didn't give me the opportunity. I 
am a woman and I am junior and they didn't recognise in me that this is the third 
time I have done this". So again, perhaps this takes us back to the cultural piece as 
well as a global company, do junior people, do women, do young people get the 
same level of opportunity and respect in these decision-making type forums.  
GK It is a very valid point. One of the things I go back to goes to the level of 
experience, I remember one of the things I was told when I first joined the crisis 
response mechanism in the company, seventeen years ago, there are two ways 
you can get off the team, die or resign, and there was rationale for that because 
there was longevity and experience of the process so it sort of became automated. 
Now that shifts into my question around checklists because there is a book I have 
just read called 'The Checklist Manifesto' and its and excellent read, and it talks 
about the importance of the checklist versus what we currently have as the tools 
because if I look at most of our plans, they actually don't contain a checklist of key 
activities, would that be a fair point. 
SME Yeap.  
GK So what do you think the value would be in designing a key prompting checklist 
that would guide the crisis coordinator? 
SME Yeah, I think there is value because the nearest that I would say we have to that is 
the question summary the ten or twelve questions, I can't remember exactly 
where there are, they are key questions and basically if we can sit down and we 
can answer each of these then we have the basis of what we need to report up etc. 
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it's still not necessarily the basis of what's going to solve it and the actions have to 
be taken. So, there is almost a checklist there, but with the tools we don't have 
that and the tools as we touched on earlier, some people view the tools that you 
must go and answer ever box whereas each situation is different and for me you 
put your thinking across and say in these circumstances as we know it is this 
relevant. So, what's the business solution, what’s the emotional thing, that is a 
really useful exercise because it maybe that we have got an incident here that's 
happened, and it’s happened in a country where that is particularly sensitive 
because of what's happened. Whereas if it’s in the next country along it would 
have different sensitivity level. So, I think addressing your mind as you go 
through the tools is a good thing, but equally I think that going through a checklist 
and I go back to my homicide time where we actually have, these types of 
checklists we go back and say right have we covered this bit. Not only have we 
covered it but is what we've got valid. The word checklist I think has a difficult 
connotation in people’s minds, they think it’s the case of you just have to go, just 
go over it. The checklist is, have we actually satisfactorily answered this question, 
do we have this. So, the checklist approach can have a very beneficial thing, 
particularly going back and making sure. Because like a murder, these incidents 
we have limited information at the start and we have to make some assumptions. 
Then we start building our actions through those assumptions and we gather 
more information. What we should do and better teams do is then go back to the 
system and say right, knowing what we know now, were those assumptions right, 
are they still valid, do we continue with them, do we change them. And if so let's 
record why because a lot of that decision making is lost.  We are not good at 
keeping records. We spoke about having decision logs, but coming back over now, 
good teams don't have to spend a lot of time doing that and the checklist type 
approach may have a lot of benefit. A younger less experienced team may need to 
spend a little bit more time going through it as it is part of their learning curve as 
well. But definitely, I have come across it and I am sure you have Gerry, in 
validations where people are spending inordinate length of time trying to find 
information to answer a box which has no relevance in this really. Okay, address 
your mind to it, does it apply in this stage, if not let's move on.  It might when we 
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do a summary later, it might be quite an important thing, but at the outset we 
didn't have the information that would suggest that that was in play. 
GK Yes, and I think if we look at the tools, people use that as Gawande the author 
says, he calls them the Read and Do checklist which is the thing that pilots have, 
are the brakes off, whatever, so you read it and you do it, and I think people get 
fixated on what is the problem, is there a solution, and they see that as a check 
box, that they must tick before they move on versus a mechanism to help 
formulate thinking which I have always seen them as. It is a formula to guide, so 
it's a routine and it’s there and it’s to guide you. The checklist is more of a 
confirmation, did we actually do this, so a) has public health risk changed, have 
the dynamics changed, and it's yes or no. If it's yes then it guides your thinking, 
and I think me miss that as a tool and an artefact that we can use.  
SME One of the concerns that I have is that we rarely, even if they start off using the 
tools, we rarely go back to them. Either in a validation or in real life, and in real 
life, they are less likely to start with the tools anyway, the just start with what do 
we know okay, right, let's start running around like headless chickens, rather 
than actually having a structured approach and the better teams actually have 
them up on the wall and look up and say right, okay, in this case is there 
something we are missing. It is there. We are focused on this part of the problem 
but is there actually an emotional reaction going on in the market place, that we 
should be concerning ourselves with over and above this, because ultimately 
didn't someone say there were two sick kids in the hospital, isn't that a concern at 
this time. So, I do think that having something, and the moment we have this and 
if that was taken away and replaced with something, as long as people used it.  It 
is like anything, it’s having a crisis management system, but if you don't take it 
out from the binder and use it when you have a crisis it is not going to assist you 
at all. The other thing I feel is that these things happen that often so practicing it, 
being comfortable with it, sitting down and that's where I think this concept of 
should we select people that have, the natural traits to be good crisis managers, 
and then train them more and keep them at a level, exactly the same as if we are 
saying we are going to set up a firearms team. We don't want to give everyone a 
gun, but certain people have the traits to use it. Now let's pick those people and 
let's keep them highly trained so train fewer people to deal with it. 
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GK Are there any other tools you would put into play. Because if I go back, we haven't 
revisited this as a system since 2000, 2001, so we are fifteen years down the 
track, the worlds changed, any tools that you would think? 
SME I personally think it’s overdue, a fundamental over haul, it has been tinkered with 
and stuff, but I think there is an overarching need to go back. One thing is I don't 
see communication as a tool, communication is a function that runs throughout 
the process and I think we lose something by taking it and trying to box it in its 
own right.  We have to communicate at every stage, there isn't a single method of 
communication, we have to say what is most appropriate and it as to be doubled 
up with who we are communicating to, so your stakeholder identification and 
management and communication run together so I think that it is not helpful to 
make people think oh that is something that I got to go to, where that is 
something that should be thought throughout the process.  I have not really given 
much thought to what other pieces could come in, but I do feel that it is overdue a 
review.  
GK One of the tools that has been raised is potentially somehow bringing a structure 
on risk management into the thinking. So, we make a lot of recommendations and 
one of the key things we should be looking at is what are the risks associated with 
that. So, if we take direction a) where have to obviously understand the risks of 
unintended consequence for that action and the risks for the other part. It has 
been observed that there hasn't been enough discussion around what is the risk 
that is being generated from our strategy so bringing risk management into the 
piece. Going back to 2000 risk management in its current form within ERM was in 
its infancy but some of the people I have spoken to have said that maybe it’s time 
to bring some of that language, so of that thinking around generation of 
opportunity into the discussion as a tool might be beneficial.  
SME I think it is right because I think it would benefit by being formalised as I think 
there is some thought and discussion around risk when we are talking about well 
at this stage should we do nothing, but yeah, what if this happens, so the 
discussion sometimes goes on but it is not formal and they are not actually being 
applied to a tool in its own right, so I think that would be very beneficial because 
it brings it to the forefront of people’s minds. To say, well these are our options, 
but each come with its own set of risks and if you are identifying risks, then you 
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should in my view then take the other side of the coin and say, okay if we are 
going to take that decision, we have identified these risks, what can we do to 
mitigate them and who will own that. So, it’s just that next step, so okay, if we are 
not going to do anything at the moment, when are we going to get to the stage 
where we are going to do something because that could happen at three o'clock 
in the morning and we will all be in bed. So are we going to get up and have 
another meeting, or if we say well it’s at three at the moment, if it goes, and hits 
five, these are the steps that will come in. So, I think to formalise bringing risk 
mitigation into the structure would be a very positive thing because it gets it on 
the table because I think at the moment its sometimes spoken about but it is not 
captured and people don't even realise sometimes that it is risk mitigation that 
they are talking about. I hadn't thought through how that would look in a tool but 
it has to be as its going to be present in everything that we do, it’s just that we are 
not consciously acknowledging it. 
GK Maybe it’s a construct of mapping risk and opportunities, so we say okay if we 
take, this is the problem, we have used the tool and we understand the problem 
and we say this is the risk that can potentially emerge if we do X but on the flip 
side we also have an opportunity here to leverage Y. So, on the opportunity side 
we also have to think about what do we have to implement in order to leverage 
the opportunity. I don't think that formal discussion...sometimes we do it 
intuitively but I don't see that as being the centre piece. 
SME You know the way you described it there, that is exactly how I was taught formal 
risk management at the British Government University. It is actually about risk 
management, preventing the harmful things from happening, and having the 
mitigation plans should it happen, but the other side was to maximise the 
opportunities that doing this project is going to bring, so if we say, we are 
embarking on a project that is going to bring us this benefit, what's in place to 
make sure that this benefit happens. So not that the project becomes the 
outcome, so that was part of it. I have seen it happen but not captured in that type 
of thinking, and I go back to the [location removed] case where we had a really 
bad relationship with the health authority but this occasion, cause normally we 
are the people that has done something wrong that has caused the issue, this time 
we are the innocent victim so we sat in a different light with them. I hadn't 
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appreciated just how bad things were and we were invited along and we were in 
the office with them with their new chairman, and they actually let us work with 
them in the wording of their statement. We didn't want a statement to go out and 
the Police support us, but they wanted to cover themselves, their role, they 
wanted to put something out, but they allowed us to help word smith and when 
we came out, it was only then that I was told that we have never actually been in 
and sat down with them. That is a massive step forward, so what I identified as 
the opportunity of coming out of this negative, was well when this finishes, why 
don't you make sure we keep this relationship going. In fact, the suggestion was 
that they don't really appreciate what we go through when we come with our 
plan to them, so why don't you invite them to come and see a training, a 
validation. Bring the team together, put the scenarios up let's practice it, we want 
to look good, but invite the police and invite the partners. We do it in global 
special events, we invite the organising committee, we invite key people from the 
police, and its warts and all but in this case they would probably be able to say 
hang on you are probably the only company that has ever done this, A - we didn't 
know that you had this system B - we didn't know it was so extensive, so that 
when you come to my building with your file, this is the process that you have 
gone through, I now appreciate it. Certainly, it helped us in the London Olympics 
when we did that with the organising committee because they realised we hadn't 
got just a five-minute process to get to the point where we are coming to them. So 
again, opportunities throw themselves up and we don't really have a mechanism 
to really seize them because what I tend to find happens is it’s over, we go back to 
our day job, we don't properly review, we don't properly tease out the learnings, 
and we don't properly task people to follow up on where the benefits and the 
gains can be made. So, we walk away having gone through the negatives without 
actually gaining those positives that we have discussed. 
GK Fair call. Anything else, any other thoughts? 
SME The other thing that I think we are really bad at and I know organisationally we 
are going to try and get better at this, but, I don't think we do enough by way of 
summarising, going back after the event, and picking through what worked and 
what didn’t and capturing it and putting it into a system and then demanding of 
the system that we want to have this feedback because we have to get everybody 
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doing it, and then the volume of knowledge and learning will grow and we have 
to have regular feedbacks. So, if we are going deal with this situation, then go 
back to our job, then you want us to come back again and summarise and capture 
it into a cohesive document then there has got to be something in it for us, 
because we are all busy people and unless there is a tangible outcome to us why 
would we do it, so I kind of think that it's a discipline that needs to be, if we are 
going through, the tools and the process, I think that there should be a post. It is 
really not well articulated, we need to have something there that says right, this is 
what we do when we are dealing, but when we are finished, what's that 
procedure for stopping, at the moment it’s okay, right see you for the next one 
and we need to have a formalised close out from the point of view of what I call a 
tombstone log which is a full report from the start to the finish of what happened 
so the person who hasn't dealt with this case, can pick it up. Read through and I 
understand what went wrong, I understand what cause it, I understand what you 
did, and I understand what worked and what didn't and why it worked, why it 
didn't work, and all of that learning and it is about putting that type of thing 
together in organisational knowledge and then having that logged with a central 
point who use that information to make a much bigger, and it might have to be 
statistical it might have to be case study, but something that can feedback.  
GK  Interesting cause there is now software, which I am going to use for the 
interviews, that can analyse words and commonalities, so if you take that 
approach, and in CCHBC we have implemented a process that every case must 
have a closure, a lessons learned, before you can actually close it down. For 
elevated incidents, there must be one facilitated by group, for incidents, it’s a self-
assessment, go through the fifteen odd questions, but we are forcing people to 
now do that process. Now whether that is going to be reflected on the company 
system is a different aspect, but we acknowledge what you say that it is important 
about the lessons learned before we all pack up and move to the next case. 
SME No I think that is very good, one thing that if you are going to use software, is that 
we have to do some work around data entry standards, because having worked in 
the intelligence industry in the police on many occasions the problem is we can 
have great intelligences systems and you can put information in but you might 
never find it, if don't put it in the same way. So, you know, if I am looking for 
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British Airways and you are looking for BA, it is not going to read that. So, I think 
that that is one of the key things that we have to have a simple system and we 
have to have some commonality of how we put things in. That could be as simple 
as a template, again we have that type of thing for what has been reported, this is 
what's happened, these are the steps we have taken, this is what we are going to 
do and this is what we are going to report back. It’s an easy way to read through 
and I think that is the piece within the system that if we are going to have a root 
and branch over haul and think that we need to have that formalised in as well. 
GK Alright SME2, excellent. Thanks for participating, if I can think of anything else I 
will let you know. 
 
INTERVIEW COMPLETED  
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Appendix D: Researcher Vignette Sample 
UNEDITED RAW CASE DATA – EXTRACTED FROM CONTEMPORANEOUS NOTES 
 
Vignette Observations 2016: 
During the course of 2016, the business experienced one hundred and thirty-eight 
activations of the crisis teams across the group addressing a variety of issues of varying 
level of complexity.   
 
The vignette in its full version documented in detail eleven (8%) of the activations. This 
section provides an abbreviated version of the vignette. It is designed to provide 
contextual insight into the observations and commentary recorded for five of the cases.  
It is presented with business sensitive and identification data removed.   
 
These were cases in which the researcher provided crisis support which enabled direct 
observation of the team’s utilisation of the artefacts and the performance of the crisis 
leader (co-ordinator). 
 
The comprehensive data set incorporating all eleven cases was utilised for the purpose 
of the researcher’s analysis and for input and analysis by Leximancer. 
 
Case One: January 2016 Health and Safety: Process Observations Only 
 
In this case the process and the artefacts assisted in the resolution of the case.  It could 
be argued that there were some initial process deviations, which came about due to the 
requirement for the team members to initiate an immediate response due to the 
presence of police and media at the scene.  Once the initial spike had been addressed the 
team reverted to the processes and routines and convened and focused on addressing 
the questions at hand.  In this case, we had a very experienced and structured 
coordinator leading the process, so the tools were used; the questions in respect of 
emerging issues were raised.  One of the shortcomings was the decision to not engage 
the Group Coordinator, as he was on leave in a different time zone for the actual 
meeting. So, while an immediate alert occurred, a lack of involvement in the meeting 
resulted in the Group Coordinator not being in a position to answer questions from the 
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Regional Director when he called.  As an overall assessment, the structure of the 
coordinator assisted in guiding the team correctly in their response and evaluation of 
the implications of the case.  The shortcoming was in the space of the investigation itself 
driven by the fact that the investigator/s were too close to the case.  This emotion 
brought a level of bias to the investigation and ultimately the opportunity to delve more 
deeply into the root cause was missed.  This highlighted an important point of third 
party investigation of the case, removing emotion, and thereby ensuring that the crisis 
team was presented with the correct data from which to draw their conclusions.  
Training and experience in complex investigations is critical for enhancing this process 
in the future. 
 
Case Two: February – Quality Non-Conformity: Process Observations Only 
 
This case was managed by the same IMCR coordinator [country removed] as per the 
first case. This coordinator was methodical, logical and structured in his approach to the 
response. The tools were utilised and a checklist approach was followed which ensured 
that key elements were examined at all time. This coordinator had over 10 years’ 
experience in the system, which provided the structured capability to respond.  It was 
again illustrated that the tools played a very valuable role when used and leveraged 
correctly. The importance of a structured agenda was also shown, that is the team were 
familiar with the order in which the proceedings would be conducted and this provided 
for preparation, a structured response, and the ability for the coordinator to effectively 
control the flow of the meeting.   
 
It also highlighted the importance of the coordinator in driving the team dynamics, 
ensuring that tasks were allocated and that activities and actions were completed. The 
other dynamic of this case was the emerging similar issue in [country removed], which 
had the potential to draw the team in a different direction.  The case was given the 
relevant level of focus and attention from a cross-market perspective, and the response 
in [country removed] was somewhat less structured, with the team, as will be shown in 
other cases failing to have the same level of interaction and focus in respect to the 
utilisation of the tools. The observations in relation to [country removed] response 
versus the [country removed] response further brought into focus the aspect of culture 
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and whether some cultures simply are not prone to following established routines, 
rather they drift and deviate from the process.   
 
As a learning and for integration into the checklist it was note that testing conducted by 
local approved laboratories is often faster than the approved laboratories in [country 
removed] and provides equally good information. Being aware of issues in other 
operations through knowledge sharing, [country removed] in this case, helps the team 
focus on other possibilities for the reason of non-conformance. Having traceability and 
withdrawal plans ready before the lab test results arrive, ensures fast and efficient 
replacement of affected products on the market.  
 
Case Three: Quality Non-Conformity: Process Observations Only 
This again was a solid effort by the team in resolving the issue and utilising the artefacts 
to develop conclusions and validate the approaches. The [country removed] team was 
led at the time by a very experienced coordinator and again the tools were effectively 
used to analyse the nature of the incident, the risks, exposures, and core elements that 
had the potential for this case to evolve from a serious consumer complaint to a crisis.  
The complexity is always increased in cases [data removed].   
 
A couple of elements stand out here, the first being the experience of the team with the 
core members having been in place for several years working together on a variety of 
cases. This bonding serves to ensure that there is a level of trust within the team, this 
trust ensuring that the members follow the instructions of the coordinator, by 
respecting the nature of her position. So, the team has trained closely together, worked 
closely in real cases, and this experience has enabled them to be in a position where they 
understand the importance of following the process.  Again, it was evident that the team 
understood the purpose of the tools, the processes and leveraging stakeholders and 
engaging with key members in the Group when there was a benefit in doing so.   The 
approach in summary was structured and disciplined and this was in my view driven by 
a culture dynamic and a level of trust, that came from the experience of the participants 
and the trust that they exhibited for one another. Being proactive in finding contact 
information of the affected customer, managing social media the right way, expressing 
empathy and dealing with the case systematically can prevent its escalation.  
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Case Four: Counterfeit Product – Process Observations Only 
Anti-counterfeit efforts have to be aligned and systematic in order to be effective and 
managed under the umbrella of the crisis management program to ensure conformity in 
approach. Sales personnel in the field should be effectively leveraged to ensure that they 
could proactively identify potential outlets selling counterfeit. Security, Legal and TCCC 
should refresh the counterfeit strategy to clearly state what is the objective of the 
efforts, together with confirming the means and actions needed to achieve the ultimate 
goal of the strategy. This ensures timely activation of the crisis management procedures. 
 
This case was managed in an extremely ad hoc manner, as there was a perception 
amongst the crisis team that this was not really a matter that required their focus, 
rather, it was one that was specialised in nature requiring the ongoing management 
focus of the specialised stream.  This was an interesting direction for the team to take, 
for the reality is that if this topic is incorrectly managed there is the potential for the 
issue to grow rapidly and create significant reputation issues for the business. This 
therefore removed the opportunity for the artefacts to be effectively utilised and 
resulted in both the investigative and business responses being mismatched.  It was 
explained to the team that managing under the crisis management umbrella did not 
mean, nor indicate, that the team did not have the situation under control, rather it 
brought with it the ability to ensure that a sound structure was in place.   
 
As the structure was not in place, this meant that the processes were not followed, and 
therefore no deviation from process occurred, as there was no process.  Later in the 
piece, crisis meetings were held, and these again were ad hoc, driven by the fact that 
there was no clear agenda.  This was reinforced again during the simulation training 
provided in 2016 at which point the team acknowledged the importance of structure. It 
was evident that despite training and experience, there was more a few that reporting 
was a group requirement, yet when it came to the case itself it was okay to avoid the 
following of the full processes.  This should not be the case as the team is relatively 
experienced; yet the deviation from the full activation of the process was evident.  
Training would obviously have a role to play here as the team had not been subject to an 
exercise for three years, hence, awareness of the importance of leveraging the artefacts, 
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checklist and overall ostensive routine may not have been imbedded into the response 
mechanism. 
 
Case Five: Health & Safety – Process Observations Only 
This was a case where the team clearly did not adhere to the processes and deviated 
from the utilisation of the tools. The basics were not followed and my conclusion is that 
this was because the team became focused on the injuries of the victim, rather than 
focusing on the root cause and the breaches that had occurred.  While empathy is of 
course crucial, so is the ability of the crisis team to remain unbiased in their response 
and an approach.  They have to remember the basics and they have to link back to the 
process.  
 
Investigation of high visibility elevated incidents should be carried out by unbiased and 
independent team of personnel knowledgeable in fact gathering, analysis and 
interviewing, aligned with country IMCR team and the Group. The local team showed 
extraordinary empathy and care for the victim despite his negligence and 
decisions/actions that contributed to the situation occurring.  
 
By not following the tools, the team fell into a trap of missing vital information, allowing 
personnel with a vested interest, that is the plant management to conduct the 
investigation, which failed to raise all issues of process failure and negligence as 
important in the first instance.  Decisions were also made outside of the process, in that 
the team did not review the nature of the matter, and make the recommendation 
stemming from the meeting; rather they made the decision as a sub team, which was not 
best practice.  Cultural perhaps was a variable at play in this case as it is observed the 
further south that one moves in the Balkan region that process often gives way to 
intuitive responses.  The team also missed analysing the risks created by their actions.  
This was particularly evident in the area of victim response and the allocation of funds 
and the view that by being so supportive, we could then utilise the victim as a health and 
safety poster boy.  This messaging and approach was contradictory to our zero tolerance 
to safety breaches and was rewarding the victim for creating the environment in which 
this incident was allowed to occur.  A challenge was continually raised – if the off sider 
had received the burns, caused by the other party, what action would we be taking? The 
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answer likely terminate, so why is this then different. The breaches occurred yet no 
disciplinary action was proposed.   
 
The team were reminded to revisit the tools, understand the position of each 
stakeholder, not just the position of the victim, rather than fall into the automatic focus 
that they adopted.  The response in totally lacked structure and illustrated that training 
is central to ensuring practices are implemented.  This team was relatively fragmented, 
new, and had continually postponed training, which resulted in a gap being created.  
Experience and practice – the two basic fundamentals.  
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Appendix E: Crisis Simulations Observed  
 
The research included observing and monitoring ten crisis management teams during 
their crisis management training and simulation exercises during the period of March 
2016 until January 2017.   The observations covered ten Coca-Cola HBC territories and 
the program was undertaken with support from the members of the Central and Eastern 
Europe Business Unit of TCCC.  
Approvals were attained from the Core Team and extended crisis team members. The 
following table details the location and timing of the simulations observed.  A master file 
with the details and identities of the participants together with their authorisations to 
participate in the research are retained by the researcher. 
 
Table 12 – Crisis simulations observed 
Business Unit and Location Date 
Switzerland 
(Zurich) 
31 March 2016 
Nigeria 
(Lagos) 
12 May 2016 
Isle of Ireland Business Unit 
(Belfast) 
2 June 2016 
The Baltics Business Unit 
(Tallinn) 
15 June 2016 
Greece 
(Athens) 
13 July 2016 
Poland 
(Warsaw) 
24 August 2016 
Serbia 
(Belgrade) 
26 October 2016 
Russia 
(Moscow) 
16 November 2016 
Austria 
(Vienna) 
19 January 2017 
Romania  
(Bucharest) 
26 January 2017 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
246 
Appendix F: Example of Simulation Observations 
 
EXAMPLE 1 – MARKET 1 2016 
UNEDITED RAW DATA 
 
IMCR VALIDATION OBSERVATIONS 
Market 1 – 2016: Researcher’s Contemporaneous Notes  
The IMCR coordinator for this simulation was the PAC Director of the country 
operations. This individual was an experienced crisis coordinator having worked on 
multiple cases with various dynamics over a system career in excess of ten years.  As 
part of the core team two other highly experienced crisis team members supported her. 
One from legal and one from risk/strategy, members who have formed the core of the 
crisis team for over a decade.  This was a team with longevity and structure which 
engendered a high degree of trust.  Even with some new comers it was clear from the 
preparation that the team had gone through a series of pre-work activities. 
On the initial input, which was a quality complaint, the approach was to assign the data 
to the quality team for their initial evaluation, rather than to simply jump into exercise 
mode and assume that because an exercise was taking place that this had to be an 
incident.  After evaluation, it was concluded that this information needed to follow the 
protocol and was escalated to the Initial Assessment Team (IAT) where discussion was 
held as to the nature of the material, whether it meet the criteria of an incident and what 
actions would need to be taken.  It was validated that this was an incident and would 
need to be managed under the process. It was noted that the team actually articulated 
their rationale for adopting the course of action that they took. When the team expanded 
to incorporate the broader IMCR components, the coordinator stepped back and took a 
guiding role, oversighting the tasking, the allocation of actions, and importantly ensuring 
that there was follow up.   
In the course of the early stages of the exercise, there was a gravitation to the utilisation 
of the tools that had been placed on the walls and this saw a congregation of participants 
forming around the walls and this created a little white noise simply due to the 
proximity of the participants. 
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Processes and procedures were followed and information receipt and exchange was 
generally effective. However, despite the aide memoir being circulated there was no use 
of the checklist, it was what could be described as an automated process, driven by 
experience, but as was observed when things intensified, a couple of aspects feel by the 
wayside.  This was a point that in the debrief was reinforced with the team.  
In relation to the administrative side and log keeping, at first it was not clear who was 
maintaining the information. In fact, the assigned team member was carrying her laptop 
around so that she could be close to the discussions.  From a log retention point of view 
this created complexities for her due to trying to listen to every aspect, and record every 
aspect rather than, be feed the key data, which would then be stored.  This was also 
observed when the second simulation scenario commenced with this being mirrored by 
the second log keeper. This created a risk of confusion and poor recording. A quick chat 
was had to correct this, to ensure that the administrative team understood, that staying 
in one spot and having the data feed to them made their life easier. The other benefit 
here was that the core team had to focus on articulating the key elements that needed to 
be recorded. The other aspect in this area was while reviewing the logs and assigned 
actions it was clear that the key data was being captured, and there was a logical 
sequence, what was not always evident was the rationale for the decisions that were 
being made.  
In this case, the tools themselves acted again as a magnet. The question for a post review 
was were tools a distraction in the form of wall charts, due to this gravitation to one 
location?  The general consensus was no, and the team believed that the model ensure 
that they stayed in their frame of reference. It was evident that they were assisting in 
guiding thinking, and unlike some instances, this team did not become purely fixated on 
answer the question, but there is a danger here if the coordinator falls into a trap of 
making the tools the focal point is not guiding the overall response of the team. 
On a couple of instances, the team did not remember their investigative logic, the ABC. 
Assume Nothing, Believe No One, Challenge Everything, and fell into making 
assumptions.   This was particularly evident as we progressed into the second scenario, 
which was a fire incident with a health and safety element.  While the team formed in a 
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timely manner and tasks were assigned, a number of assumptions were made, and this 
required clarification to be sort.  Again, with the sub leadership, there tended to be an 
automated approach, no reference to the plan or the checklists, again there was a strong 
reliance on the expertise and experience an example of a team potentially thinking that 
they already knew the answer. So, while automatic and logical in approach, again with 
sound decisions being made, the team did not leverage checklists, but did focus on the 
tools.  On the point of assumptions this was particularly relevant when it came to 
validating the effectiveness of the emergency response.  The attitude was that the teams 
at the plant practice this regularly and therefore it must have occurred correctly on this 
occasion.  The lesson reinforced with the team in the debrief was always to ask the 
question and to not simply assume.   This was evident when they were required to 
provide me with a briefing on the status of the scenarios and the response. They were 
asked some hard questions, to which the assumptions were made, and on occasion 
members became a little defensive.  I reminded them that the checklists may have 
prompted them to focus on additional elements.  However, while these deviations were 
observed, it was ultimately picked up by the coordinator who was performing a 
helicopter view and this enabled the team to be steered back on track. 
In respect of the briefings, these were an area of opportunity, ensuring that they avoid 
being ad-hoc in their approach. The coordinator assigned the briefing to her deputies 
and this was a good capability test for them.  While most points were covered, the 
communications as they relate to a senior management briefing could have been more 
succinct. While the tools were referenced there was the possibility to use them to 
structure the messaging in relation to the ramifications.  This is potentially where the 
10Q summary could have come into play. This would have enabled the team to validate 
the further extensions of the implications of a product recall, which is what is the 
consumer expectation – for example it would be expected that a consumer would want 
to know how they should respond, versus the focus that they had on the regulator.  This 
would have been picked up through a utilisation of the checklist.   
Looking at the exercise in totality the team worked seamlessly together, there was no 
them and us between the two elements of TCCS. Commitment was excellent, 
engagement was of the highest order, and exhibited a team that was comfortable with 
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each other.  It was evident that there was a good degree of trust present and that trust 
stemmed from team longevity.  In discussions after the exercise, it was clear that this 
was stemming from the fact that they were familiar with each other’s skills and 
attributes, and were able to utilise the various skill sets.  Logical and rational decision-
making was present. They needed to ensure that when challenged by leadership that 
they do not see this as a defensive position, and become argumentative. Challenges will 
come and the task at hand is to illustrate that the strategy is sound and as is the logic 
behind it.  As an observation it was there, in the articulation, there is a possibility to 
strengthen.  Again, this was in English, and perhaps in [native language removed] the 
briefing may have differed, but as the GM is [nationality removed] and the company 
language is English, a little refinement here would be an opportunity. 
The crisis plan, which created the ostensive routine was reviewed as part of the 
validation process.  It followed the redesigned format, but as I looked at this plan and 
others I see the continued opportunity to refine and simplify.  The need to draw the 
checklists out becomes clearer with every simulation and event. The preventative risk 
work was also solid and reflected in the document. However, it did contain old TCCC 
methodology and there is a need to pull this out, particularly as the plan custodians in 
the US have not reviewed the format to align the template with the new TCCC enterprise 
risk management approach. 
In the post validation assessment, the team identified the following as having worked 
well. 
• High engagement and focus.  
• Collaboration between the teams ensuring that each sub group received full 
support. 
• Clear role sort for each team member 
• Clear Leadership 
• Effective utilisation of the tools ensuring that the revisited the tools after each 
new development. 
• Clear action plans executed in a timely manner 
• System alignment. The team worked as one and the response was seamless. 
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• Smooth split and transition to two teams when the new cases started. 
• Well maintained logs 
The team identified the following as areas of improvement. 
• Always confirm and double check that procedures are really followed 
• Attention to detail is critical 
• Ensure the right person, contacts the right stakeholders and in the right tone.  
They picked up the case that in one instance they thought the contact with the 
stakeholder was lacking empathy, so another person was assigned to follow up. 
The validation team was generally aligned with the self-assessment of the team.  
The validation team identified the following as positive areas: 
• ABC – the concept was generally followed, although this appeared on the 
improvements list as well, and we were aligned with their finding to always go 
back and check. 
• Team dynamic, just as they identified, they worked as a seamless team, excellent 
team dynamics.  
• Leadership was strong.  Consideration was given to pull out the coordinator due 
to strength, however, we were able to observe that there was depth in the team.  
• Processes were followed and generally the followed the investigative questioning 
effectively. 
• Media statements were strong, empathy was shown to the victims. 
• Root cause analysis and all quality tasks were carried out effectively. 
Areas of improvement from the training team were: 
• ABC, as above, while generally good there were a couple of lapses, just need to go 
back and visit the process. 
• Follow the process. Everyone had an aide memoir but it was not used as 
effectively as it could have been.  Members gravitated to the tools on the wall. 
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Reminded that it is vital to double check things, even the smartest team can 
forget. 
• Avoid being defensive.  When challenged by ‘management’ on rational of 
decisions the team at times would go into defensive mode.  Remember that the 
challenges will come, they needed to be factual and specific. 
• Do not assume things, always challenge, reinforced the old adage, no matter how 
good you plan and respond, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. 
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Appendix G: Myers Briggs Background Data 
(HomePage, 2017) 
This appendix provides a summary of the Myers Briggs personality inventory as 
projected by the Myers Briggs foundation. They note that the objective is to make the 
theory of psychological types as described by C. G. Jung understandable and useful in 
people's lives. The essence of the theory is that much seemingly random variation in the 
behaviour is actually quite orderly and consistent, being due to basic differences in the 
ways individuals prefer to use their perception and judgment "Perception involves all 
the ways of becoming aware of things, people, happenings, or ideas. Judgment involves 
all the ways of coming to conclusions about what has been perceived. If people differ 
systematically in what they perceive and in how they reach conclusions, then it is only 
reasonable for them to differ correspondingly in their interests, reactions, values, 
motivations, and skills." 
In developing the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator the aim of Isabel Briggs Myers, and her 
mother, Katharine Briggs, was to make the insights of type theory accessible to 
individuals and groups. They addressed the two related goals in the developments and 
application of the MBTI instrument.  They are the identification of basic preferences of 
each of the four dichotomies specified or implicit in Jung's theory and the identification 
and description of the sixteen distinctive personality types that result from the 
interactions among the preferences.  These are depicted below: 
 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
254 
Appendix H: Examples of Crisis Management Tools 
Process and Decision Matrix 
 
 
Figure 26 – Crisis Tool: Process and Decision Matrix 
The Process and Decision Matrix is used to illustrate the core crisis processes to be 
undertaken by TCCS.  It starts with the work of the ‘Initial Assessment Team’ (IAT), the 
composition of the ‘Incident Management Team’ (IMT) and ultimately the review of the 
crisis response once the incident is over. This ensures a learning loop is established.  
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Problem Analysis Tool 
 
 
Figure 27 – Crisis Tool: Problem Analysis 
The Problem Analysis Tool is designed to focus a CMT’s thinking in relation to the true 
nature of the problem that they are managing.  Through a structured questioning 
process, it focuses the investigation’s data collection and leads the CMT to a construction 
of the ‘best possible outcome’ and ‘worst case’ scenarios. Responses can be developed 
for either scenario and the potentially a third that sits in between.  That is ‘the most 
likely outcome’. 
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Critical Ten Questions Tool 
 
Figure 28 – Crisis Tool: Critical Ten Questions Checklist 
The Ten Questions Checklist provides the CMT with a mechanism to structure their 
executive reporting. A team that can comprehensively answer these ten questions can 
illustrate to an Executive Leadership team or a Board of Directors both that the nature of 
the issue is clearly understood and that an effective command and control structure 
exists to manage the crisis to its resolution. 
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Appendix I: Leximancer Raw Data 
 
This appendix provides an illustration of, and additional insight into, various elements of 
the data as produced by Leximancer.  It outlines the data created and highlights the 
purpose of the creation of the concept cloud and the concept threads. 
 
 
Figure 29 – Leximancer concept cloud 
The Concept Cloud Explained 
The project results were also presented in the form of a ‘concept cloud’.  The concept 
cloud provided the researcher with an alternative visual. This visual resembles a tag 
cloud on the Internet. Similar to the concept map, the concept cloud is heat mapped in 
that colours integrate and illustrate the intensities of the themes.  As an additional 
variable, the font size of each concept’s label denotes its frequency in the text 
(Leximancer, 2016). 
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Figure 30 – Leximancer concept threads: Personality 
 
Figure 31 – Leximancer concept threads: Risk 
 
Figure 32 – Leximancer concept threads: Tools 
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Explanation of Figures 29 – 32  
These figures are examples of the output and analysis for three of the concept threads 
examined in the research being the themes of ‘personality’, ‘risk’ and ‘tools’.  In the initial 
modelling the concepts are clustered into the high-level themes. Concepts that appear 
together often in the same pieces of text attract one another, and so they tend to settle 
near one another in the map space. The themes aid interpretation by grouping the 
clusters of concepts and portraying them in the coloured circles within the maps.  The 
information and themes were selected with the brightness of the ray indicating the 
strength and co-occurrence between the concepts. A ranked list of the related name and 
word-like concepts is displayed on the right side of the panel  (Leximancer, 2016, pp. 12-
24).   
This modelling was used across the core concepts and themes of the research.  The 
benefits of this detailed examination included the ability to browse locations in the 
documents where the concepts co-occur.  This enabled additional data analysis to be 
undertaken on the themes and for linkages to be reviewed.  
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